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The Study of Maternal Employment in South Korea: 
Cultural and Structural Constraints 
 
Summary 
 
 
This thesis explores factors in the low rates of maternal employment in South Korea 
through a quantitative analysis of a large-scale survey dataset, the Korea Labour and 
Income Panel Study (KLIPS). This thesis elaborates Western debates and theories of 
women’s labour market participation within Korean contexts, develops hypotheses on a 
theoretical basis accommodating both individual factors such as human capital, children 
and spouse factors and structural factors like the workplace and class practices, and 
examines them through descriptive, cross-sectional linear and logistic regression 
analyses.  
 
The thesis finds that mothers’ decisions toward paid work are responsive to children’s 
ages, implying that lifestyle preferences adapt in accordance with the family’s life cycle. 
Also, it is found that precarious employment and a long work-hour culture contribute to 
career interruptions while parental welfare such as child care leave and provision have a 
negative association. The thesis finds social class to be a critical factor linked to 
mothers’ labour force participation. Middle class mothers tend to delay their career by 
trading off time for childrearing, including attending to children’s educational needs, 
whereas lower class mothers tend to return more quickly to work.   
    
A key finding is that whilst married women’s labour market behaviour appears to be 
explained in part by individual factors, such as work experience and the presence of 
children (as neo-classical theorists have argued), this thesis strongly suggests that 
structural factors are key to explaining the low level of maternal employment in Korea 
with a gendered labour market and welfare regime – such as the long work-hour culture 
and low parental welfare – sitting alongside social class as primary explanatory factors.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
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Socioeconomic changes in South Korea (Korea hereafter) in the decades since the 1960s, 
such as industrialization and urbanization, improved standards of living, changes in 
family values and attitudes towards gender roles and the rise in women’s education, 
have contributed to the overall increase of women’s (especially married women’s) 
labour market participation. In particular, there have been demographic changes such as 
the low childbirth rate and the rapidly aging population, so that the economy 
increasingly requires women’s labour market participation, along with the increasing 
importance of female spouse earnings to uphold living standards in an era of surging 
economic and job instabilities. Nonetheless, female economic activity rates in Korea 
have remained below 50 per cent until recently, compared with over 70 per cent in the 
advanced economies such as the Nordic nations, the UK, the Netherlands, Australia and 
the US (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:3). Why do many women in Korea give up paid 
work and stay home? This may well be related to the Korean-specific socio-economic, 
institutional and cultural contexts. 
 
 
1.1  Socioeconomic changes over the past decades 
 
 
1.1.1. Changes in socio-demographical context 
 
First of all, the socio-demographic changes over the last two decades in Korea will be 
considered. According to the national statistics as shown in Table 1.1 (Seok et al., 2009), 
the Korean population (48,750,000 in 2009) is decreasing steadily, along with the low 
childbirth rate, and is aging rapidly (Kim and Lee, 2009:7-9); the childbirth rate of 
growth has decreased to 1.19 per cent in 2008 (1.08 in 2005) from 1.45 per cent in 1998 
(2.57 in 1983), and the population aged over 64 has increased from 5.9 per cent in 1995 
(3.8 in 1980) to 9.3 per cent in 2005. Accordingly, the average number of household 
members has decreased to 2.9 in 2005 from 3.7 in 1990 (Lee and Kang, 2009:141). 
Over the period from 1995 to 2005, among people aged over 14, marriages decreased 
slowly (from 60.7 percent to 59.3 per cent) and divorces rose considerably (1.1 percent 
to 3.0 per cent), while the proportions for widows/widowers remained around 7.4 per 
3 
 
cent to 7.6 per cent (Kim and Lee, 2009: 9-10). Notably, the number of well-educated 
people has increased dramatically; university/college graduates have increased from 
25.0 per cent in 1995 to 38.8 per cent in 2005. As women’s education level has 
increased, women tend to delay the first marriage (increasing the average age from 25.7 
in 1997 to 28.3 in 2008) and the first childbirth (increasing the average age from 26.9 in 
1997 to 29.6 in 2008). In general, middle class women’s economic activity, particularly 
among the well-educated (university graduates upwards) has increased considerably 
since the 1980s whereas lower class women’s economic activity for their livelihood has 
remained stable (Lee and Kang, 2009:159-60).  
 
Table 1.1  Socio-demographic changes in South Korea over the years, 1995, 2000 and 
2005 (percentage) 
% of the population 1995 2000 2005 
Sex Male 50.2 50.2 50.0 
 Female 49.8 49.8 50.0 
 0-14 23.0 21.0 19.1 
Age 15-64 71.1 71.7 71.6 
 Over 64 5.9 7.3 9.3 
Marital status
a
 Never-married/single 30.8. 30.1 30.2 
 Married/with spouse 60.7 60.6 59.3 
 Widowed 7.4 7.4 7.6 
 Divorced 1.1 1.9 3.0 
Education level Primary school 14.4 12.5 11.0 
 Lower secondary school 15.0 12.7 11.0 
 Upper secondary school 45.6 42.7 39.2 
 University/college and upper 25.0 32.1 38.8 
Source: Table I-1, Seok et al. (2009:8). Note: 
a
 statistics for people aged over 14. 
 
1.1.2. Changes in the socioeconomic context  
 
Over the 40 years since the 1960s, there have been dramatic changes in industrial and 
employment structure, reflecting successful economic growth. In the 1960s, when the 
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Korean economy centred on agricultural and fishery industries, industrialization and 
urbanization took place rapidly (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-3). The majority of workers were 
self-employed (mostly male) and non-paid family employees (mostly female) in the 
agricultural and fishing industries. In the industrialization process through the 1960s 
and 1970s, waged employment began to rise while non-paid family workers decreased 
rapidly because of the increasing number of paid female workers (Kim and Kim, 
2004:1-3). Nonetheless, few women continued to work after marriage or after giving 
birth, until the late 1980s. Meanwhile, in the late 1970s, with the slow-down of the 
economy caused by the impact of the international oil crisis, the government-controlled 
economy required adjustment; for instance, privatization and liberalization of the 
banking system (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). 
 
With the economic boom of the late 1980s, Korean firms, particularly small and 
medium-sized firms, suffered from labour shortages, especially in the manufacturing 
sector (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). In order to resolve the labour shortage in the 
manufacturing sector, the government focused on increasing the married women’s 
labour force participation and expanded childcare facilities as well as strengthening 
supervision to ensure workplace practices did not discriminate against married women 
(Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). In effect, the number of married women employed in 
production-related jobs increased sharply, contributing to the increase of the female 
economic activity rate (37.0 per cent in 1963, 39.3 per cent in 1970, 42.8 per cent in 
1980 and 47.0 per cent in 1990) (Kim and Kim, 2004:3, 86). In the 1990s, while the 
manufacturing sector began shrinking and production jobs decreased, neo-liberalism – 
which seeks labour market flexibility and deregulation – accelerated, particularly after 
the 1997 financial crisis, by sharply increasing employee lay-offs and irregular (or non-
standard) employment such as part-time, dispatch, daily (casual) and temporary jobs 
(Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5).  
 
As a result, many women with lower education became irregular employees because of 
the decrease in the number of lower educated women employed as permanent 
employees in the manufacturing sector, while the number of female college/university 
graduates taking on irregular employment increased steadily after the end of the 1990s 
(Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5). Recently, in the 2000s, there have been continued changes in 
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industrial and employment structures (Jang and Bang, 2009:109). Between 2000 and 
2008, as shown in Table 1.2, the number of workers in fishery and agriculture fell 
sharply to about 7 per cent in 2008 from 10.6 per cent in 2000, while that for 
manufacturing reduced from 20 per cent to 17 per cent. However, that for service 
industries increased relatively sharply overall over the same period: specifically, there 
was a notable increase in personal/social/other services from 34 per cent to 43 per cent, 
which contrasted with the decrease in food/lodging services from 27 per cent to 24 per 
cent. Along with the continued expansion of the service sector, irregular employment 
increased continuously to reach 37 per cent in 2004, although it appeared to decrease 
slightly or to become stabilised between 2005 and 2007 (Jang and Bang, 2009: 109-11). 
 
Table 1.2  Changes in the industrial structure in the 2000s (percentage) 
 
Agriculture & 
Fishing 
Manufacturing 
Construction 
/electricity 
/water 
Food/lodging 
service 
Personal/ 
business/ 
social service 
Column-
total 
% 
2000 10.6 20.4 7.8 27.2 34.1 100 
2003 8.8 19.1 8.5 26.4 37.1 100 
2005 7.9 18.6 8.2 25.4 39.8 100 
2008 7.2 17.4 8.1 24.1 43.2 100 
Source: adapted from Table IV-4, Seok et al. (2009:110). 
 
In 1997, the economically active population aged over 14 in Korea was 65.5 per cent.  
However, although it fell sharply after the financial crisis, it has recovered steadily since 
2004, staying at about 62 per cent in 2008 (66.0 per cent for those aged between 15 and 
64); by the international standard definition of the International Labour Organisation 
(ILO), the economically active population includes the employed who are working for 
remuneration and the unemployed who are actively seeking a job and willing to work if 
a job is offered (Jang and Bang, 2009:106-8; ILO, 2010). Over the 20 years since the 
1980s, as shown in Table 1.3, the employment rate for men has stayed above 71 per cent 
while that for women has remained below 50 per cent despite increasing steadily by 
about 5 per cent from 44 per cent in 1988 to 49 per cent in 2008. Accordingly, the 
contribution of female spouse earnings to household income remains small, accounting 
for only 12.7 per cent of the household income in 2008 (Lee and Kang, 2009:140-5).  
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There were notable falls in the employment rate and sharp rises in the unemployment 
rate in 1998 for both sexes, due to the impact of the 1997 financial crisis. Waged 
employment grew from 57 per cent in 1988 (52 per cent in 1983) to nearly 70 per cent 
in 2008, decreasing the proportion of non-waged employment from 43 per cent in 1988 
(48 per cent in 1983) to a third of the total employment (31 per cent) in 2008 (Jang and 
Bang, 2009:108-10). However, the proportion of non-wage workers in Korea remains 
relatively high when compared with the other OECD member countries.  
 
Table 1.3  Employment and unemployment proportions by gender and non-wage 
employment share between 1988 and 2008 (percentage) 
 
Employment rate Unemployment rate Non-wage employment 
proportions of total 
employment  
Male Female Male Female 
1988 70.7 44.2 3.0 1.7 43.0 
1990 71.8 46.2 2.9 1.8 39.5 
1996 74.4 48.1 2.4 1.6 36.7 
1998 69.2 44.4 7.8 5.7 38.3 
2000 70.7 47.0 5.0 3.6 36.8 
2002 72.2 48.4 3.7 2.8 36.0 
2004 72.0 48.3 3.9 3.4 34.0 
2006 71.3 48.8 3.8 2.9 32.8 
2008 70.9 48.7 3.6 2.6 31.3 
Source: derived from Table IV-1,2,3, pp108-9, Jang and Bang, 2009. Note: the statistics are for the 
population aged over 14. 
   
According to a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report on GDI 
(gender-related development index), the gender difference for Korea is high, as the 
country was ranked 98
th
 for this in 2009 among the UN member nations (193 in 2013; 
see UN, 2013). The GEM (Gender empowerment measure) has remained low (0.554 in 
2009, 61st among the UN nations): this is measured by such factors as the percentage of 
female members of parliament (14 per cent), female managers in the upper occupational 
class (9 per cent), female professional/skilled workers (40 per cent), and women’s 
average income level to men’s (52 per cent) (Lee et al., 2009:279). Likewise, there is a 
distinctive gender difference in employment: in 2008, 60 per cent of male workers were 
permanent whereas 62 per cent of female workers were temporary/daily. Of females in 
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non-wage employment, 42 per cent were non-paid family workers whereas for males it 
was only 5 per cent (Jang and Bang, 2009:109-11). The proportion of women in 
permanent and employed/self-employed jobs remains low, at less than 30 per cent (Kim 
and Kim, 2004:4).  
 
It is important to note that the 1997 financial crisis and the consequent labour market 
restructuring in the early 2000s affected the whole of society; massive unemployment 
among professional manager jobs had an impact on the middle class. Instabilities in jobs, 
especially those taken by men, increased due to continuous labour market restructuring, 
so women’s employment became more important for securing income sources (Lee and 
Kang, 2009:140-4). The income inequality between households has become higher 
since the 1997 financial crisis, compared with the relatively low income gap in 1995. 
This is due to the differentiated increase in the rate of earnings which are the major 
source of the household income, accounting for 68.5 per cent in 2009 (Lee and Kang, 
2009:140-4). The increasing household income gap is partly explained by the increasing 
gap of female spouse earnings between the well-educated and the less-educated (Lee 
and Kang, 2009:144-5); as the earnings gap has widened between the well-educated and 
the less-educated women, it has contributed to the income gap between households (Lee 
and Kang, 2009:159-160).  
 
In parallel with increased income inequality between families, the middle class appears 
to have stopped expanding since then and has reduced steadily in the mid 2000s; 
according to the national statistics of Koreans’ perception of their class (taking into 
account such factors as the household head’s earnings, occupation and assets), statistics 
for the upper class in 2006 (1.5 per cent) has not changed much, compared with 2003. 
However, that for the middle class (53.4 per cent) has reduced by 2.8 per cent while 
increasing by a similar amount for the lower class (45.2 per cent) (Lee et al., 2009:278). 
Moreover, the 1997 financial crisis affected the education expenditure differently by 
income class: the middle income class spent consistently on child education over the 
period between the late 1990s and the early 2000s, whereas the lowest income class 
reduced expenditure for that period, which strongly suggest that the impact of the 
financial crisis was greater on lower income families (Lee and Kang, 2009:146).  
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1.1.3. Changes in the legislations for supporting women employment 
 
In the late 1980s, the economy suffered a labour shortage and there were also active 
labour movements and women’s movements along with the gradual political 
democratization. Accordingly, as growing attention has been paid to women’s labour 
force participation, especially by married women, the Korean government incorporated 
women’s issues such as childcare and gender discrimination into the national economic 
development policy and established the Equal Employment Act 1988 and the Infant 
Care Act in 1991 (Kim and Kim, 2004:3-5; Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:3-5). 
Subsequently, the government established the Women’s Development Act in 1995 and 
the Gender Equality Act (or Gender Discrimination Prevention and Relief Act) in 1998. 
In the 2000s, maternity rights and childcare schemes were enhanced dramatically, by 
improving the legislation and increasing the revenue for childcare services. Public 
support for childcare expense (2002) was extended to cover up to 70 per cent of lower 
income families and the revenue for childcare services increased in 2008 to about 6 
times what it was in 2003 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:4-5; KDI, 2008:72-3).  
 
More recently, the Korean government introduced work-life balance schemes (that is, 
childcare leave, paternity leave and flexible work arrangements) into the Gender 
Equality Act in 2008 to encourage businesses to support working mothers (Grubb et al., 
2007:57; KDI, 2008:71; Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:3-5). In addition, Korean childcare 
policy has extended the scope from the existing childcare service for pre-schoolers to 
after-school care services for school age children, as an OECD report (2007) 
emphasises (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:19-20); and legislation for after-school care 
services was enacted in 2004 through the re-adjustment of the Infant Welfare Act and 
was further enhanced by introducing day-long childcare programmes (open up to 8 pm) 
in 2009 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:38-9, 41-2). Despite these recent improvements in 
the legislation, the childcare policy has been criticised for focusing on support for lower 
income families based on a means-tested scheme, and for not being extended to middle 
class working parents (Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010: 4-5). The majority of infants aged 
between 0 and 5 are excluded from public childcare support (only 29.5 per cent benefit 
from childcare expense support). Moreover, the proportion of primary school children in 
after-school care programmes is very low, remaining at 0.8 per cent of total primary 
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students in 2006, 1.2 per cent in 2007, and 1.4 per cent in 2008 (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 
2010:27-9, 38-9, 41-2). Furthermore, the legal enforcement of the work-life balance 
scheme remains in doubt because it is not obligatory for businesses, but instead is left to 
their discretion (KDI, 2008:71). 
 
 
1.2  Maternal employment 
 
 
Despite the steady increase in Korean women’s economic activity rates, however, 
women’s participation in the labour market is still considerably interrupted by marriage 
and childbirth, which are often seen as critical events in life (Kim and Kim, 2004:20; 
Kim, 2003:67-101). There is a worldwide phenomenon that sees parenting, and 
particularly the presence of preschoolers, as having a negative effect on women’s 
careers, as Gornick and Meyers (2003) have pointed out (Hong, Kim and Lee, 2010:20).  
 
Figure 1.1  Women’s economic activity rate by age group in 2005 
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Source: ILO (2005), LABORSTA Internet (E), Yearly Statistics. http://laborsta.ilo.org.  
Note: For the UK, the age cohort grouping is different from the other countries: 76 per cent for the age 
group 25 to 34, and 78.7 per cent for the age group 35 to 49. However, in order to show the trends, the 
statistics for the age groups of 25-29 are repeated in the age cohort of 30-34.   
 
However, the bimodal pattern of women’s participation in most developed countries has 
become flatter since the 1980s, whilst Korea has a clearer M-shaped participation, as 
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shown in Figure 1.1. The figure shows that the trends towards non-working for women 
in their early 30s, who are more likely to be starting a family, is more pronounced in 
Korea compared with France, Germany, the Netherlands and UK. In this regard, 
Hwang’s study (2003:26-36) observes that the influence of having young children is 
crucial, that is, the preschooler effect, as Gornick and Meyers call it (2003). Hwang 
(2003) analyses Korean women’s work patterns in accordance with the stages of family 
life, in 5 stages, as shown in Table 1.4. The employment rate of married women in the 
first stage (the period from marriage until childbirth) is 45 per cent; however, that of 
married women in the second stage (the period from the first child’s birth till the last 
child reaches 2 year old) drops sharply to 25 per cent. In the third stage (the period 
when the last child is aged between 3 and 12), the employment rate of married women 
increases sharply again. It is also notable that married women’s unemployment rate is 
highest in the third stage, rising sharply to 2.7 per cent from 0.2 per cent in the second 
stage. This suggests strongly that married women, particularly mothers, want to return 
to the labour market, but have difficulty re-entering it.  
 
Table 1.4  Married women’s economic activity by the stages in family life in Korea, 
2001 (percentage) 
 
Stages in family life 
Total 
1
st
 2
nd
 3
rd
 4
th
 5
th
 
Employment  45.1 25.7 48.3 45.4 9.7 41.4 
Unemployment 1.3 0.2 2.7 1.3 1.5 1.6 
Spouses’ employment 91.6 95.4 92.3 69.6 29.5 79.6 
Source: Table 2-10, Hwang (2003:33). Note: Hwang (2003) identified 5 stages of family life using the fourth 
wave of the Korea Labor and Income Panel Study, Korea Labor Institute.   
 
In addition, attention needs to be paid to the different life courses of the genders, in that 
an interrupted career is typical for women rather than for men (Hakim, 2004). Kim and 
Kim (2004:39) found that the different working life patterns of men and women are 
more pronounced in Korea, indicating that the impact of child care responsibilities is 
greater on women. This is clearly shown in the statistics for the second stage of family 
life in Table 1.4 above: married women’s employment was about 26 per cent whereas 
male spouse’s employment reached 95 per cent. In short, it is suggested that the 
presence of young children is the most influential factor on the labour force 
11 
 
participation of Korean mothers, rather than fathers, and subsequently affect the 
mothers’ chances of re-entering the labour market as their children get older. This 
implies that it may not be just about motherhood but that other factors are involved, to 
the point that maternal employment is not necessarily affected greatly by motherhood 
itself, as shown in many other societies; for instance, the Nordic nations. Then, what 
other factors are involved behind Korean motherhood? This leads to the research 
question: What accounts for the low level of maternal employment in Korea?  
 
Contextual understanding of motherhood appears to be essential for exploring the 
research question, which requires the adoption of more structuralist perspectives in this 
thesis. Therefore, in the light of structural perspectives, this thesis pays particular 
attention to Korean-specific cultural and structural contexts. The rationale for this 
decision is supported by the broader literature focusing on geographical regions outside 
Korea which often links maternal employment with socially and culturally-constructed 
gender role attitudes or motherhood (Crompton and Harris, 1999a; Duncan and Irwin, 
2004; Treas and Widmer, 2000). Treas and Widmer (2000:1410) have pointed out that 
gender role attitudes respond to the structural and cultural contexts produced by 
distinctive historical experiences, such as religious heritage and service sector 
development. Treas and Widmer (2000:1416) argue that ‘normative beliefs reflect both 
a general dimension of structural and cultural factors facilitating female labor force 
participation and a life course dimension specific to maternal employment’.  
 
In considering Korea, it is strongly suggested that gender role attitudes and motherhood 
are likely to be responsive to Korea’s culture-specific heritage, ‘Confucian familism’ 
(Whitley 1992; Won and Pascall 2004), which is reflected in the policy logic of the 
Korean welfare regime putting greater emphasis on women’s responsibilities for 
childcare; despite the recent improvements in the legislation toward supporting working 
parents, there is a gender difference in the take-up of childcare-related leave; childcare 
leave is predominantly taken by women; moreover, men are reluctant to take this up, 
due to the gendered workplace culture (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-9; Hong, Kim and 
Lee, 2010:44-45). In addition to the cultural heritage, maternal employment can also be 
understood in the structural context of the labour market. The existing literature has 
carefully documented Korean women’s low labour market position, particularly the 
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concentration of married women in low-paid non-standard/irregular employment 
(Grubb et al., 2007:22). It has been claimed that perhaps the sex segregation regime 
during the industrialization process is responsible, ‘putting women in subservient 
positions under the expectation that they will leave employment upon marriage’ 
(Whitley, 1992:218-238). Furthermore, Treas and Widmer (2000:1429) argue that in 
countries where part-time work is not readily available, a substantial number of women 
choose between full-time work and staying at home: ‘Women have the choice of 
working full-time or not at all – an objective condition of employment that surely 
influences respondents' evaluation of alternatives.’ In this context, the low incidence of 
part-time employment in Korea (around 10 per cent) is likely to be reflected in Korean 
mothers’ evaluation of their alternatives. The low availability of reduced hours (part-
time) work is closely related to the long work-hours culture in Korea. In the literature, 
long work-hours are pointed out as a barrier to mothers’ take-up of employment due to 
its creating extreme tensions between the demands of employers and the demands of 
their children (Kim and Kim, 2004:17; Won and Pascall, 2004:282). An EU study 
reports that numbers of working parents aged between 30 and 44 suffer from work-
family conflict and these are found to be greater in nations with a long work-hour 
culture (Han, Hong and Jung, 2009:42). Furthermore, parents in permanent/full-time 
jobs complain about the lack of work-hour flexibility whereas self-employed/non-paid 
family workers and, notably, irregular (temporary and daily) workers complain about 
long work-hours (Hong, Kim, and Lee, 2010:21).  
 
More importantly, previous studies of the UK have found that mothering is 
differentiated by class: for instance, middle class women prefer or value one-to-one care 
of children more than lower class women do (Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391, 397; 
Vincent et al., 2008:13-4). Won and Pascall (2004:274-5) also indicated that class 
inequality is implied in the experiences of Korean motherhood. Class differences in 
motherhood could be reinforced, directing mothers’ choices as dichotomous – either to 
participate in the labour market or stay at home – and linked to the policy logic of the 
welfare regime in Korea with greater dependence on family care and very limited public 
childcare support. Therefore, Korean mothers’ decisions about whether to take up paid 
work are likely to be constrained by a culturally-specific construction of motherhood, 
the labour market and welfare regimes as well as class status.  
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The literature reviewed here leads to the research hypotheses that aim to answer the 
research question. There are five hypotheses accommodating both the micro-level and 
the macro-level to be explored in this thesis: the first is whether individual factors like 
education, work commitment and work experiences are significantly associated with 
mothers’ labour market participation. The second is whether situational factors like 
dependent children and spouse’s job are significantly associated with mothers’ labour 
market participation. The third is whether Korean culturally-specific workplace 
practices, such as discrimination and long work-hours, are significantly associated with 
Korean mothers’ labour market participation. The fourth is whether gendered welfare 
regime factor, such as the low level of parental welfare provisions, is significantly 
associated with mothers’ labour market participation. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis 
considers whether class-differentiated mothering is significantly associated with 
mothers’ labour market participation. The main concern of all the hypotheses is to 
explore whether they are statistically significant and which factors best explain Korean 
mother’s labour market behaviour. The explanatory value of these hypotheses will be 
examined throughout the chapters that follow. 
 
 
1.3  Outline of the Thesis 
 
 
Chapter 2 reviews the debates and theories of women’s labour force participation in 
both the Western and Korean literature, and focuses particularly on understanding the 
relevance of these debates within the Korean context. This chapter provides a 
structuralist critique of neoclassical explanations, while pointing out that both 
neoclassical and social structural explanations in the Korea literature recognise that 
gender role attitude plays a part in Korean society. This chapter attempts to identify both 
individual and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context, which are very likely to 
constrain Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour. It focuses on the cultural legacy of 
gender norms, the policy logic of the labour market and welfare regime, and the 
workplace culture, paying particular attention to how the different classes experience or 
organise their mothering role as a potential factor.  
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Chapter 3 explains the methodological approach chosen in this thesis: a quantitative 
approach, the analysis of large-scale survey data, was chosen. I describe how the 
surveys were selected, the study sample, the data analysis techniques, and how I arrived 
at the thesis hypotheses to answer the research question despite the data limitations. 
Using a Korean national panel survey of urban areas, the Korea Labor and Income 
Panel Study (KLIPS), this chapter defines the employed as including job seekers and 
non-employed, in accordance with the international standard definition of economic 
activity. It also provides the concepts of work attitudes, work commitment, gender and 
discrimination, with the caveat that this thesis is not appropriate to address work 
attitudes due to the unavailability of attitude data in KLIPS. In addition, it attempts to 
draw the hypotheses at both the micro-level and the macro-level, under the assumption 
that both individual factors and structural factors are associated with maternal 
employment in Korea. Finally, Chapter 3 explains the research framework of this thesis: 
quantitative employment research without a gender bias, using the secondary data, 
KLIPS.  
 
Chapter 4 examines to what extent individual (human capital) and situational factors, 
explain Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour (whether they are employed or not), 
which permits an enquiry into the arguments of human capital theory, mainly through 
the one way-ANOVA analysis and logistic and linear regression analyses. Firstly, 
through the one way-ANOVA analysis I explore whether there is any difference in work 
commitment by gender and if motherhood is associated with work commitment. It is 
found that there is no gender difference in work commitment and motherhood itself is 
not linked to work commitment. Secondly, the chapter examines how education and the 
children’s age cohorts are associated with the mothers’ labour market participation, 
through using a series of logistic regression and linear regression analyses across the 
selected years to study, including the situational factors such as spouse’s job-related 
factors. Human capital, such as work commitment and education, are found to be not 
necessarily important for Korean mothers’ take-up of paid work, although work 
experience is very significant. In addition, interruptions to mothers’ careers are 
associated with less education and household income rather than linked to their work 
commitment. 
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Chapter 5 examines whether culturally-specific workplace practices and self-reported 
experiences of discrimination are associated with mothers’ labour market participation, 
by the use of logistic and linear regression analyses on the probability of being 
employed or not, along with comparisons between the genders through a multiple-
response analysis. Discrimination experience is positively associated with employment 
interruptions. Furthermore, it is observed that parental welfare benefits and work hours 
are closely related to Korean mothers’ employment interruptions. Parental welfare has a 
positive link to mothers continuing to work, while the long work-hours have a negative 
association with it. As might be expected, lower status jobs such as irregular and low-
paid employment are negatively associated with mothers’ continuous careers. The 
overall statistical analysis results suggest that Korean mothers’ alternatives are likely to 
be restricted by their lower labour market status and culturally-specific workplace 
practices, particularly the long work-hour culture.   
 
Chapter 6 addresses class-differentiated mothering and labour market participation, and 
examines further whether there is any difference between the classes in child education 
expenditure, mainly through frequency analyses and logistic regression models. Gender 
inequalities were found as well as class divisions in labour market participation. That is, 
middle class mothers were more likely to stay at home compared to lower class women, 
whereas middle class men were more likely to be employed than lower class men. It 
was also observed that there were class differences in expenditure on children’s 
education and belief in social mobility. The greater the proportionate amount spent on 
children’s education, and the greater the belief in social mobility, the more likely 
mothers were to stay at home and look after the children. Overall, the analysis of 
Korean mothers’ class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts the 
expectation that middle class women with better human capital have greater 
expectations about combining motherhood with substantial employment opportunities.   
 
Lastly, Chapter 7 summarises the findings of the previous chapters as well as 
acknowledging the limitations of this research. Along with providing a discussion about 
how neoclassical and structuralist arguments are supported by the analysis results, I 
conclude the research by suggesting the implications of the findings from a policy 
perspective and making recommendations for future research. 
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Chapter 2  
Debates and theories of women’s labour 
force participation and discussions in 
the Korean context 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17 
 
Chapter 2 sets out to review the debates and theories of women’s labour force 
participation in the Western literature, and in particular to understand the relevance of 
these debates within the Korean context. The chapter also provides quite a broad range 
of discussions which are essential for this research, for a contextual understanding of 
what Korean mothers face in reality, based on the structuralist critique of neoclassical 
explanations in the Korean literature. 
 
The Western debates are largely divided into either individualist or structuralist 
explanations, which tend to predict different trends in women’s labour force 
participation: the individualist perspective is marked by neoclassical arguments based 
on human capital theory and self-selection theory and, relatively recently, by Hakim’s 
preference theory (2000, 2002). The neoclassical theories claim that women’s labour 
force participation is directed by women’s self-selection through rational decision-
making and based on human capital specified by their gender role, and the preference 
theory argues that individual preference is a major predictor of female labour market 
behaviour. On the other hand, the structuralist perspective of, for instance, welfarists 
and feminists, tends to discuss gendered welfare regimes and labour market 
discrimination and predicts that women’s labour force participation has been and still is  
constrained by the legacy of a gendered regime. Furthermore, class theorists argue, 
along with rejecting the ‘individualisation’ thesis, that class-differentiated constraints 
and opportunities available are closely associated with mothers’ attitude toward market 
work. Nonetheless, most sociologists, whether individualist or social-structuralist, 
recognize that both individual and structural factors correlate with women’s labour force 
participation, although the two positions emphasise different influential or primary 
factors (Woodfield, 2007:32-45).  
 
In the Korean debates, supply-side explanations based on neoclassical economic 
theories, especially the human capital theory, are the mainstream of labour market 
research. Most economists and labour market researchers emphasize supply-side factors 
such as human capital, often referred to as work commitment, education and work 
experience. On the other hand, some policy researchers stress demand-side and social 
structural factors, and feminist sociologists in particular tend to relate these to Korean 
gender patterns along with the recognition of culturally-specific gender-role attitudes. 
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There is also class-based research as an important structuralist approach, which mainly 
addresses class mobility and gender differences in the occupational hierarchy. However, 
there is no analysis of class-specific attitudes towards childcare, and no specific 
attention has been paid to a possible link between Korean mothers’ labour market 
behaviour and class. The Korean literature indicates that gender assumptions defining 
women as the main child-carer and child education manager, culturally-specific 
workplace practices and a lack of welfare provision are the main barriers to women’s 
employment in Korea (Jang and Bu, 2003:1-5; Shin, 2001:102-104; Kim and Kim, 
2004:7-26). Yet there are no synthesized discussions incorporating both individual and 
structural factors under the assumption that individual labour market behaviour suffers 
cultural and structural constraints. Therefore, this chapter attempts to identify both 
individual and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context, focusing on the cultural 
legacy of gender norms, the policy logic of the labour market and welfare regime, and 
the workplace culture, paying particular attention to how the different classes 
experience or organise their mothering role as a potential factor.  
 
 
2.1  The Western debates and theories of married women’s 
labour force participation and structuralist criques of the 
neoclassical arguments 
 
 
Much attention has been paid in Western literature to the gender division of labour, with 
ongoing disputes about the cause of occupational or labour market gender segregation 
largely between feminist sociologists and neoclassical theorists; that is to say, whether it 
results from discriminatory practices in organisations which assign inferior ‘dead-end’ 
jobs to women, or is the result of economic agents’ rational decisions in the recognition 
of different gender-role specialisation (Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:1). The 
structuralists criticise the neoclassical approach for having a lack of contextual 
understanding, whereas individualists or neoclassical economists criticise the social 
structuralist approach for over-emphasizing social structural factors in their attempts to 
understand people’s attitudes and behaviour. Nonetheless, the structuralist approach 
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appears to have more explanatory value with regards to gender role segregation in a 
gendered society of the cultural legacy, where ‘the still-extensive, extra-individual 
factors’ (Woodfield, 2007:32-4) cannot be ignored. Previously, Kanter’s thesis (1977) 
indicated a significant influence of social structures on workers’ work attitudes and 
behaviour patterns (Reskin and Padavic, 2002:64-78; Kanter, 1977:260-264), and 
recently, the importance of organizational contexts and personnel practices that ‘link 
workers’ sex with the jobs they hold and the places they work’ (Reskin and Bielby, 
2005:71) has been increasingly recognized.   
 
2.1.1  Neoclassical, individualist arguments and the structuralist critiques  
 
Neoclassical theorists explain women’s labour market disadvantages by using the 
human capital theory or rational choice theory of economics; sex wage differentials are 
attributed to sex difference in human capital, defined by Mincer (1970) as ‘earnings 
capacity units’ (Polacheck, 1981:60-61). Furthermore, they argue that labour market 
discrimination can be solved by market functions; that is, firms with fewer 
discriminatory practices can maximize their profits. These arguments began with Becker, 
who initially linked traditional economics with sociology (Hakim, 2004). 
 
Becker’s thesis is the fullest development to date of human capital theory and 
models formulated originally by Mincer (1962) and extended by others seeking to 
explain the characteristics of female labour force participation with reference to the 
family division of labour. (Hakim, 2004:13) 
 
It is argued that human capial theory and rational choice theory (also called, rational 
action theory or exchange theory) in economics can be applied to the social institutions, 
i.e. the family, to explain ‘non-economic aspects of the family, including the sexual 
division of labour in households, decisions about investments in children, and decisions 
about marriage and divorce’ (Hakim, 2004:11).  
 
Becker (1981, 1985) believed the gender division of labour arose from the different 
allocations of time and investment in human capital between married men and women, 
along with increasing returns from specialized human capital. According to Becker 
(1985:S58), married women economize on the effort expended for market work by 
seeking less demanding jobs due to more effort being required during the same period 
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for childcare and housework, and because the remunerative rewards for women are 
lower than those for men. Therefore, in short, the responsibility of married women for 
childcare and housework, and concomitant individual decision-making about paid work, 
account for the gender difference in earnings and occupations. Polacheck (1981) 
developed further the argument that the duration of time in and out of the labour force 
affects women’s occupational choices and their intermittent labour force participation 
explains occupational segregation. Through the comparison, by sex and occupation, of 
the time spent on caring for the home, Polacheck (1981) found from the research of 
women in the United States that ‘sex differences in labour force commitment alone 
account for much of the difference in professional and menial employment’: 
 
If women were to have a full-time commitment to the labour force (zero home-
time), the number of women in professional and managerial professions would 
increase respectively by 35% and more than double, and also women in menial 
occupations would decrease by a fourth… (1981:68) 
 
He (1981) insists that occupational segregation arises as women choose jobs with low 
penalties for intermittent employment over their working lives, the reason why married 
women are concentrated in low-paid jobs and resulting in an earnings gap between the 
sexes. Even in the absence of discrimination by employers, occupational gender 
segregation takes place through the self-selection of the labour force (Polacheck, 1981).  
 
These neoclassical, supply-side arguments have been subject to a considerable amount 
of criticism. Demand-side sociologists reject neoclassical arguments by arguing that 
women’s lower wages are caused by market discrimination and this decreases women’s 
incentives to invest, thereby reducing women’s labour force participation, and thus 
corporate discrimination is the main factor in occupational segregation. Earlier 
Bergmann’s occupational segregation theory (1974:294) explained occupational 
segregation through the crowding hypothesis, which assumes that racial labour market 
discrimination in the United States was responsible for concentrating African-
Americans into certain occupations. The literature following Bergmann’s occupational 
segregation thesis suggests that discrimination against women does take this form. 
England (2005:268) criticises the supply-side explanation while taking a position 
against the earlier more sociological view of gender role socialization. While being 
aware that supply side and demand side factors like recruiting/placement discrimination 
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reinforce each other, she refutes economists’ assumptions that women are in mother-
friendly jobs that best fit their childbearing responsibilities by arguing (from the 
evidence of the United States) that ‘there is little evidence of women’s jobs having more 
mother-friendly characteristics and also non-mothers were as concentrated in female 
jobs as mothers’ (England, 2005:277).  
 
Even Hakim (2000:31), who agrees in general with neoclassical theorists, is critical of 
economists’ assumptions that parenthood alone produces role-segregation in the 
household, and points out that role-segregation takes place within marriage or 
cohabitation (for instance, childless couples also adopt role-segregation), adding that 
efficiency gains from role specialization may result in married women’s preference for 
role segregation over egalitarian roles within the family, where roles are still 
considerably unequal in many modern societies. Hakim sees the human capital theory as 
useful for the analysis of female employment, particularly in explaining that the 
earnings gap between men and women is largely due to the difference in work 
experience and employment-related investment between the sexes. Nevertheless, she 
(2004:13) points out that the human capital theory has become somewhat discredited, 
especially by some sociologists who reject Polacheck’s thesis (1979) explaining 
women’s behaviour with reference to their family role because they see this as ‘sexist or 
related to the discredited Parsonian functionalism’ (Hakim, 2004:13). 
 
Most importantly, the way neo-classical theorists address women’s work commitment 
and sex-role attitudes is criticized in the statistical sense. Bielby and Bielby (1984:234-
235) point out that from their data they infer inadequately operationalised work 
commitment. That is, they infer subjective work orientation from the (intermittent) 
patterns of labour force participation, where commitment was not at all operationalised 
and they also infer opinions about sex roles simply from employment patterns: ‘Sex role 
attitudes represent an individual’s judgment of appropriate roles for men and women in 
general, and tell us little about a woman’s intentions, aspirations, and expectations for 
paid employment as part of her own constellation of work and family roles’ (Bielby and 
Bielby, 1984:234-235). Bielby and Bielby (1984:234-235) argue from the American 
longitudinal data that intermittent employment is not a consequence of unstable work 
commitment, but a consequence of adjusting their labour market behaviour to 
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accommodate the demands of bringing up children. 
 
More recently notable individualist explanations have emerged regarding married 
women’s work attitude; for instance, British sociologists, Hakim’s preference theory 
(2000, 2002) and Joshi’s opportunity costs of caring (1992). The preference theory is 
about women’s heterogeneous life style and having different work commitments and 
work plans from men. Hakim (2000, 2002) argues that working women include at least 
two qualitatively different groups defined by their work commitment and work plans 
based on a proxy indicator: full-time or part-time, the first having a work commitment 
and long-term work plans similar to those of men, while the second group has little or 
no commitment to paid work and a clear preference for a homemaker role. Hakim’s 
placing responsibility on women for little or no work commitment for their lack of paid 
employment is disputable:  
 
Policy measures to facilitate women’s return to work after childbearing (such as 
childcare services) could result in increasing the labour force participation of 
secondary workers with little or no work commitment and an insignificant 
investment in paid employment. (Hakim, 2002:440-442)  
 
More specifically, Hakim (2002:440), through an analysis of British longitudinal 
statistics of 1999, argues that there is a long-term impact of attitudes, values and 
aspirations on labour market behaviour and outcomes and that there are three distinctive 
female lifestyles, according to their preferences: a home-centered, work-centered, or 
adaptive lifestyle (Table 2.1). Hakim finds that among these three female lifestyles, 
adaptors are the dominant group. Around 14 per cent of women are home-centered and 
their main priorities throughout life are family life and children and they prefer not to 
work. The majority of women (about 70 per cent) belong to the adaptive lifestyle group, 
which includes women who want to combine work and family, plus drifters and 
unplanned carers. Lastly, the remaining 16 per cent of women are work-centered. 
Childless women are concentrated here and their main priority in life is employment or 
activities in the public arena (Hakim, 2000:6). It is argued that these different lifestyle 
preferences are a major determinant of fertility, employment patterns, and work choices. 
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Table 2.1  Hakim’s three female lifestyle preference groups 
 Home-centered Adaptive Work-centered 
% employed 
     Full-time 
     Part-time 
 
40 
16 
 
35 
37 
 
63 
15 
% not in employment 44 28 22 
% married/cohabiting 71 80 45 
Average number of dependent children 
    Aged 0 to 16 at home 
 
1.28 
 
1.02 
 
0.61 
% left full-time education 
    by age 16 
    17 to 21 years 
    Age 22+ 
 
55 
33 
12 
 
56 
32 
12 
 
42 
40 
19 
Base = 100% N=171 N=870 N=194 
National distribution of the three groups 14% 70% 16% 
Source: Table 5, p442, Hakim, 2002. Note: the sample consists of women aged 20 to 59 and the fertility 
indicator (the average number of dependent children) is shown for women aged 20 to 55 years. 
 
In short, women have different work commitments and work plans from men and thus 
women prefer and are quite satisfied with secondary or peripheral jobs (low-skilled, 
low-paid, part-time, casual and temporary jobs) by valuing convenience factors over the 
higher pay and security of skilled and permanent full-time jobs (Hakim, 2002:453-455; 
2004:15-16). Although it is agreed that this theory recognizes the heterogeneity of 
individuals and examines the impact of the presence of children on the participation of 
women of prime age (their choices between paid work and family varies by the presence 
of children), it has been subject to a huge critique due to its lack of sociocontextual 
understandings and the aptness of the statistical tests.   
 
Indeed, Hakim’s work is open to criticism. Her finding that the majority of women are 
adaptive is not surprising, because surveys concerning work commitment were biased in 
disregarding the reality that family care responsibilities mainly fall upon women’s 
shoulders, not men’s. Rather than simply comparing work commitment by gender 
without taking into account child responsibilities as a factor, it may be more useful to 
examine whether the presence of children affects work commitment in one or both 
genders. With regard to the emergence of a large group of adaptive women working 
part-time, particularly in the countries with the largest proportion of working women, 
Hartmann’s argument (1981a) appears to explain more than the preference theory. 
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Hartmann (1981a) argues that this is because working part-time fulfils the patriarchal 
requirement that a substantial amount of women’s work is necessarily in the home, 
doing housework and taking care of children:  
 
Men may perceive that part-time wage labour by their wives is useful in 
contributing to the family’s financial support without interfering very much with 
the provision of household services to them. (1981a:391-392) 
  
Her argument also explains the considerable size of the non-working women’s group: 
‘Given women’s restricted access to decent jobs and wages, however, women also 
maintain their interests in men’s continued contribution to family support’ (Hartmann, 
1981a:391). In particular, the preference theory can be criticized for neglecting 
institutional and cultural factors (socio-contextual factors) in the statistical tests. 
Crompton and Harris (1999:105-127), using qualitative data from over 150 work-life 
biographies of women in two occupations - medicine and banking - in five countries 
(Western Europe), demonstrated how both choice and constraints play their part, and 
also showed how women’s intentions and actions change and vary over time and with 
particular circumstances. Their study suggests strongly that any explanation based on 
individual choice or preferences must be supplemented by an account of the structural 
factors (occupational circumstances) shaping these choices. Also, McRae (2003:334) 
criticizes the aptness of the preference theory through an analysis of a British 
longitudinal data (from 1993 to 1999) showing little evidence that preferences 
distinguish the minority from the majority, although she agrees that employment careers 
are centrally important for only a minority of women. McRae (2003:334) stresses that a 
complete explanation of women’s labour market choices after childbirth depends as 
much on how they understand the constraints as on their ability to overcome them, 
which is patterned by social structure/class.  
 
Along with the lack of a full description of these structural constraints in general, from 
my viewpoint, Hakim ignores the simple reality that people are more likely to work 
either for financial reasons or in order to maintain their living standards. The reality 
overrides the preferences. In this regard, Bradley (2007:94) claims that in Britain ‘most 
people believe that two salaries are necessary to achieve a decent or desirable standard 
of living for a family’. Also, Hakim failed in predicting the rapid change in women’s 
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work aspirations over recent decades and the popularity of dual-salary couples (when 
both women and their husbands or male partners work fulltime). In the recent years, it 
seems that female employees’ work ambitions become less important, as Shaw and 
Shapiro (1987:12) pointed out from U.S. longitudinal data of 1968 to 1980: ‘Young 
women in their late teens and early twenties today appear to have much stronger work 
expectations than women in the past’. Similarly, Johnson (2001:340) found, from a 
longitudinal anlaysis using U.S. panel survey of high school seniors carried out since 
1976, that gender differences in job values narrow in the transition stage from student to 
adult worker, and that for both males and females, job values change in response to the 
attainment of valued rewards rather than in response to their family roles. Johnson 
(2001:338) argues that certain circumstances, such as social constraints, can override 
personal preferences, which are highly likely to be adapted to the socially structured 
experiences during the course of an individual’s life.  
 
Last but not least, Hakim argues that lifestyle preferences (sex-role ideology) cut across 
educational levels and across all social classes (Hakim, 2002:440), along with an 
explanation of the function of education in the marriage market, which contradicts the 
human capital theory. According to the human capital theory, women make less effort or 
invest less time and money in developing their human or social capital (i.e., education) 
than men, and thus full-time homemakers are assumed to be less educated or are women 
with few qualifications or work experience. Hakim (2000:97) found that women 
graduates differ little in career or sex-role attitudes from non-graduate women in a 
comparison between attitudes in the 1960s and those in the 1990s, despite a massive 
expansion in higher education in Britain in the 1990s and a wider group of women now 
being university graduates. Based on this, Hakim (2000:94) rejects the economists’ 
assumption by emphasizing that ‘graduate women, or women of high ability, do not 
automatically prefer a career over family life,’ and that polarized sex-role attitudes 
(family life or career) are also apparent among highly educated women just as in other 
groups of women.  
 
Hakim (2000:159-163) suggests that education has a function not in the labour market 
but in the marriage market, arguing that higher education does not change women’s 
preferences for paid work over marriage (in effect, does not lead to an egalitarian model 
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of family roles), but that women use it as a means of upward social mobility through the 
marriage market rather than through the labour market (Hakim, 2000:203, calls it the 
‘educational homogamy of spouses’). However, she does not consider the possibility 
that the most highly educated women might return to the labour market more quickly 
than less educated women, after child-rearing. In that case, higher qualifications do have 
a considerable impact on the employment market in the sense that higher qualifications 
appear to help them either return to work or find a new job more easily in a situation 
where mothers are likely to be penalised for taking maternity leave. Furthermore, there 
is no empirical evidence that ‘highly educated women bring their qualifications as “an 
intellectual dowry” to a marriage’ (Hakim, 2000:150-160). Even if this were true, men 
may prefer women with higher qualifications, not simply as an intellectual dowry, but to 
secure a potential place in an increasingly competitive labour market as insurance 
against their own unemployment, and this may also be another indication of their 
socioeconomic position (living standards) having fallen. It may well be sensible to say 
that highly educated women use their qualifications to secure both their marriage and 
career, while not giving priority to marriage over career. 
 
Unlike Hakim’s preference theory which has raised a vigorous debate as to whether the 
persistence of the gender division of labour should (or should not) be regarded as a 
reflection of women’s own preferences, Joshi’s concept of the opportunity costs of 
caring (1992) provides an alternative economic perspective to explain married women’s 
attitudes to marketplace work. This concept compares a course of action with the best 
possible alternative, and opportunity costs are the value of what has to be given up in 
order to achieve a particular goal (Joshi, 1992:110). In the light of Joshi’s concept of the 
opportunity cost of caring, the rise in cash opportunity cost in post-industrialized 
economies could affect women’s lifestyle choices more than ever before. Dex (2003:10) 
has noted that the opportunity cost of caring for children is increasing because mothers 
have much higher potential earnings than in the past owing to the rise in women’s 
education levels; that is, the opportunity cost of caring is higher as women’s educational 
levels rise. This suggests that as the opportunity cost of caring goes up, women are more 
likely to prefer paid work to staying at home to care for their children:  
 
Opportunity cost is the amount that you could be earning, or the amount you forgo 
in the alternative best activity. If other opportunities would pay more per hour, the 
27 
 
opportunity cost of an hour goes up. If you have to forgo more lucrative 
opportunities to care for your own children, then it becomes relatively less 
attractive. If you have no alternative earning options, the opportunity cost would be 
zero. Any changes in these relative prices/costs will affect (some) people’s 
decisions at the margin. (Dex, 2003:10; footnote 1) 
 
By estimating the opportunity cost of caring using British cross-sectional data, Women 
and Employment Survey of 1980, Joshi (1992:124) attempted to contribute to 
understanding the change in people’s attitude to women’s care for children and unpaid 
domestic work (which has often been devalued and disregarded). Joshi estimated 
women’s foregone earnings as a result of giving up employment, using the concept of 
opportunity cost, suggesting mothers may speculate about what might be the gross cash 
loss if they give up work or reduce their hours of work, especially before making 
decisions about how to allocate their time between paid work and other activities. Joshi 
(1992:112) found evidence in a statistical analysis that women with dependent children 
tend to have interrupted work patterns and also reduce their hours of work in subsequent 
employment, rather than withdraw completely from the labour force. Based on this 
evidence, Joshi shows the difference in lifetime participation between hypothetical 
groups of women with and without children (Table 2.2). 
 
Table 2.2  Average lifetime workforce participation according to number of children 
Number of births Age at giving birth 
Reduced years 
of full-time 
employment 
Extra years 
part-time 
Net effect on time 
in paid work 
(years) 
1 25 
- 7.16 + 2.83 - 4.32 
2 25,28 
- 9.05 + 2.80 - 6.25 
3 25, 27, 29 
- 10.44 + 3.10 - 7.34 
4 25,27,31 
- 11.44 + 2.80 - 8.24 
5 25, 27, 29, 31 
- 11.77 + 2.99 - 8.79 
Source: adapted from Joshi (1992:115), ‘The cost of caring', in Glendinning and Millar (eds), Women and 
poverty in Britain: the 1990s. 
 
According to Table 2.2, as the number of children increases, women’s full-time work 
decreases (incrementally from seven years for one child to twelve years for four). In 
contrast, women’s choice of part-time work appears to remain stable regardless of how 
many children they have. However, it seems clear that the overall time allocated to paid 
work decreases as the number of children increases. From Joshi’s observation of the 
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effect of various patterns of child-bearing on subsequent employment histories 
(1992:114-115), it is suggested that the opportunity cost of caring explains why women 
adjust hours in paid work on having children. Although this argument could provide an 
alternative economic understanding of women’s choices between paid work and child 
care rather than women’s work attitude or aspirations, some criticism is inevitable 
because it is also based on a utilitarian rationale. While Joshi pays attention to the 
foregone cash gross loss resulting from adjusting hours in market work, many other 
social scientists note the practical reality that the cost of childcare arrangements will 
affect women’s choices between paid work and caring for children at home:  
 
Several empirical studies confirm that in most countries, especially those with 
minimal public investment in childcare, the greater a woman’s child-rearing 
responsibilities, the less likely it is that she will choose to participate in paid work; 
for women who are labour force participants, greater child-rearing responsibilities 
reduce the hours in paid work. (Gornick, 2000:123) 
 
Gornick (2000:123) argues that the cost of alternative childcare arrangements can lower 
women’s effective market wages; that is, if mothers have to spend a considerable 
amount of their earnings on paying for childcare, then effectively, their market wage is 
lowered. In that case, market wages are not attractive enough for mothers to return to 
work or to continue in full-time work.     
 
There is no dispute that rational choice explanations have made a significant error 
disregarding the social and cultural contexts. It is the case that they see the individuals 
without the society, denying the social beings of humans. Therefore, alternative 
perspectives recognizing individuals within the social and cultural contexts are essential, 
particularly in the study of married women’s labour market behaviour. That is, gender-
role socialisation and class perspectives, which follow in the next sections.  
 
2.1.2. Gender-role socialisation perspective: socially and culturally constructed 
motherhood and gender role attitudes  
  
Gender perspective explanations, in terms of culturally constructed motherhood and 
gender-role attitudes, provides a different approach from the neoclassical explanations 
(Duncan, 2005:51; Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391; Won and Pascall, 2004:274). It is 
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argued that gender difference in the choice between labour market participation and 
staying at home must be seen as socially constructed by the gender belief system, 
beyond any supply aspect (Ridgeway and Correll, 2004:522-524). In particular, Duncan 
and Irwin (2004:391) criticize the rational choice explanations of the gender division of 
labour by arguing that it occurs not because of women’s self-selection but through 
socially and culturally patterned gender norms (Duncan and Irwin, 2004:391; Duncan 
1999:144). More specifically, Duncan and Irwin (2004:391-392) reject the grand theory, 
arguing that ‘cost-benefit type economic questions are not separable from the social and 
moral decisions and individual goals are seen through the lens of family responsibilities 
and negotiated within wider social norms.’  
 
In their study based on in-depth interviews of British women at Leeds in 2003, they 
attempted to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the economists’ assumptions, by showing 
that there was moral reasoning in combining mothering with paid work, in allocating 
tasks with partners and in choosing childcare. They found that mothers make such 
decisions within socially negotiated moral accounts and these decisions are socially 
patterned by class and ethnicity: ‘People do not view care simply as a constraint on paid 
work. Rather, they feel morally obliged to care and often wish to do so’ (Duncan and 
Irwin, 2004:397). In addition, Duncan and Irwin (2004) believe that gender role 
attitudes are also an important predictor of married women’ choices or behaviour in that 
gender role attitudes reflecting gender belief systems in a particular society are 
differently patterned in different nations and cultures. Crompton and Harris (1999a: 
105-127) also point out that gender-role attitudes exert an important influence on the 
domestic division of labour along with other structural factors. Overall, it is suggested 
that socially and culturally constructed gender-role attitudes are not underplayed in 
modern society, which is why there is no significant change in married women’s choices 
concerning paid labour.  
 
2.1.3.  Class perspective on the gender division of labour and mothering 
 
Currently, debates have moved around the question of whether we live in ‘classless’ 
societies, relating to the postmodern arguments that ‘modern societies have moved 
beyond class’ (Crompton, 1998:140). Crompton (1998:140-142) argued that ‘we have 
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never lived in a classless society’ by pointing out the emergence of an ‘underclass’ and 
‘the new middle class’. Breen (2005:50) also argued that there is no evidence of the 
influence of class declining, but rather, that it is growing in many areas. This strongly 
suggests that class analysis is no less important in contemporary societies, despite recent 
evidence of the weakening of any causal connections between class structure and class 
action, such as weaker linkages to labour struggles or voting behaviour. In contrast to 
the arguments for a classless society, it is argued that class inequalities have been 
reinforced through the period of the decline in class-based research; that is, record levels 
of inequality (for instance, in Britain) marked the period in which individualist theorists 
argue the demise of class and individualization as late modern social actors (Gillies, 
2005:836). Class-based perspectives seem important in recent years for having strong 
indications of social division arising from the increasing family wage gap in modern 
societies.  
 
Apart from the debates over whether there is a class or classless society, gender 
questions in class debates have been raised against grand class theories focusing on 
male-breadwinning households. Marxist theorists see women’s domestic labour as 
serving the needs of capital by generating surplus value, not serving men, and women 
are seen as part of the working class (Hartmann, 1981b:22,31). However, the grand 
class theories are criticized for not taking gender into account (Crompton, 1998:92-93). 
With regard to class and gender relations, Hartmann (1981a:372) argues that capitalist 
social structures rest on the division of labour organized by patriarchy and capitalism: 
‘Patriarchy’s material base is men’s control of women’s labour: both in the household 
and in the labour market, the division of labour by gender tends to benefit men’ 
(Hartmann, 1981a:373).  
 
That is, Hartmann’s dual systems theory (1981) sees the patriarchal system as 
equivalent or similar to the class system, and also sees ‘women as suffering a double 
disadvantage – by virtue of their sex as well as in their employment’ (Crompton, 
1998:93-94):  
 
The material disadvantages of  women in respect of employment is that women 
have been concentrated in less well-paid, sex-typed occupations and are 
disadvantaged in the labour market as a consequence of their domestic and child-
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rearing obligations, and – until relatively recently – excluded by men from access 
to many of the better-paid and more prestigious occupational roles. 
 
In addition, Hartmann (1981b:22) suggested there is a vicious circle of the effects of the 
material disadvantages of women in the labour market; ‘the lower pay women receive in 
the labour market both perpetuates men’s material advantage over women and 
encourages women to choose wifery as a career, and women’s home responsibilities in 
turn reinforce their inferior labour market position.’ She basically rejects the claim that 
the receipt of patriarchal benefits (from wives’ housework and childcare) will vary 
according to class. Nonetheless, Hartmann (1981a:385-386) sees that income has the 
most important effect on the relative amounts of patriarchal benefits. For instance, 
wives of husbands with lower incomes (rather than with higher incomes) spend 
relatively fewer hours on housework due to their participation in work outside the home 
compared with full-time homemakers; at the same time, they experience the “double 
day” of waged work and housework (Hartmann, 1981a:385-386). Indeed, recently, one 
study (Bradley, 1999) found a growing gap between the middle and working classes in 
Britain by deducting advantages or suffering from disadvantages from economic and 
social/cultural capital, particularly by gender. This reveals that gender segregation is 
less rigid at the top of the employment hierarchy, while relatively strong among manual 
workers and at the lower levels of service work (Bradley, 1999:30): ‘in manual jobs, 
occupational segregation has hardly declined’ (Bradley, 2007:93). This suggests that 
class-differentiated experiences may modify women’s choices of paid work, in effect 
bringing about a class-differentiated gender division of labour. 
 
2.1.3.1. Class-differentiated experiences of mothering and labour market 
behaviour  
 
Crompton (2005:23-27) asks why occupational segregation in the West remains stable 
despite the very real changes in the law, women’s education levels and women’s 
employment rates, and answers by arguing that despite dramatic changes in family 
formation and behaviour, family arrangements and relationships are economic as well as 
cultural or normative. Overall, along with rejecting the ‘individualisation’ thesis, she 
sees class-differentiated attitudes in respect of mother’s employment as closely 
associated with the class-differentiated constraints and opportunities available. The 
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class-differentiated attitude is well articulated by Goldthorpe (1996)’s rational action 
theory (RAT), based on economic utilitarian rationalities (Duncan, 2005:1-2). 
Goldthorpe argues that rational decision-making differs according to class condition. 
However, this utilitarian-rationality idea, despite the class-based explanation, is 
critiqued just as the individualization thesis has received many critiques for the same 
reason (Duncan, 2005:1-2). Rejecting theories of classless preference (Hakim) or class-
based utilitarian rationality (Goldthorpe), Duncan (2005:50-51) argues that class-based 
motherhood created by socially and culturally constructed moralities underlies 
preferences and rationality. That is, motherhood practices are differentiated by class-
based cultures.   
 
In addition, Duncan (2005:55-56) argues from the qualitative research of white mothers 
with children under 11 in England (during 1988-2000) that there are fragmented 
constructions of social moralities within each class, that is, different types of mothering 
exist within a class. Working class mothers divide into a smaller, peripheral group, who 
expressed a primarily mothering role, and a larger, more central group who tended more 
towards the primarily worker position. Middle class mothers divide into a group of 
suburban wives (a considerable number) and a professional/managerial group. The 
division within each class is contrary evidence to Goldthorpe’s rational action theory. 
According to Goldthorpe’s class-based rationality, middle class mothers with better 
conditions and who can afford childcarers are more likely to combine mothering with 
substantial employment (the primarily worker role), while working class mothers with 
much lower paid employment cluster towards having a primarily mothering role 
(Duncan, 2005:60-62).  
 
In particular, Goldthorpe does not explain the ‘irrational action’ of the suburban wives 
who orient towards part-time employment or a primarily mothering role despite their 
high human capital assets and better competitive edge in the job market (Duncan, 
2005:60-62). Neither does Goldthorpe explain the central working class group who tend 
towards having primarily a worker role despite their relatively low human capital and 
having to take low-quality jobs (Duncan, 2005:60-62). The reasons why they act 
‘irrationally’ are the cost of childcare as an additional class constraint and the extent to 
which they value a mother’s own care. According to Duncan (2005:62-70), concerns 
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about the cost of childcare lead many mothers in the less well-paid central working class 
group to use informal childcare if not their own care at home. The professional and 
managerial class group tends to choose more expensive nursery options in relation to 
child development, as they have fewer concerns about costs. However, the high-income 
suburban wives group valued mother’s own care and tended to stress their pre-given 
gender roles more than the other two groups. In short, Duncan (2005:62,70) suggests 
that class patterns of values and choices do not always follow class patterns of resources 
as argued by Goldthorpe, and more importantly, also suggests that middle class mothers, 
in particular, tend to prioritize the culturally constructed moral exercise of motherhood 
(socially patterned rationalities) over the utilitarian use of their economic/social capital 
(or rational action). Even though Goldthorpe’s explanation based on utilitarian 
rationalities has been criticized, the attention paid to the division between the classes is 
still valuable. In fact, the division between the classes has been the concern of many. 
 
Vincent and Ball (2006:163), from a qualitative research of British parents, found not 
only evidence suggesting that the traditional gendered division of domestic 
responsibility continues to be apparent among middle-class women, but also that 
choices about childcare differ according to class, which serves to generate and maintain 
class divisions. In particular, the understanding of ‘people like us’ is complex and 
nuanced for the middle class (Vincent and Ball, 2006:163). Further, based on the results 
of two qualitative research projects focusing on middle and working class people in the 
UK, Vincent, Braun and Ball (2008:5) point out the key importance of social class for 
understanding the role and purpose of childcare. They also found that the affordability 
of childcare related to class in the UK, where costs of childcare are very high and 
parents bear about 75-80 per cent of the total costs. There is expensive (small-group) 
private childcare largely available to middle class parents and there is cheaper state or 
voluntary sector provision exclusively for working class parents (Vincent, Braun and 
Ball, 2008:10).  
 
The type of childcare preferred by mothers differs according to their social class: ‘the 
middle class mothers tended to stress the risk of emotional neglect in nurseries whereas 
the working class mothers appeared more concerned about the possibility of physical 
neglect or harm from childminders’ (Vincent, Braun and Ball, 2008:13-14). Therefore, 
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most middle class mothers tended to value the one-to-one care at home and the nursery 
was not seen as better, while the working class mothers tended to value the nursery with 
professional carers and more space. In addition, Crompton and Lyonette (2008:3) 
identified class differentiated family strategies in respect of mothers’ employment and 
paying for childcare packages from work-life interviews of British parents with 
child/ren under 14. They argue that there are persistent class differences in couples’ 
employment strategies and also suggest that childcare use differs according to class.  
 
Apart from the class differences in preferences for employment and childcare, there are 
divisions in the use of flexibility between the working and middle classes, as well as 
within the middle class (Crompton, 2000:165-170). Crompton (2000:165-170) argues, 
from qualitative research on British working women, that working class women tend 
not to enjoy the same kind of flexibility as women in the middle class; middle class 
women tend to cluster in certain professions in the upper occupational hierarchy, which 
affords them some employment flexibility, whereas working-class women tend to 
cluster in inferior kinds of jobs, so-called flexible/non-standard jobs; although these 
jobs can provide some kind of flexibility, most are low-paid, low-skilled jobs which 
cannot pay for the same quality of childcare that middle or upper class women can 
afford. Crompton (2000:169-170) found that even within the middle class, there are 
differences in how women use flexibility; women in some professions – such as 
pharmacy – have employment flexibility, which women in managerial jobs requiring 
long working hours do not, suggesting that this may explain the lower representation of 
women in managerial jobs than men: 
 
Within the middle class, women have tended to cluster in occupational niches that 
facilitate a combination of employment and caring. The rapid feminization of some 
professions, such as pharmacy, may also be explained to a considerable extent by 
the fact that part-time and flexible employment opportunities abound within this 
occupation, while managerial jobs, which require long working hours, do not 
afford employment flexibility. (Crompton, 2000:169-170) 
  
Moreover, Lareau and Weininger (2008:437) argued, from their analysis of in-depth 
interviews of U.S. children and families, that ‘parents allocate responsibility for 
children’s organized activities primarily to mothers, finding that mothers’ 
socioeconomic status is closely linked to the amount of children’s time in organized 
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activities, that is, better educated mothers increase their participation in children’s 
organized activities by trading off their own time at work (Lareau and Weininger, 
2008:440-441).  
 
2.1.3.2.  Class-differentiated attitudes toward children’s education 
 
The Western literature has well documented class-differentiated attitudes toward 
children’s education. Class-differentiated efforts for children’s education is explained 
again by Goldthorpe’s rational action theory (RAT) and culturalist explanations, as 
mentioned in section 2.1.3.1 above. According to Goldthorpe, RAT decisions about 
children’s education are made based on utilitarian calculations of the costs, benefits and 
probabilities of success of various options open to them, and furthermore, these 
calculations or evaluations differ according to social class (Hatcher, 1998:10-12). More 
specifically, the cost of education is a heavy burden for working-class families while it 
is relatively less so for upper and middle class families. In fact, the benefits of education 
are greater for upper and middle class families, particularly for middle class families, as 
the risks of downward mobility are higher, so their children’s education can be a 
safeguard against further falls, which is not the case for working-class families. Finally, 
the probabilities of success in terms of academic attainment, for instance, are also 
higher for middle class children than for working-class children because their parents’ 
greater capital – such as better educational levels and social networks, and being better 
informed – can help the children more effectively.  
 
Therefore, given their greater capacity to afford education costs, middle class families 
tend to risk failure in education more readily than the working class. In contrast, 
working-class families are likely to be less ambitious and to avoid the risk of failure by 
having lower costs, given their inability to afford high costs. This is because the 
consequences of failure to attain higher education qualifications may be more serious, 
such as the additional costs and the risk of subsequent exclusion from other alternative 
options (for instance, vocational courses). According to Goldthorpe (1996), despite the 
expansion of educational opportunities, class differences remain, due to there being 
little change in relative cost-benefit-probability factors in each class (Hatcher, 1998:11). 
However, Hatcher (1998:16-17) pointed out that RAT makes an error by counterposing 
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rational choice to culture, arguing that there are various other reasons for decisions, and 
these are not necessarily based on maximizing personal benefit in economic terms. 
Indeed, by indicating there is empirical evidence from the British youth to show that 
working class people have high aspirations for upward class mobility similar to the 
middle class, Hatcher (1998:15) suggests aspirations for upward social mobility are also 
influenced more or less by the cultural setting, for instance, schools. Hatcher (1998:16) 
saw rational choice as neither necessary nor sufficient to explain choices, as ‘RAT has 
no concept of a multiplicity of historically-constructed social identities.’ Therefore, 
Hatcher (1998:21) suggested we need a comprehensive theory which makes space for 
rational-strategic decision-making within a cultural paradigm. 
 
On the other hand, apart from the arguments of class-distinct attitudes regarding social 
mobility, neoliberal approaches have also been popular in recent years. They argue that 
greater emphasis on the meritocracy of industrial societies has inevitably brought 
increased social mobility, which has contributed to increased social stability, equal 
opportunities, and societal convergence (Crompton, 1998:209-210). However, this has 
been widely criticized by those who emphasize the persistence of class inequalities; in 
other words, extensive social mobility is rather a source of destabilization, far from 
being a source of social stability, as reflected in the wide income gaps between different 
educational levels (Crompton, 1998:210). Regarding social mobility (in the 
occupational hierarchy), whether this is through education (meritocracy) or by class 
origins, positions are divided. Marshall et al. (1997) argue that the class effect still has a 
substantial influence on occupational attainment rather than educational levels, while 
Saunders (1996, 1997) argues that ability and effort (such as motivation and work 
attitudes) are more important for achieving higher-level occupational positions than 
class origins (Crompton, 1998:216-217). However, paradoxically, Crompton suggests 
that the evidence from both sides can be used to support the other’s case – Marshall et 
al.’s evidence for neo-liberal arguments and Saunders’ evidence for class theorist 
arguments (Crompton, 1998:217): 
 
Marshall et al. have suggested that the ‘class effect’ on occupational attainment has 
declined somewhat over the years, suggesting a move in the direction of greater 
meritocracy. Saunders’s evidence shows that private schooling is important for 
class I/II children in avoiding downward mobility, suggesting that the private 
schools may offer middle-class parents some means of insuring their less able 
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offspring against downward mobility. 
  
Crompton (1998:216) argued that in effect, both positions are in competition and have 
some validity. Thanks to greater emphasis on meritocracy, middle class mothering – 
giving more commitment to children’s education – is accepted as the legitimate culture 
(Gillies, 2005:849-850). Ironically, however, it is suggested, in Gillies’s qualitative 
study of British families (2005) that the rising meritocracy of the middle class 
contributes to widening class divisions in modern societies, as middle class mothers will 
invest more time and money in their children’s education than working class mothers 
will. Therefore, parenting in relation to social mobility efforts may affect mothers’ 
labour market behaviour and also contribute to the still-existing class inequalities. This 
is why a class-based perspective is necessary in this thesis. 
 
In sum, the critical reviews on the neoclassical arguments suggest that it is necessary to 
pay more attention to the normative and structural factors, as identified as the primary 
constraints facing women: e.g. gender norms and attitudes, the cost and availability of 
childcare, and the outcomes of different social origins (McRae, 2003:329). Therefore, 
this thesis attempts to identify normative and structural constraints including class in the 
Korean context in the next section that follows.  
 
 
2.2  Critiques of Korean neoclassical explanations and 
identification of normative and structural factors in the 
Korean context 
 
 
In the case of Korea, despite noticeable debates between Korean labour scholars and 
feminist sociologists, there has been no significant debate concerning female work 
attitudes in the Korean literature on this subject as there is in the Western literature. 
However, both take note of the culturally-specific gender role attitude, as argued in the 
Western literature, that married women’s choices are closely related to their gender role 
attitudes, particularly those which are culturally constructed. It is also notable that most 
of the Korean literature addresses ‘married women’ as one group, without a focus on 
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‘mothers’, presumably due to the fact that mothers without marriage is neither the norm 
nor commonplace in Korea.  
 
Hwang and Polacheck (2004:1-2) examined whether the self-selection theory holds true 
in the Korean case, rejecting Bergmann’s occupational segregation theory (1974):  
 
Discrimination against women in the primary sector forces women to find jobs in 
the secondary sector, which makes the secondary sector crowded, resulting in an 
excess-labour supply which lowers secondary job wages and puts women at a 
disadvantage.  
 
Based on Korean data, they argue that their study findings support the self-selection 
model, as the evidence shows that the population chooses jobs to maximize lifetime 
earnings or utility by matching each gender’s talents and preferences for skill types 
(Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:1-2); Women take female-type (female dominated) jobs 
and men take male-type (male dominated) jobs because women are relatively 
advantaged in female-type jobs as are men in male-type jobs. In short, their argument is 
that gender divisions in the labour market are the result of self-selection based on 
personal and work characteristics rather than labour market discrimination. However, 
there is some recognition of the existence of sex discrimination in the Korean labour 
literature: for instance, one piece of labour research acknowledges that the human 
capital theory cannot explain everything, and that gender differences in the Korean 
labour market might be explained – to a considerable extent – by sex discrimination 
(Keum, 2002:176-179). Also, feminist sociologists in Korea have argued consistently 
that there is occupational sex segregation or gender division of labour due to the cultural 
heritage of gender norms (Kim, 1995:182; Shin, 2004:102-106).  
 
Looking from the feminist perspective, Hwang and Polacheck (2004) ignore the fact 
that the jobs characterized as female-type or male-type are defined by social gender 
norms and are likely to be the product of labour market discrimination. Furthermore, it 
is likely that as rational beings, both men and women can maximize their wellbeing by 
taking ‘integrated’ (gender-neutral) jobs (such as information service operatives) rather 
than female-type jobs (for instance, nursing) or male-type jobs (for example, in the 
construction industry), if the number of integrated jobs exceeds that of gendered jobs. In 
fact, in Korea, the number of females in integrated jobs and the number of integrated 
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jobs available are both tending to increase (Hwang and Polacheck, 2004:15, 17). If this 
tendency continues, then work attributes (female-type, male-type, or gender-neutral 
jobs) may not explain the labour market segmentation by gender. There are other 
explanations, particularly among welfarists, emphasising Korean-specific structural 
constraints and suggesting that the culturally-specific labour market system and 
workplace culture and welfare regime are likely to affect women’s labour force 
participation. In this vein, the supply-side/individualist arguments are criticized and 
subsequently demand-side/structuralist constraints in the Korean context are illuminated. 
Furthermore, the last section explores the Korean class literature, drawing implications 
for the potential link between class and labour force participation by Korean married 
women, particularly mothers, a matter which is rarely paid attention to in Korean 
research. 
 
2.2.1.  Identifying individual factors in the Korean context: Korean culturally-
specific gender norms and motherhood  
 
Based on the neoclassical labour supply theory, Hwang (2002:26) argues – in her study 
of Korean married women’s labour market participation – that whether married women 
take jobs or not is closely related to the burden of housework and their attitude to paid 
work. She presumes that although there is a notable difference between non-working 
and working groups, in their attitude towards sharing housework with their male 
spouses, traditional gender role attitudes can still be observed in both groups (Hwang, 
2002:26
i
 
1
): non-working women (over 90 per cent) consider housework as women’s 
work and nearly half the working women questioned (43.6 per cent) also consider it as 
women’s work. However, a very small percentage of women, non-working (1.9 per 
cent) and working (1.5 per cent), consider housework as women’s work as well as 
men’s work.  
 
In addition, similar to Hakim’s preference theory (2000, 2002), Hwang (2002:28-29) 
argues that there is a difference in the spheres of life satisfaction between non-working 
and working groups, suggesting that there are differences in work attitude between 
                                            
1
 All Korean references (except those written in English) are translated by Jong-Soon Ahn as the author 
of this DPhil thesis. The original Korean version of each of the quotes numbered by Roman numerals 
(differing from the footnotes numbering system) is provided in the Appendix. 
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working and non-working women, although Hwang is left unsure whether these 
attitudinal differences are the cause or the result of married women’s choices: 
homemakers are more satisfied with a more leisurely life and homemaking while 
working women are more satisfied with having some additional income (Hwang,  
2002:28-9
ii
).  
 
Furthermore, in a similar vein to the neo-classical economists, under the assumption 
that married women’s human capital factors such as education and the subjects studied 
significantly affect their labour market participation, Hwang (2002:30) argues that 
married women’s labour force participation is clearly divided by their human capital 
attributes such as age, education level and subjects studied. From the analysis of 
married women aged under 50 in the 4
th
 wave (2001) of Korea Labour Income and 
Panel Study, higher participation rates were observed among younger and well-educated 
women and those with arts or human and social science degrees (Hwang, 2002:37-41). 
This study suggests that attitudes towards family duties over the family’s life cycle 
differ according to women’s human capital characteristics, thus supporting the 
arguments of the human capital theory. However, there are some critical observations of 
Korean women’s work attitude.  
 
A study of the influence of children's private education on married women’s 
employment (Choi, 2008:33) argue that job commitment or career aspirations are not 
significantly associated with women’s employment: only a very small percentage of 
female-type job seekers reported that a lack of job commitment and career aspirations 
were a barrier to finding a job – notably, the percentage decreased significantly from 8.1 
in 1998 to 2.9 in 2006, as shown in Table 2.3 below. Most married women see childcare 
and upbringing as the main barrier to paid work, and the number of such women has 
even increased over time (Choi, 2008:33). From these figures, while the number of 
married women who see a lack of job commitment and career aspirations, as well as 
social prejudice and discrimination practices, as the main barriers to paid work has 
decreased over the researched years, the number of married women reporting unequal 
working conditions has remained stable. 
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Table 2.3  Barriers to women taking jobs (percentage, 1998, 2002 and 2006)        
 1998 2002 2006 
Childcare and bringing up children 31.4 41.1 47.9 
Social prejudice, discrimination practices  27.6 21.7 17.4 
Unequal working conditions 13 13.2 12.6 
Housework 10.8 9.2 7.4 
Lack of job commitment and career aspirations 8.1 4.5 2.9 
Lack of skills 4 2 1.7 
Lack of job information  . 2.4 3.2 
Other/don’t know 4.9 5.8 6.9 
Row-total % 100 100 100 
Source: my translation and adaptation from Figure 3-10, p33, Choi, 2008. 
 
This suggests that married women’s priority has been caring for children rather than 
their career aspirations, and unequal working conditions remain problematic, although 
social prejudice and discrimination practices appear to be decreasing as higher 
education and better employment opportunities become increasingly available to 
women as well as men. Similarly, Jang and Bu (2003:1
iii
), in a study of married 
women’s choices between market work and child care, observe that Korean working 
women tend to show strong attachment to their jobs: ‘working mothers often express 
their identity as workers and wish to stay in their jobs as long as possible if their 
childcare problems are solved’. Both studies found that married women view childcare 
responsibilities as the main obstacle to their labour force participation, other than career 
aspirations or work attachment (Jang and Bu, 2003; Choi, 2008).  
 
Notably, Jang and Bu’s study (2003:17-19 iv ) attempts to measure women’s career 
aspirations (‘job attachment’ as expressed by the paper) by using survey scales in a 
questionnaire asking them to respond to the following questions:  
 
 Would you wish to continue in paid work for as long as possible even if it were 
not economically necessary for you to work? 
 Would you like to work for as long as possible irrespective of having children 
you might have to care for? 
 Would you be more willing to work if there were extensive social childcare 
support available for your children? 
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 Would you be prepared to work (more/longer) if there was no employer 
discrimination against working mothers? 
 
Jang and Bu (2003) incorporated institutional factors into their survey questions of 
individuals’ work attitudes. From the survey results, it was found that married women’s 
work aspirations were very high. Although the Korean survey measures are not in 
accordance with the international index, they do indicate Korean working women’s 
career aspirations. However, there is no sampling of women who are not employed, and 
thus the studies do not show the job attachment or career aspirations of non-working 
women. Furthermore, neoclassical arguments, including the human capital theory, do 
not explain satisfactorily the reasons for mothers’ choices when they have young 
children, reasons which are likely to change as their children get older, because these 
women in Korea tend to be non-working regardless of education, job experience (before 
childbearing) and career aspirations. It seems that culturally-specific gender norms, 
especially during motherhood, are more likely to explain these women’s behaviour. 
Therefore, Korean women’s gender-role attitudes and their culturally-specific 
motherhood need to be elaborated upon further. 
 
Some literature indicates that Korean gender role attitudes are rooted in the cultural 
gender norms and women’s status in the family formed in pre-industrial Korean society, 
which has been defined as patriarchal (Byun, 2001:19-20
v
; Kim and Kim, 2004:6; Shin, 
2001:103; Kim, 1995:182): women’s status was subject to men’s, and women were 
defined mainly as homemakers, not as part of the labour force, although lower class 
women participated in non-domestic work as well (Kim, 1995:182); for example, in 
agricultural work. Byun (2001:6-10) argues that although traditional gender role 
attitudes have been steadily weakening overall in Korea, in the younger age cohorts, 
along with the rapid increase in women’s employment, women’s status and their gender 
role in the family has not changed much; men’s share of household chores is still low 
and there is some gender discrimination in educational investment, especially in 
working class families. Byun (2001) argues that there are more investments in sons, 
either due to the traditional preference for sons or due to gender-determined career 
prospects in the labour market and the fact that the care of children and/or elderly 
parents is still primarily entrusted to women, without much state support.  
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Like Byun (2001), Park et al. (2008:176) also suggest that gender role attitudes remain 
relatively unchanged for both Korean women and men. As shown in Table 2.4, there is a 
considerable gender difference in the hours spent on housework by working couples. 
Working women still spend considerably more hours on housework than working men. 
Even non-employed men do not share the housework, implying that gender role 
attitudes have not changed much despite the rapid increase in women’s labour market 
participation. More recently, an OECD report (2011:13-15) confirms this, finding that 
Korean men do the least amount of housework (1 hour and 19 minutes per day) of all 
OECD member countries. 
 
 Table 2.4  The annual hours of housework of Korean married women and men  
  Weekdays Saturdays Sundays 
Women 
Working 184 203 213 
Non-working 317 315 311 
Men 
Working 29 35 46 
Not working 37 38 49 
Source: <Table V-5-20>, Park et al. (2008 :176). Note: for men, ‘Not working’ refers to the non-employment 
for the last week. 
 
While British motherhood is seen by some researchers as having a culturally 
constructed heritage (Duncan, 2005:51), Won and Pascall (2004:274) define Korean 
motherhood as culturally ingrained from the tradition of Confucian expectations: ‘the 
difficulties working mothers encounter come firstly from childcare and secondly from 
strongly ingrained cultural traditions.’ In the past, Confucian values and assumptions 
expected women to obey their parents-in-law, husband and sons, consequently placing 
them in a low position in the family hierarchy, imposing heavy obligations and stronger 
obligations as daughters-in-law than as daughters (Won and Pascall, 2004:272). Won 
and Pascall (2004:273) argue that the traditional Confucian assumptions about gender 
relations still hold true in Korean families these days, in that ‘motherhood frequently 
brings withdrawal from paid work while fatherhood strengthens men’s roles as 
breadwinners.’  
 
Shin (2001:97, 101-106) also points out that Korean mothers are seen as the primary 
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child-carers, and subject to the traditional normative role of motherhood, to the point 
that child-rearing is not shared between women and the Korean regime as is the trend in 
many Western developed societies. An empirical study supports this, finding that 
although nearly 60 per cent of homemakers had work experience before marriage or 
childbirth, more than half the researched group did not want to work, the main reason 
being so they could be available for childcare and their children’s education, which 
suggests that motherhood seems trapped by the traditional gender norms (Jang and Kim, 
2000; 55-63). Therefore, it seems evident that culturally-specific normative motherhood 
along with little-changed gender role attitudes is associated with married women’s work 
behaviour.   
 
2.2.2. Identifying socioeconomic factors in the Korean context: labour market 
and welfare regime  
 
2.2.2.1. Socioeconomic changes over the last four decades in Korea 
 
An ILO research project carried out by Kim and Kim (2004:1-26) and Kim (1995:181-
2) noted how socio-economic and institutional changes in Korea over recent decades 
have related to Korean family and work life, along with a historical review of Korean 
mothers’ labour force participation. In the pre-industrial society, Korean married women 
of the middle and lower classes mainly carried out their traditional domestic work, 
including caring for the family: 
 
Women carried out sewing, spinning, weaving, milling, domestic chores and 
animal husbandry, vegetable cultivation and making soy bean paste and sauce, as 
well as preparing for the performance of Confucian rites. Middle-class and poor 
peasant women had to do field work as well, such as weeding, transplanting, and 
manual irrigation, though their contribution was undervalued or considered as 
valueless. (Kim, 1995:182) 
 
However, with industrialization and urbanization, their domestic jobs were substituted 
steadily by industrial work, although most married women tended to participate in 
farming or home-based work which seemed compatible with their traditional roles and 
norms (Kim, 1995:182). Until the rapid industrialization of the 1960s, most workers 
were self-employed or unpaid family workers in the agriculture sector, which made it 
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possible for most women to work after marriage and childbirth as nearby childcare from 
family members or relatives was available (which is less the case in present-day society) 
(Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). During the industrialization process, the number of women 
in paid employment – mostly young and unmarried – increased rapidly, but a small 
number of women continued to work after marriage and childbirth (Kim and Kim, 
2004:1-26).  
 
However, in the late 1980s, the economic boom caused a labour supply shortage in 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), particularly in the manufacturing sector, 
and thus the participation rate for married women increased dramatically, exceeding that 
of unmarried women (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). Nonetheless, as the labour supply 
shortage was unsolved, the Korean government began to address this issue by 
establishing the Equal Employment Act (1988) and expanded childcare facilities at the 
same time as the rise in the labour and women’s movements (Kim and Kim, 2004:1-26). 
In the 1990s, with the shrinking of the manufacturing industry and the growth of the 
service industry, businesses were required to extend their labour market flexibility (Kim 
and Kim, 2004:1-26): as Dex (2003:5-10) indicates, businesses are required to extend 
their work hours ‘to cater for customers’ demands in the 24 hour/7 day society’ in the 
postindustrialised economies, which is also true in Korea.  
 
According to the literature, as in Western society, it seems that the ‘de-industrialization 
(referred to the decline of manufacturing and the growth of the service industry) and 
structural changes in the Korean labour market (more labour market flexibility) under 
global trends of neo-liberalism’ (Mishra, 1999:25; Kwon, 2001:214; Kim and Kim, 
2004:23) have contributed to the continued increase in married women’s participation 
by offering women flexible work. Since the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s, the 
deregulation and restructuring of the labour market in South Korea has also increased 
the number of female workers employed in non-standard/irregular work, especially the 
number of married women (Grubb et al., 2007:22). Furthermore, the structural reforms 
in the Korean labour market have necessarily continued until more recently, up to the 
mid 2000s, as economic polarisation has widened due to the economic recession after 
the financial crisis at the end of 1997 and subsequently the credit crisis in 2003 (Keum 
et al., 2009:7-8, 20-23). As a result, waged employment has increased steadily whereas 
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non-waged employment has decreased from the mid-2000s (Keum et al., 2006:2, 19).  
 
However, the structural reforms since the financial crisis in 1997 have been differently 
experienced according to gender, and are most evident in the two or so years after the 
economic crisis as more women than men moved from permanent to irregular work or 
unpaid family employment, while more men than women moved from permanent to 
self-employed jobs (Keum et al., 2006:12-4). In addition, although the structural 
reforms of the mid-2000s in the service industry contributed decisively to the decline in 
self-employed businesses overall, the increasing rate of females as self-employed 
workers (23.5 per cent) is greater than that for males (13.4 per cent) in the period 1998 
to 2007 (Keum et al., 2009:59
vi
). The increase in female workers in non-standard jobs 
including self-employed jobs suggests that married women’s labour market status has 
been degraded. As Einhorn (2006:152) points out, the process of reforming the labour 
market system and economic restructuring is highly likely to be gendered in form and 
impact.  
 
Apart from the changes in the economy and labour market, demographical changes in 
Korea are also related to married women’s labour force participation. Although 
industrialization with rapid economic growth has brought some changes in attitudes and 
values concerning work and the family, Kim and Kim (2004:24) argued that the 
traditional Korean family (characterized as having very strong family solidarity) and the 
policy of prioritizing economic growth have been sustained over the last four decades. 
They indicated, however, that family structure and demographic changes with increased 
women’s employment have weakened the function of families as the primary source of 
family welfare. Over the past 40 years, the number of traditional extended family 
households has rapidly fallen and that of single-generation households has increased 
steadily (Kim and Kim, 2004:9-12). Moreover, the number of single-person households 
has risen as well due to the increase in the number of elderly people living alone, 
divorced people (lone parents) and people who have never married (Kim and Kim, 
2004:9-12).  
 
While the demographic changes have increased demands for public support for 
childcare and care for the elderly, the Korean gender regime does not seem to respond to 
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this demand (Kim and Kim, 2004:9-12). In particular, family structural changes have 
intensified the childcare problems of working parents, especially lone parents in nuclear 
families, and furthermore, the traditional function of families of nursing and caring for 
the elderly and/or the disabled has been weakened considerably in a rapidly aging 
society (Kim and Kim, 2004:5, 12-13; Grubb et al., 2007:15). Therefore, it seems clear 
that Korean mothers face more work-life balance problems than ever, due to the lack of 
social support in response to demographic changes. Further reviews of socio-economic 
characteristics (namely, institutional structures) follow. 
 
2.2.2.2. Labour market structural changes over the last four decades 
 
During the last 4 decades of the 20th century there were changes to the industrial and 
employment structures in Korea, as shown in Table 2.5, with the industrial focus 
moving from agriculture and fishing to the service industry, so the number of women 
workers entering the SOC increased (Keum, 2002:77
vii
; Kim and Kim, 2004:1-5). 
However, in the service sector, the employment share of wholesale and retail sales and 
the hospitality industry (Korea has one of the largest shares of employment in the 
wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotels) has decreased, whereas the 
employment share of the finance sector, the medical and health industry, digital 
components and business services where men are concentrated has been growing 
considerably (Keum, 2002:77-78). Despite an increase in the number of jobs in some 
areas of the service sector such as in domestic service, education, health and social 
services, the proportion of females employed in these jobs accounts for just 14 per cent 
of total female employment and office/service/sales jobs where women are concentrated 
is relatively static (Keum, 2002:79-81). Similarly, Hwang (2008:27
viii
, 54-55) argues 
from the analysis of labour panel data 2002 to 2006 that the growth of high value-added 
services (education and healthcare services) is slowing down and low productivity 
service areas are expanding, and that the service industry tends to lose jobs or increase 
the number of non-regular workers to reduce wage costs. With the concentration of 
female workers in low quality service jobs, it seems clear that high-quality service work 
for female workers is underdeveloped in Korea (Hwang, 2008:55-56).  
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Table 2.5  The proportions of employed females by industry over the past decades 
(percentage) 
 Industrial distribution of employed females Female ratio (against male ratio) 
 A&F* M&M** SOC*** A&F M&M SOC 
1963 
1970 
1980 
1990 
1995 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
68.7 
57.3 
39.0 
20.3 
14.6 
13.2 
14.6 
13.3 
12.5 
11.6 
6.9 
12.2 
22.3 
28.2 
21.4 
18.4 
16.7 
17.4 
17.5 
17.0 
24.4 
30.6 
38.7 
51.5 
64.0 
68.4 
68.7 
69.3 
70.0 
71.4 
38.0 
41.5 
43.7 
46.2 
47.6 
48.2 
47.6 
46.9 
47.6 
47.2 
30.3 
33.8 
39.5 
42.4 
36.8 
35.7 
34.5 
36.0 
35.8 
35.8 
30.0 
31.6 
34.0 
38.5 
40.4 
41.8 
40.9 
41.4 
42.0 
42.5 
Source: Table 1, Kim and Kim (2004:3). Note: *A&F refers to agriculture, fishing and hunting; **M&M refers 
to manufacturing and mining; ***SOC refers to Social Overhead Capital including all the public services 
(transportation, power, education, etc) and other services. 
 
According to Keum et al.’s studies of Korean labour market structural reforms and self-
employed business in the 2000s (2006:45-6; 2009:7-9, 59-61
ix
), structural reforms 
brought about respectively by the financial crisis at the end of 1997 and after the credit 
crisis in 2003 have had different effects on the labour market; for instance, the impacts 
on the self-employed sector in the early 2000s were different from those in the middle 
of the first decade of the 21
st 
century. Firstly, the financial crisis in 1997 resulted in self-
employment increasing dramatically for a few years, presumably as a secondary effect 
of high unemployment among waged workers (Keum et al., 2009:59-61); workers, 
especially male or older workers (in their 50s and 60s) tended to move from waged 
employment to non-waged employment. Indeed, there was a sudden rise in self-
employed men in 2001 (see Table 2.A in Appendix). Also, after the financial crisis, the 
proportion of female non-paid family workers increased in 1998, as did female casual 
workers in 1999 (Table 2.B in Appendix).  
 
Secondly, the structural reforms in the service and sales industry brought about by the 
credit crisis in 2003 led to an increase in waged jobs (receiving a salary), at the same 
time decreasing non-waged jobs (self-employed jobs) for both men and women, 
although this was also observed in most OECD countries in the early part of the first 
decade of the 21
st
 century (Keum, 2009:45-49). More specifically, during the period of 
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structural change in the service industry, non-waged jobs in the wholesale/retail trade 
and hospitality industries (by number and concentration) declined, while waged jobs in 
business, and the personal and public service industries increased considerably (Keum, 
2009:45-9). 
 
Keum et al. (2009:59) see the decline of non-waged jobs as closely related to the 
collapse of poor and small-sized self-employed businesses after the 2003 credit crisis 
(see Table 1.3 in the previous chapter). In short, since 2003, there has been an overall 
decline in the self-employed sector along with a considerable decrease in the number of 
female non-paid family workers (Keum et al., 2009:21-23). Despite the restructuring as 
well as the decrease in non-waged employment, the proportion of self-employed 
workers (24 per cent in 2004) in Korea remains very high, a distinctive feature of 
Korean society (Grubb et al., 2007:13) compared with other developed countries 
(around 10 per cent in 2001), as shown in Table 2.6. Even excluding the farming and 
fishing industries where non-waged employment is concentrated, the proportion of non-
waged workers in Korea is the highest. 
 
Table 2.6  The proportions of non-waged workers in selected developed countries in 
2001 (percentage) 
 All industry Industries except farming & fishing 
Self-
employed 
Non-paid 
family 
workers 
Total % of 
non-waged 
workers 
Self-
employed 
Nonpaid 
family 
workers 
Total % of 
Non-waged 
workers 
Japan 10.8 5.1 15.9 8.9 3.4 12.3 
Australia 13.6 0.4 14.0 11.8 0.3 12.1 
France 8.9 0.0 8.9 6.8 0.0 6.8 
Germany 10.1 0.9 11.0 9.5 0.5 10.0 
Sweden 9.5 0.5 10.0 8.6 0.2 8.8 
UK 11.3 0.9 12.2 10.8 0.9 11.7 
US 7.3 0.1 7.4 6.5 0.1 6.6 
Korea
*
 27.1 6.9 34.0 24.1 4.9 29.0 
Source: adapted from Table 2-1, Keum et al. (2006:6). Note: * 2004 data replaced for Korea. 
 
The incidence of part-time employment in Korea is also notable as shown in Table 2.7. 
Compared with other countries, it is particularly low (9 per cent in 2005). In countries 
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such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Australia, Japan, the UK, and Germany, part-time 
employment rates are much higher than the OECD average (15.4 per cent in 2005). The 
proportion of part-time out of total employment was highest in the Netherlands (about 
35 percent in early 2002), followed by Australia, Japan, Germany, Switzerland, the U.K, 
and Norway, averaging between 20 and 27 percent. Part-time employment rates as a 
percentage of women’s total employment (rather than full-time, self-employed, and 
other non-standard work) in 2006 were highest in the Netherlands at about 60 percent, 
followed by Switzerland (about 45 percent), Japan (about 42 percent), Australia (around 
41 percent), the UK (about 40 percent), and Germany (39 percent). For Korea, the 
percentage was around 12 per cent in 2006, an increase from 8.7 per cent in 2000.  
 
 Table 2.7  Incidence of part-time employment
a
 and part-time female employment 
(aged 25 to 54 years) in the selected countries between 1994 and 2006 (percentage) 
 
Part-time employment as a proportion of 
total employment 
Part-time rate of 
Women’s total employment 
 1994 2002 2005 2000 2006 
Australia 
b,c
 24.4 27.5 27.3 41.8 40.7 
Denmark  17.3 16.2 18.0 16.6 (1998) 25.6 
Finland  8.9 11.0 11.2 9.2 (1997) 14.9 
France  13.8 13.7 13.6 23.7 22.9 
Germany  13.5 18.8 21.8 35.2 39.2 
Ireland  13.5 18.1 18.6 29.7 34.9 
Japan 
b,d
 21.4 25.1 25.8 38.4 (1999) 40.9 
Korea 
b
 4.5 7.6 9.0 8.7 12.3 
Netherlands  28.9 33.9 35.7 55.9 59.7 
Norway  21.5 20.6 20.8 31.8 32.9 
Portugal  9.5 9.7 9.8 11.2 13.2 
Spain  6.4 7.7 11.4 15.3 21.4 
Sweden  15.8 13.8 .. 17.9 19.0 
Switzerland 
c
 23.2 24.8 25.1 47.1 (2001) 45.7 
United Kingdom  22.4 23.4 23.6 38.6 38.8 
United States 
e
 14.2 13.1 12.8 14.6 (1999) 17.8 
OECD total 
f
 11.6 14.6 15.4 23.2 26.4 
Source: adapted from Tables 2.4 and 2.5, Employment Outlook, OECD (2006, 2002, and 2007). 
Note: 
a
 Part-time employment refers to work of less than 30 hours per week in the main job. Data include 
only persons declaring their usual work hours. 
b
 Data are based on the actual number of hours worked. 
c
 
Part-time employment is based on hours worked in all jobs. 
d
 Less than 35 hours per week. 
e
 Data are for 
waged and salaried workers only. 
f
 Average percentage for OECD member countries.  
 
Furthermore, the incidence of part-time employment is also significantly low among 
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temporary workers, while the incidence of temporary employment in the mining, 
manufacturing and construction industries is twice as high as the OECD average and 
three times as high as in the service industries, and temporary employment is 
concentrated in small establishments (Grubb et al., 2007:23). The characteristics of the 
Korean industrial structure, ‘the low incidence of part-time employment and total 
employment in the service sector staying below the OECD average’ (OECD 2007:24) 
implies that Korean women’s choices for paid work are more likely to be constrained 
than in other developed countries. However, it should be noted that the low incidence of 
part-time employment is traded off by the high incidence of self-employment and non-
paid family employment, which are likely to absorb women’s labour efforts. In short, 
the characteristics of the labour market and employment structure suggest strongly that 
gendered labour market segmentation has a potential link with Korean women’s 
(especially mothers’) job take-up. 
 
2.2.2.3. Sexual and marital division of labour and married women’s labour 
market status 
 
It is often argued that there is occupational segregation by sex in the Korean labour 
market. Women are concentrated in low-skilled and low-paid jobs or non-standard jobs, 
and are more likely than men to be unpaid family workers, while men are much more 
likely than women to be self-employed in Korea (Kim, 1995:185). Furthermore, Korean 
women’s occupational status is in accordance with their marital and employment status 
(Kim, 1995:185). Jobs in agriculture, production, sales and services are predominately 
occupied by married women, while clerical, professional, technical and managerial jobs 
– considered of higher social status than that of factory workers – are largely taken by 
single women due to employers’ preference for them (Kim, 1995:186-7). Kim 
(1995:188-9) found the difference between married and unmarried women’s 
employment status also persisted in the sexually-divided labour market. Married women 
were less common in waged jobs and more likely to be self-employed and family 
workers than single women, in the 1990s (Kim, 1995:188-9). This suggests that married 
women’s labour market status is even lower than unmarried women’s. In short, although 
the demand for married women’s labour is still increasing, occupational segregation by 
sex and by marital status seems to persist in the Korean labour market. 
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According to Kim and Kim (2004:4), the female share of non-standard jobs 
(temporary/daily workers and self-employed) has not changed over the last two decades, 
staying at around 50 per cent, and the female share is predominantly high among unpaid 
family workers (over 85 per cent), as shown in Table 2.8. The proportion of women in 
permanent and employed/self-employed jobs remains relatively low at less than 30 per 
cent, while the influx into temporary and daily jobs has been noticeable since 1997. As 
Hakim (2004:135) indicated, interrupted career patterns are typical of women’s rather 
than of men’s employment, and Kim (2007:39) also found that the difference in the life 
paths of men and women, particularly among irregular workers, is more pronounced in 
Korea. Many male temporary and daily workers are under 25 or over 60, whereas in the 
case of the equivalent female group, temporary and casual jobs are predominantly taken 
by women in their 30s and 40s, who are more likely to have childcare responsibilities. 
 
Table 2.8  The proportions of working women by working status over two decades 
(percentage) 
 Distribution of female employment 
by working status 
Female ratio by working status 
Employer/
Self-
employed 
Unpaid 
family 
workers 
P.W
a
 T.W
b
 
Casual
c
 
workers 
Employer/ 
Self-
employed 
Unpaid 
family 
workers 
P.W
a
 T.W
b
 
Casual
c
 
workers 
1980 23 37 .. .. 8 26 76 .. .. 33 
1990 18 24 21 22 12 27 87 26 52 51 
1997 20 19 22 27 10 29 90 27 56 46 
2001 20 18 19 28 13 29 88 27 55 52 
Source: Table 2, p4, Kim and Kim (2004). Note: 
a
 P.W. refers to permanent workers; 
b
 T.W. refers to 
temporary workers; 
c
 Casual workers are known as ‘daily workers’ in Korea. 
 
Similarly, Grubb et al. (2007:22) found that a high proportion of women aged around 30 
are in part-time work, and that married women, even compared with unmarried women, 
are concentrated in non-regular jobs along with an increase in the gender gap in older 
age groups, as shown in Table 2.9 below. In relation to the low-paid occupations taken 
mostly by married women, Grubb et al. (2007:25) found that the large wage difference 
between the sexes and between regular and non-regular workers in Korea is clearly 
attributable both to the prevailing labour market system and the frequent withdrawal of 
female workers from the labour market due to marriage and/or childbirth. With regard to 
the reason why married women are concentrated in non-standard jobs, Kim (1995:184) 
and Kim and Kim (2004:4) argue that this is associated with traditional gender 
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assumptions: ‘businesses presuppose women’s main responsibility is at home, so they 
seem to utilize women as a marginal workforce’ (Kim and Kim, 2004:4). 
 
Table 2.9  Incidence of non-standard employment by gender, age and marital status in 
Korea in 2005 (percentage) 
  Men Women 
Age cohorts 15-19 78.3 64.1 
 20-29 32.0 33.4 
 30-39 25.3 40.1 
 40-49 29.2 46.7 
 50-59 35.0 55.2 
 60 and over 60.0 75.7 
Marital status Not married 36.7 35.0 
 Married 28.5 46.4 
 Separated 48.1 56.5 
Source: Table 2.6, Grubb et al. (2007:22). 
 
In the British case, Blackwell’s research (2001:159-60) attributed it to the allocation of 
females to such jobs, by pointing out that many women (over a fifth of British women 
in the study) who started off in better-paid, full-time jobs ended up doing low skilled, 
female-type work during their child-rearing years, mostly as part-timers. Similarly, a 
Korean researcher, Jang (2001:90
x
) argues from her study of Korean married women’s 
irregular employment that the reason why married women are trapped in the irregular 
job market is due to the structural mechanisms of female work depreciation, that is, 
women have been persistently allocated to female-type work and such jobs tend to be 
flexible such as temporary, part-time, and other casual employment, especially in small-
sized firms where women are predominantly employed. In short, the research explored 
in this section suggests that married women’s labour market status is weak and low 
either due to discriminatory practices or the highly segmented labour market. Also, 
married women’s weak labour market status might affect their choice between being 
predominantly family carers or part of the labour force. 
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2.2.2.4. Cultural norms in the labour market and labour market discrimination 
 
Recent research has found that gender inequality in the labour market is widely 
accepted in Korea, arguing that ‘it could be that in cultures which accept gender 
inequalities, the role identity of women is in conflict with certain non-traditional roles 
(e.g. participating in the labour market)’ (Tesch-Romer et al., 2008:344). Tesch-Romer 
et al. (2008:337) considered that culturally-specific attitudes toward gender equality 
could affect the level of gender inequality at a societal level such as in female economic 
activities. To examine these relationships, they used data from the World Values Survey 
(WVS) from 1999 to 2004 of the country specific gender equality norms measured by 
both men and women’s agreement with the statement, ‘when jobs are scarce, men 
should have more right to a job than women’. In order to find any association between 
country-specific gender equality norms and maternal employment, the table produced 
by Tesch-Romer et al.’s study has been adapted by adding maternal employment with 
young children aged under 6 and by selecting countries, especially a few cases of 
Western and East Asian countries from the Human Development Report of 2002.  
 
Table 2.10  Norms of gender inequality and maternal employment in Korea 
(percentage) 
 
Disagree on 
gender 
inequality(%)* 
Relative 
female 
economic 
activity(%)** 
Maternal employment               
with young children(%)*** 
Age 0-2 Age 3-5 Age under 6 
Gender inequality on 
the labour market is 
widely accepted 
China 43.0 86 . . . 
Japan 20.8 67 28.5 47.5 38 
Korea 27.1 70 . . 25.7 
Gender inequality on 
the labour market is 
widely rejected 
Germany  55.7 69 36.1 54.8 45.5 
Ireland 76.9 52 . . 56.3 
US 81.9 81 54.2 62.8 57.5 
UK 68.6 74 52.6 58.3 55.5 
Source: derived from Appendix, C. Table 2-10, Tesch-Romer et al. (2008:346) and Selected tables from 
Employment Outlook (Vol.5), OECD (2007).  
Note: * Norms on gender inequality: percentage of the total population disagreeing with unequal treatment 
of men and women in the labour market, based on aggregated data from the fourth wave of the World 
Values Survey 1999-2004. ** Relative female economic activity rate per country, based on the Human 
Development Report 2002. ***Average percentage of mothers employed with children aged less than 3 
and 3-5, based on Appendix Table 3. The percentage of maternal employment with children aged less than 
6 is the average of the two children’s age groups. For Korea, data from Hwang (2003: 33) is used.  
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According to Table 2.10, the norms of gender inequality appear not to be associated 
with women’s overall economic activities in East Asia, but to be closely related to the 
economic activity rates of mothers with young children (derived from Hwang’s study 
(2003) of Korean married women’s employment). In countries where gender inequality 
in the labour market is widely accepted, fewer than 40 per cent of mothers with children 
aged under 6 are employed. However, in countries where gender inequality in the labour 
market is widely rejected, about 50 per cent of mothers with young children are 
employed – ranging from 45 to 60 per cent. The gap between the two groups seems to 
be more pronounced in the employment of mothers with children aged less than 3. This 
implies that gender inequality in the labour market may affect mothers’ labour market 
participation. As discussed earlier, in relation to Table 2.3, although discriminatory 
practices and systems appear to have reduced over time, the statistics indicate that 
married women see working conditions as unequal and this has remained unchanged 
over time. This implies that there is not much improvement in the gender and marital 
biased labour market system in Korea.  
 
With more concern about sex discrimination, Keum (2002:194) argued that there is 
continued sex discrimination by firms in Korea despite the extension of gender equality 
legislation and government-led affirmative action. Similarly, Shin (2006:58) also shows 
that there is sex discrimination in the Korean labour market and that there is a 
considerable gap between the legislation and labour market practices. Keum (2002:110) 
pays attention to the discriminatory practices inside firms resulting from social/cultural 
gender norms and education. Keum (2002:136-140, 178) argues that although the 
research findings support the human capital approach, there is a considerable proportion 
which cannot be explained by individuals’ expected productivity, so gender differences 
in human capital should be considered the result of sex discrimination because they 
could be caused by social prejudice towards gender roles and women’s education. The 
author argues that the proportions can be explained by labour market discrimination 
(Keum, 2002:178-179
xi
): for instance, according to the research findings of explanatory 
variables for the gender wage difference in Korea, the considerable proportions left 
unexplained (29.5 per cent) suggests there is sex discrimination, while the gender 
difference in (expected) productivity accounts for 69.5  per cent.  
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In line with the human capital approach, he stresses the possibility that labour market 
discrimination may cause or reinforce the gender differences in pre-market human 
capital investment (in other words, parents may invest in their sons due to the market’s 
discrimination against women), individual preferences (affected by parents and 
teachers) and gender comparative advantages (Keum, 2002:96, 153-154). More 
importantly, the author suggests that the removal of sex discrimination by market 
function, as mentioned above, is not likely to take place due to discrepancies in the 
supply and demand for female workers (Keum, 2002:194-196
xii
); while a highly 
educated labour force is increasing, the labour market lacks professional and highly 
productive jobs for the highly educated labour force. As a result, as firms prefer a male 
work force due to women’s high turnover rates, married women are more likely either to 
give up employment voluntarily or take up low quality jobs such as temporary or daily 
jobs (Keum, 2002:194-196). Indeed, in Korea, although professional jobs for skilled 
administrators and management positions with high salaries and high productivity have 
increased, such occupations are more often taken by males than by females, and female 
workers are concentrated in low-paid service jobs (Keum, 2002:104-105
xiii
).  
 
Table 2.11  Sex restrictive practices in recruitment by Korean firms in 2001 
(percentage) 
Jobs 
No sex 
restriction 
Employ 
only men 
Employ          
only women 
Management 48.9 48.9 2.1 
Office work Planning/promotion/recruitment/training  79.0 12.9 8.1 
Financing/accounting  57.4 24.6 18.0 
Clerical  65.3 16.3 18.4 
Sales/service Sales  65.9 25.2 8.9 
Customer service  72.0 20.0 8.0 
Professional 
skilled 
Researching/design/technician  79.3 17.9 2.8 
Sales engineer  54.6 45.5 0.0 
Skilled 
manual 
Field manager/supervisor  30.8 69.2 0.0 
Manufacturing production  61.6 31.3 7.1 
Unskilled 
manual 
Construction  40.0 50.0 10.0 
Driving/cleaning/porter  55.9 37.8 6.3 
Total (the number of firms) 65.8 (538) 27.0 (221) 7.2 (59) 
Source: Table 6-3, Keum (2002:160, my translation). 
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The analysis of the National Statistics data of 2001 suggests that ‘gender division in 
occupation is over-represented in the Korean labour market and has got worse over 
recent years. Women’s share of female jobs increased from 70.4% in 1993 to 77.0% in 
2000, for instance, in service and sales jobs and bio-science and health, education, 
customer service jobs’ (Keum, 2002:111-112). In particular, Keum (2002:161) gives 
evidence of sex discrimination inside firms such as in the recruitment, promotion, job 
assignation, position, wage level and on-the-job training in Korean firms. For example, 
34.2 per cent of firms (in 2001) set sex restrictions in their recruitment: men are 
preferred particularly for the professional, managerial and supervisory jobs (Keum, 
2002:159), as shown in Table 2.11. 
 
Women in their late 30s upwards who want to re-enter the labour market after childbirth 
are more likely than men to stay economically inactive (Keum, 2002:157
xiv
), 
presumably, due to labour market discrimination against their interrupted careers and 
age as well. Furthermore, there is a big sex difference in the top jobs, which suggests 
women have low status in firms and the likelihood that there is sex discrimination 
(Keum, 2002:164-165): for example, this is predominant in promotion experience. The 
paper observes that twice as many men receive promotion than women when 
controlling for explanatory factors such as wage level, seniority, employment type, job 
position etc., suggesting strongly that there is sex discrimination in the promotion 
practices of firms (Keum, 2002:170
xv
). Notably, women workers are more likely to be 
employed in a job with less chance of promotion as women workers are concentrated in 
small-sized firms, which offer little opportunity for advancement (Keum, 2002:175). 
The participation rates on job-training schemes between the two sexes also illustrate this, 
with the proportion for men being more than double that of women: 3.4% for men and 
0.9% for women in 2001 (Keum, 2002:182).  
 
In a similar vein, Shin and Cho (1998:718
xvi
) also stress that sex segregation in the 
labour market results from the gender division of job allocation through the recruiting 
process in response to employers’ gender preferences and attitudes. Moreover, they 
argue that gender differences in the time of starting a job are associated with gender 
differences in job mobility (promotion) over the course of the working life, with strong 
indications of gender-discriminating organizational principles embedded in a gender-
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divided job system and gendered value system in Korea – men tend to start work before 
the age of 30 while women tend to take up work later than men and may only enter the 
job market in their 30’s; and while only 2.1 per cent of men begin work  in their 30s, 
over 25 per cent of women start work after they reach 30 and these women tend to be 
concentrated in the lower occupational class (Shin and Cho, 1998:723
xvii
). On the other 
hand, a survey researching Korean people’s consciousness of labour market 
discrimination, using a random sample of 2,000 interviewees aged over 20, found that, 
in general, people thought discrimination against disability and education was most 
serious, followed by discrimination against regional origins and irregular work in 
Korean society (Park et al., 2004:183-188). Park et al. (2004:57, 94-96) found that more 
women (51.2 per cent) were aware of sex discrimination than men (34.9 per cent), and 
that men, especially those with army service experience, and older and less educated 
people, were more likely to embrace traditional gender norms. As the literature suggests, 
in short, norms of gender inequality in the labour market and labour market 
discrimination may be closely connected with the Korean-specific labour market system 
and workplace culture which is illuminated in the following section.  
 
2.2.2.5. Labour market system and workplace culture 
 
Whitley summarized the characteristics of labour market systems in East Asian 
countries including Korea:  
 
East Asian societies share some common pre-industrial features and also their 
experience of rapid industrialization, and all ‘post-Confucian’ cultures share the 
common theme that individuals achieve their identity solely through family 
membership, which distinguishes these societies from Western societies. 
(1992:219)  
 
In particular, Whitley (1992) described the gender difference in the labour market 
involvement during the industrialization process in East Asian countries that put women 
in subservient positions and developed policies for male skilled workers that were 
different from those for short-term female workers under ‘the common expectations that 
they will leave employment upon marriage’ (Whitley, 1992:218-238). The way the 
Korean labour market system has developed allows many industries to use low-paid, 
low-skilled female labour as a way of increasing flexibility during the rapid 
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industrialization process. The Korean labour market is characterized as a seniority-
based wage and management system (Grubb et al., 2007:56; Kim and Kim, 2004:2). 
Grubb et al. (2007:56) found that a rigid seniority-based wage system remains dominant 
in Korean businesses. Kim and Kim (2004:2-5) also indicated that married women’s 
low level of return to work was closely related to the seniority-based remuneration and 
personnel management system of Korean firms, despite the introduction of a 
performance-based system in recent years. Under the seniority-based wage and 
promotion system, wages increase with each successive year of continued employment 
regardless of employees’ skills or performance, and promotions up to middle 
management positions are based on certain seniority measures, such as the level of 
education and the length of continuous service at work (Kim and Kim, 2004:2-5). 
 
In fact, age is an important factor in the workings of gender and class dynamics in the 
internal labour market, which paints quite a different picture of Korea from that of 
Western societies. Korean women often suffer from an incongruity between age and 
authority in the workplace, and this is one of the reasons for women leaving jobs earlier 
than men or having a short job tenure (Janelli and Yim, 2002:119-121). Married women 
who often re-enter the labour market in their mid or late 30s after childbirth are more 
likely to confront age-related problems (Janelli and Yim, 2002:121): ‘Female office 
workers usually are not promoted beyond the lowest rank, [and] a woman who stays 
employed will eventually find herself taking orders from a male superior who is her 
junior in age as well as in corporate experience’. This implies that the result may be the 
employment of fewer older women of working age in Korea compared with other 
OECD countries: in fact, in the case of older women aged between 55 and 59, the 
participation rate in Korea where the retirement age is 60 for both sexes (see Table 2.C 
in the Appendix) was nearly 52 per cent in 2009, below the OECD average of about 58 
per cent in the same year (OECD, 2011c). Numbers in Korea have not increased much 
above the 51.3 per cent in 2000, while the OECD average has increased by 9 per cent 
from 49 per cent in 2000 (OECD, 2011c). It is highly likely that married older women 
are doubly disadvantaged by the cultural age and gender system.  
 
In addition to the characteristics of the labour market system, the historical-specific 
developments of the Korean workplace culture are also important to note. After the 
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Korean War (1950-53), Korean society was led by a coalition consisting of an 
authoritarian military government and the conglomerates, the so-called ‘Chaebol’, 
which dominated the economy as well as the labour market hierarchy (Kendall, 2002:5-
9). The Korean Chaebol copied many of the existing hierarchical and disciplinary 
practices, and these, as well as the organizational structure, were again widely copied by 
small and medium-sized firms (Kendall, 2002:6-7). The Confucian tradition of 
privileging men over women has been re-articulated over recent decades through the 
government’s rhetoric of meritocracy and valuing military service (Janelli and Yim, 
2002:115), and has been encouraged by the culture of common dining and after-hours 
activities in workplaces (Janelli and Yim, 2002:119-122); in particular, married women 
are not expected to join the long evening work-related socializing activities as often as 
men do. As Shin (2001:103-104
xviii
) argued, in the ideal Korean work model where men 
are assumed to be the main breadwinners and the ideal labour force, married women are 
most likely to be marginalized, because long working days and extra activities outside 
formal work-hours are often too heavy a burden for married women, and thus Korean 
cultural practices define married women within specific work areas or in the home. Jang 
and Bu’s study of married women’s work and childrearing (Jang and Bu, 2003:19-21) 
showed that for Korean married women workers, especially those in their 30s and 
highly educated, a masculine work culture and long work-hours are two of the major 
concerns, following the lack of a social system to support these women’s work-life 
balance. 
 
In research into the time-pressures within the family in Korea, You (2008:56-58) also 
found that a couple’s long work-hours contribute to the different labour market 
behaviour of couples: in households with children, the male spouse tends to increase his 
work-hours and the female spouse tends to reduce hers. The culture of long work-hours 
is also reflected in the labour market system for regulating work hours and employment 
flexibility. In this regard, Won and Pascall (2004:271) pointed to the long working day 
culture by showing the unofficial work hours in Korea remain far higher – above 51 
hours for men and 49 for women – than the official work hours, which are legally 
limited to 44 hours per week. There have been some attempts to improve practices by 
amending the legislation but with little success. According to Kim (2007:451
xix
), despite 
the reduction in official work-hours in Korea (to 40 hours per week) since 2003, 
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improved work-hour practices after the legislation became law spread very slowly in 
businesses and had little impact on individual workers’ actual working hours. Kim and 
Kim (2004:27) found that working hours per year in Korea are about 600 to 900 hours 
longer than in other developed countries. In short, the long-work-hour culture is also 
associated with the form of married women’s participation, as it is recognized as a 
barrier to working mothers and as creating extreme tensions between the demands of 
employers and the needs of children (Kim and Kim, 2004:17; Won and Pascall, 
2004:282). 
 
Along with the long-work-hour culture, absence of labour market flexibility may 
constrain women, particularly married women’s choices to work or not, because flexible 
options such as part-time work offered by employers may affect their decision to settle 
for lower status work. Many Western developed economies, such as the UK – which has 
recently changed its social norms and undergone institutional change (Smith, 2003:180-
182, 309-311), especially regarding maternal employment – have higher rates of 
mothers returning to work after completing their families, along with having more 
choices such as both full-time or part-time options. By contrast, particularly in Korea, 
women’s choices seem to be very limited in that the incidence of part-time employment 
is relatively low and far from flexible. OECD statistical data (OECD, 2007), as shown 
in Table 2.7 earlier, indicates that part-time work is significantly and positively 
associated with women’s participation, particularly mothers with young children, in the 
UK, for instance. Therefore, in a country where women’s participation rate is relatively 
low, it is likely that mothers’ choices are more constrained by less provision of work 
time flexibility. 
 
Wakisaka and Bae (1997:259-262) argued that the reason why the proportion of part-
timers is lower than in other Western countries and even Japan, is closely related to 
workers’ status in Korea. However, rather than saying that workers prefer not to take 
part-time jobs due to ‘their low-status’, it would be better to consider the effects of the 
long-work-hour culture of the Korean labour market on the low incidence of part-time 
jobs. As a result, firms are likely to offer fewer reduced-hour jobs (that is, part-time) 
while longer hour flexible jobs such as temporary, dispatch, and casual jobs are more 
popular. This point of view I made is supported by Grubb et al. (2007:22) arguing that 
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temporary jobs taken by women are less related to the need for work-time flexibility in 
Korea, in that the incidence of part-time employment among temporary workers is 
significantly low: in 2005, only 14 per cent of temporary workers and 4.1 per cent of 
permanent workers worked part-time. However, temporary workers in Western 
developed countries seem to prefer part-time employment linked to flexible scheduling 
(Grubb et al., 2007:22): in 2000, over one-third in 10 OECD countries and over half the 
temporary workers in the Netherlands and Ireland worked part-time. In short, Korean 
women are disadvantaged by the labour market system, long-work-hour culture and the 
lack of work-time flexibility, suggesting that Korean married women’s choices are more 
likely to be constrained by the gendered labour market regime.  
 
2.2.2.6. Korean welfare regime and cultural gender assumptions in policy logic 
 
The Korean welfare regime has been described as ‘productivist welfare capitalism, due 
to the legacy of its early development era [which was] preoccupied with economic 
development’ (Kim, 2008:110; see also Razavi, 2007:70).  
 
According to the productivist welfare capitalism thesis (PWC thesis) defined by 
Ian Holiday (2000:709 and 2005:149), the productivist welfare regime has two 
central features: that of the existence of a growth-oriented developmental state, and 
that of the subordination of social policy to economic and industrial policy, 
emphasizing that social policy does not have its own autonomous developmental 
logic and is fundamentally restrained by growth-oriented economic policy. (Kim, 
2008:110) 
 
It has also been referred to as ‘Confucian social welfare’, whereby the extended family 
provides an effective source of income support (OECD, 2000:3; Kim, 2008:109; Won 
and Pascall, 2004:271; Sung, 2003). However, there have been some welfare 
developments in the post-financial crisis of Korea. As joblessness and poverty rates 
increased after the 1997/98 financial crisis, the Korean government needed to respond 
with the expansion of the social safety net, and the Korean welfare regime appears to be 
moving towards a more universal social welfare system by expanding coverage and 
increasing benefit levels in the social insurance system and social assistance scheme 
(Kim, 2008:113). Nonetheless, it is still considered to be a residual welfare regime, 
where public relief programme reforms have been restrained – often due to the 
overriding concern of damaging work incentives – by retaining means-tested thresholds 
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and placing greater reliance on family responsibilities for welfare, and as one where 
there is an imbalance in the employment protection legislation of regular and non-
regular workers in Korea, although the official coverage rate is claimed to be over 90 
per cent for both groups (Ban, 2006:33-35).  
 
In particular, discrepancies in corporate welfare coverage between regular, permanent 
employment and irregular employment are a salient issue in the Korean literature and 
policy discourses, because the weak function of corporate welfare as indirect 
compensation widens the pay gap between the two and increases the exclusion of 
irregular workers, in other words their ‘marginalization’ in the labour market (Ban, 
2006:28
xx
). According to Grubb et al. (2007:26-27, 55), ‘non-regular workers are openly 
denied the fringe benefits that a company provides its regular workforce’ because of the 
number of employee benefits requiring a minimum working period or a working hour 
threshold. The situation is worse in small firms where most non-regular workers are 
concentrated, as the legislation is easily avoided (Grubb et al., 2007:26-27). Table 2.12 
clearly shows that the proportion of non-regular workers benefiting from social 
insurance in 2005 is roughly half that of regular workers and while establishments 
compliant with the employment insurance system were 53 per cent, the compliance rate 
for small-sized workplaces (15.2 per cent) is significantly lower than the larger-sized 
(62.5 per cent). This implies a weaker position for non-regular workers, particularly 
Korean women, in the social welfare system. 
 
Table 2.12  Compliance with social insurance schemes in 2005 (percentage) 
 
Employment 
Insurance 
Public 
Pension 
National Health 
Insurance 
Employment Insurance System: 
By the establishment size 
Regular 
workers 
63.8 75.7 75.9 
Workplaces with fewer 
than five workers 
15.2 
Non-regular 
workers 
34.5 36.6 37.7 
Workplaces with five 
and more workers 
62.5 
Source: adapted from Table 2.10, in Grubb et al. (2007:27). 
 
To solve this issue, the Korean government introduced anti-discrimination legislation in 
2006, to combat discrimination relating to wages and working conditions between non-
regular and regular workers (Grubb et al., 2007:54). However, Grubb et al. (2007:55) 
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suggest it is difficult to put into practice without reforms to the complex, seniority-based 
wage structure prevalent in Korean firms, where a number of different allowances are 
paid in addition to a basic salary, depending largely on an employee’s seniority, with the 
result that many are excluded; for instance, ‘employers may well argue that some 
specific allowances are paid as remuneration for long-term service, rather than for the 
job currently performed’ (Grubb et al., 2007:55). In short, despite the recent reforms and 
the expansion of the Korean welfare system after the financial crisis, many see the 
changes as limited and thus the Korean welfare system is considered to have adopted a 
Confucian model or growth-friendly welfare system with the characteristics of 
voluntary – not compulsory – welfare for some employees (Kim, 2008:109-111). 
Particularly at the quality level and in practice, welfare schemes remain inadequate, as 
suggested by the considerable discrepancy between numerical and substantial coverage 
(Grubb et al., 2007:41).  
 
On the one hand, it is argued that ‘instrumentalist’ family values – particularly in the 
sense that women’s sacrifice of personal ambition is justified by the family’s welfare – 
have been gradually fading, along with the social trend toward individualism and 
women’s movements (Kim and Kim, 2004:9). On the other hand, many still see the 
legacies of the ‘Confucian social welfare’ (Won and Pascall, 2004:271) as reliance on 
the family remaining disproportionately high in the Korean social welfare system 
(OECD, 2000:2-3). The low public family welfare expenditure could be attributed to the 
characteristics of the Korean welfare system: public spending remains very low in terms 
of international comparison despite social expenditure per GDP increasing from 3.9 per 
cent in 1997 to 5.7 per cent in 2004 (Kim, 2008:114). Compared with Western countries, 
reliance on the family in the Korean regime seems distinctly greater: 
 
Korean state expenditure on childcare is low, with parents footing 72 per cent of 
the bill, compared with 59 per cent in the USA, 47 per cent in Japan and 17 per 
cent in Sweden. The proportion of children in formal childcare is only 7 per cent of 
those aged under 3, compared with 40 per cent in Canada, Sweden, Denmark and 
Norway, and 26 per cent of those aged between 3 and the mandatory school age, 
compared with 90 per cent and more in most OECD countries. (Won and Pascall, 
2004:271) 
 
Won and Pascall (2004:270-272, 278-279) argue that the Korean welfare system has to 
be understood as a product of Confucian ideals or traditional family culture, and 
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problems are closely related to the Korean government’s gendered assumptions and the 
consequently heavy weight placed on the family and private sector. This strongly 
suggests that inadequate welfare provision is due to the cultural expectations of the 
family unit within the social policy’s logic, and these earlier gendered cultural norms 
negatively impact on Korean mothers’ employment. Kim and Kim (2004:21) explain the 
low maternal employment level in Korea as being due to the state childcare policy, that 
is, the childcare policy emphasizes private facilities rather than public facilities:  
 
Private nurseries have been encouraged through deregulation and cheap 
government long-term loans since 1997, with an almost three fold rise between 
1995 and 2000, while the numbers of publicly funded and operated centres has 
remained consistently low. (Won and Pascall, 2004:276) 
 
This has contributed to increasing the burden of childcare costs for parents, and as a 
result, limiting the economic activities of married women: for instance, most married 
women have no choice but to accept not to work. Kim and Kim (2004) criticize the 
government’s childcare policy as one reason why the participation rate of married 
women with children under 6 years old has decreased steadily. Indeed, infant care, 
whether public or private, is severely limited: only 10 per cent of the demand for infant 
care is satisfied (Won and Pascall, 2004:279).  
 
Kim (2005:48) also stresses the need for childcare for children of primary school age 
(up to age 8 in year 3), who need after-school care for the morning-only school sessions. 
Gornick et al. (1997:49) suggest that mothers’ taking up paid work is heavily 
constrained by children’s school hours. In the case of Korea, the school day for children 
at primary school (up to year 3) is very short, just morning sessions and lunch but with 
insufficient state after-school provision. State childcare and after-school clubs at school 
are offered, but mainly for lower-income families (Kim, 2005:48). This suggests that 
most Korean mothers suffer from a lack of good quality childcare for infants as well as 
primary school age children. In short, considering the low level of public spending on 
the family and small amount of state childcare provision, it seems clear that the policy 
logic of the Korean welfare regime is still rooted in cultural gender assumptions. 
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2.2.2.7. Public support for maternal employment and recent changes in the 
legislation 
 
As for the impact and importance of welfare policies supporting maternal employment, 
this has been well documented in the Western literature. With a full recognition of the 
importance of public support for maternal employment, the recent policy changes in 
Korea are illustrated following the arguments of the Western studies. Gregg et al. 
(2003:15-16) demonstrated that policies concerning maternity rights, taxation and 
childcare can induce a change in mothers’ attitudes toward returning to work after 
childbirth. Earlier, Lewis (1992:162) looked at the way in which twentieth century 
welfare states treated women as wives, mothers and paid workers and suggested that the 
idea of the male-breadwinner family model still more or less cuts across most welfare 
regimes. Similarly, Rubery and Grimshaw (2003:1, 43-50), in an attempt to incorporate 
gender-ordered welfare typologies and employment systems, suggested that the variants 
of welfare regimes characterized by the nature of the tax system, support for parents, the 
working patterns of women, female contributions to family income, and gender 
segregation were associated with maternal employment, along with their policy 
assumptions about the type of legitimate family model (the male-breadwinning family 
model).  
 
In addition, Gornick et al. (1997:60) suggested from empirical observations of the 
cross-national variants of policies in 14 Western developed countries between 1984 to 
1987 that women’s employment is evidently associated with gender regimes by pointing 
out that schooling for children does not match mothers’ work system or work hours: 
 
In countries where government benefits were altogether limited, without job 
protection and access to leave, many women workers faced stiff penalties for work 
absences due to childbirth, and without publicly subsidized childcare many had 
few viable alternatives to the full-time maternal care of children. (Gornick et al., 
1997:65)  
 
Gornick et al. (1997:65) further argued that in the countries referred to above, an M-
shaped employment pattern was more likely as women workers would exit the labour 
force temporarily and/or repeatedly in response to inadequate social support. Moreover, 
they emphasized that such countries need to develop policy packages combined with 
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job protection and wage replacement at childbirth for women with dependent children 
below school-age: for example, separate support by child age cohorts such as 
leave/provision for the care of infants below the age of three, publicly subsidized 
childcare and early enrolment in state schools for the care of children above the age of 
three (Gornick et al., 1997:64). EU policy trends regarding maternal employment and 
childcare, and family-related leave and provision (especially parental leave), have been 
reinforced in recent years with increasing concern in European countries to encourage 
men to participate in childcare activities (Riedmann et al., 2006:35-36).  
 
Likewise, more recently, the Korean government enhanced support for maternal 
employment by increasing the revenue for childcare provision and by introducing 
legislation for work-life balance schemes (integrated into the legislation for gender 
equal employment opportunities) in 2008 (Grubb et al., 2007:57; KDI, 2008:71). In 
order to support the work-life balance, the government has built a work-life balance 
scheme incorporating the existing childcare support scheme (KDI, 2008:71-75); the 
work-life balance scheme includes maternity leave, paternity leave, leave of absence 
(childcare leave), workplace day care, and flexible working arrangements; maternity 
leave and benefits have become a legal obligation and right, extended by increasing the 
government’s burden of costs and coverage. The government’s contribution (through the 
Employment Insurance System) means maternity leave has increased from 4 weeks to 8 
weeks, particularly for SMEs, the cost of the  duration of the leave being paid through 
employment insurance (Grubb et al., 2007:55-57).  
 
Also, the period of maternity leave has increased from 8 to 12 weeks and from infants 
aged less than 1 year to those aged less than 3, but remains at a low level of benefit and 
is restricted  to those with infants aged less than 3 (KDI, 2008:75). However, as in the 
case of unemployment, women must have been insured for at least 180 days in order to 
qualify for this benefit scheme (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-279). Despite these recent 
improvements, the duration of paid maternity leave is still only half the average of other 
OECD countries where, in 1999, the average length of paid maternity, parental or 
childcare leave was 26 weeks (Grubb et al., 2007:57-58). Paternity leave, which was at 
the employers’ discretion, became obligatory in the updated legislation of 2008, and 
remains superficial and hardly generous in that paternity leave consists of 3 days’ 
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unpaid leave (KDI, 2008:78). It is doubtful whether male spouses will really take it. As 
for childcare leave, Korean women can take paid childcare leave for 52 weeks and 
unpaid childcare leave for up to one further year (KDI, 2008:76). In the case of paid 
childcare leave, they receive 200,000 won a month (approximately £100) from 
Employment Insurance to compensate for their loss of income (Won and Pascall, 
2004:278-279).  
 
Flexible working-time arrangements have been introduced as a work-life balance 
support scheme to supplement ‘leave of absence’ (unpaid childcare leave) (KDI, 
2008:76). Like childcare leave, the flexible working time arrangement is limited to one 
year and for mothers with children aged less than 3 (KDI, 2008:79-80). However, the 
right is not a statutory obligation but at the employer’s discretion, and mothers with pre-
school age children or primary school children at the lower level who have half a day’s 
schooling, are excluded (KDI, 2008:79-80). Thus, the most needy are highly likely to be 
excluded from benefiting from the legislation. On the other hand, childcare services in 
Korea are provided predominantly by the private sector: in 2003, private childcare 
facilities accounted for 56.5 per cent, home-based private childcare facilities for 37 per 
cent, public childcare facilities for 5.5 per cent and company-based childcare facilities 
were 1.0 per cent (Kim, 2005:48).  
 
Moreover, compared with the relatively higher percentage (on average 3 per cent) in EU 
countries of company-based childcare provision plus 2 per cent of other forms of 
provision (Riedmann et al., 2006:39-40), company-based childcare provision in Korea 
is extremely low; workplace childcare facilities are only for 1.2 per cent of all infants 
using  childcare provision (Kim, 2004:2). Although workplaces with more than 300 
female employees are obliged to have childcare facilities, only 48.4 per cent, in fact, 
offer workplace childcare and only 6 per cent of establishments offer a childcare 
assistance allowance (Kim, 2004:3-4). Support for workplace childcare has been 
reinforced by extending the financial support the government gives to the workplace; 
however, it is limited to businesses with 500 and more employees or with over 300 
female employers (KDI, 2008:77-78). Furthermore, support for the childcare service is 
based on a means-tested scheme which excludes applicants who have wages of more 
than the average wage for all urban workers and who have children aged less than 5 
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(KDI, 2008:72-73). To sum up, the recent legislation (as of 2008) is presented in Table 
2.13. 
 
Table 2.13  The support for childcare and work-life balance scheme (2008) 
 Length Compensation Eligibility 
Maternity leave  12 weeks 
(90 days) 
paid 100% of 
average of 
wages 
working women with a child under 1 
year: unemployed women need to 
have been insured for at least 180 
days. 
Paternity leave  3 days unpaid 
working men with a child under 1 
year: newly introduced from 2008 
Work-life 
balance 
scheme 
Childcare leave 
52 weeks 
paid 
(about £100) 
for working women with children aged 
less than 3 and for working women 
with insurance contributions for over 
6 months 
up to one 
year 
unpaid 
Flexible working up to one 
year 
non-compulsory 
for employers 
for working women with children aged 
less than 3  
Childcare 
facilities 
Workplace day 
care 
1% (2003) compulsory for workplaces with more 
than 300 female employees 
Public day care 5.5% (2003)  
Source: derived from Grubb et al. (2007:57-58), Won and Pascall (2004:278-279), Kim (2005:48), and KDI 
(2008:71-78).  
 
Although the Korean government has improved maternity rights and childcare leave 
schemes by legislation such as the Gender Equality, Infant Care Act and Employment 
Insurance Act over recent years, violation of the legislation is common due to 
insufficient legal penalties and there is also a gender difference in the take-up of 
childcare leave (Won and Pascall, 2004:278-9). Most women (more than 60 per cent) 
are employed in small firms with fewer than 100 employees where violation of the 
legislation is common, and childcare leave is taken primarily by mothers (Won and 
Pascall, 2004:278-9):  
 
36 per cent of firms violate it by not paying entitlements, or by partial payment. 
But the penalties are insufficient to ensure effective implementation. Many firms 
are reluctant to pay for temporary cover for childcare leave, and women who take 
leave may feel a burden to their colleagues. Only 0.7 per cent of working mothers 
took childcare leave on average, due to financial difficulties and lack of cover.  
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It is important to note here that Won and Pascall (2004:279) believe that both employers 
and mothers should take some of the responsibility because although the legislation is 
not effectively implemented in practice by employers, mothers are caught in the 
Confucian family ideology trap as well. Riedmann et al. (2006:35-36) also indicate that 
apart from the regulatory schemes, the take-up of parental leave by both mothers and 
fathers seems to conform to the prevailing gender roles within society, whereas 
considerably more mothers than fathers take it up in all EU countries. In short, the 
prevailing gender roles within a society as well as an inadequate and inefficient welfare 
policy for maternal employment are likely to influence married women’s decision 
toward paid labour as well as both mothers’ and fathers’ take up of childcare 
leave/provision. 
 
2.2.3. Identifying class factors in the Korean context: class differentiated 
mothering and child education 
 
One assumption in this thesis is that Korea is a class society and women reflect their 
class as part of their identity and behaviour, while the ‘class’ or ‘classless’ debates are 
not a big concern in the Korean literature as the Western ones. To provide the context 
for the situation in Korea, an overview of the development of the class structure in 
Korea and the characteristics of married women’s class identity are elaborated first of 
all and followed by a discussion of the class differentiated experience of mothering and 
child education in the Korean context.   
 
2.2.3.1. Historical and cultural-specific development of class structures and the 
characteristics of married women’s class identity 
 
As the historical and cultural factors will affect how class is structured and people’s 
class identities, it is useful to review the Korean-specific historical and cultural 
developments. According to Abelmann (1997:401-403), there are three main historical 
and cultural factors affecting the structuring of class in modern Korean society. The first 
is Korea’s rapid structural change: the growth of the industrial sector and the dramatic 
rural exodus of the 1960s and 1970s including the radical rates of urbanization and 
industrialization and the profound restructuring of the labour market. The second factor 
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is the Korean War 1950-1953, which recast class configurations due to the war’s real 
dislocation to downward mobility and the redistribution of wealth brought about by the 
relatively successful land-reforms (Abelmann, 1997:401-403; Kendall, 2002:1-6; Koo, 
2001:46-48). Third, Korea’s meritocratic institutions, particularly education (refer to 
Whitley, 1999/2000:156-164), have affected the occupational class structure. Similarly, 
Kendall (2002:1-9) points out that class and gender identities were re-shaped through 
the re-formulation of classes after the Korean War and the legacies of ‘engender’ in the 
pre-industrial society, the culture of privileging men over women, have been either 
preserved or reinforced by the coalition between the authoritarian military and the 
conglomerates, “Chaebol”, which has contributed to the expansion of the white-collar 
class and dominated the labour market hierarchy. Janelli and Yim (2002:115) argue that 
women are set lower in the occupational hierarchy by the privileging of men, 
particularly in terms of men’s higher education and military service in Korea.  
 
Shin and Cho (1998:728-732
xxi
) also argue that the probability of female skilled 
workers becoming urban working class is higher than for men in Korea, suggesting that 
there is gendered structure sustaining the gender inequality embedded in the class 
relations. Due to the late entry of women into the labour market and their having fewer 
possibilities for class mobility (almost half those of men), women are much less likely 
to be in the upper occupational classes (such as professional, managerial and 
entrepreneurial) than men (Shin and Cho, 1998:715
xxii
). Furthermore, female workers’ 
concentration in the low occupational class appears to have contributed to family 
income inequality in Korea as well (Kim and Shin, 2008:76-103). In the sense that the 
‘family as such is a unit incorporating individuals’ earnings and consumption, and the 
investment in children’s education which affects class mobility is also determined by the 
size of the material resources of the family’ (Kim and Shin, 2008:81xxiii), wives’ lack of 
income contributes to the family’s economic inequality, which, it could be argued, is 
also related to the reproduction of generational inequality including regarding jobs and 
children’s education.  
 
It has been argued that the industrialization and urbanization in Korea over the past 
decades has developed in such a way as to widen the difference between the social 
classes (Byun, 2001: 20, 43-44
xxiv
): middle and upper class families have secure 
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employment and relatively higher incomes by contrast with lower class families in 
insecure and low-paid jobs. These historical and cultural-specific developments of class 
structuring will affect how Koreans, particularly married people, perceive their socio-
economic status. While class divisions in the post-industrialization society appear to 
have been perpetuated along with economic growth and wider income gaps, class 
identity is becoming clearer than ever before, more than in the industrialization era. It is 
often noted that people’s actions differ according to their class identity – different 
political affiliations, voting and consumption patterns. As this thesis is concerned with 
the relationship between class identity and labour market behaviour rather than political 
action and consumption, it is important to review how Koreans perceive class identity 
with reference to their socio-economic status before the analysis.  
 
While Lee and Shin (2009:271
xxv
) define class as status identification referring to ‘how 
society members perceive their socioeconomic status subjectively and which 
hierarchical level they belong to’, they find that there is a difference in status 
identification between the sexes (Lee and Shin, 2009:273). Lee and Shin (2009:285-
286) found that Korean married women tend to borrow or share their spouse’s social 
status, even when they are themselves employed. In particular, Korean married men and 
women tend to report their class downward when their or their spouse’s employment 
status is irregular, reflecting the fact that irregular jobs are considered low-status jobs in 
the Korean labour market. By contrast, a female spouse’s status does not affect the male 
spouse’s status identification. They also examined what factors are significantly 
associated with changes in status consciousness by comparing 1999 (the recession of 
the Korean economy after the financial crisis) and 2007 (during relatively good 
economic conditions), with the assumption that socio-economic conditions affect 
couples’ status identification (Lee and Shin, 2009:280).  
 
Their study shows that increases in household income and consumption are significantly 
associated with upward-status identification (Lee and Shin, 2009:284-285). Most 
interestingly, they found that married women tend to upwardly report their status when 
their employment status changes from irregular employment to non-employment (Lee 
and Shin, 2009:279-280). Married men do the same when their spouse’s employment 
status changes from irregular to non-employment. This means that a female spouse’s 
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non-employment status does not affect her status identification negatively and it also 
implies that a female spouse’s non-employment (perhaps, staying at home as a kind of 
lifestyle) is considered as a ‘legitimate culture’ of the middle-class in Korea. 
 
2.2.3.2. Class differentiated experience of mothering in Korea: class difference 
in access to quality childcare  
  
Together with a widening family income gap, there is the suggestion of class inequality 
amongst Korean mothers; ‘mothers in higher classes are more likely to be able to afford 
and have access to quality childcare than mothers in the lower class’ (Won and Pascall, 
2004:274-275). There seems to be a distinct class division in the affordability of 
childcare between the classes in Korea. Class divisions in access to childcare in Korea 
are closely related to the growing polarization of women by discriminatory labour 
market experiences and the welfare benefit system (that is, different benefits according 
to employment status). Women in the upper occupational classes are better educated and 
more likely to be promoted by overcoming gender discrimination, whereas gender 
discrimination is much more strongly experienced by women at the bottom of the 
occupational classes, as McRae (2003:334) suggests in the research of British women. 
Won and Pascall (2004:279) point out that ‘Poorer mothers are experiencing more 
broken career patterns and poorer-quality work, often part-time work characterized by 
low wages, low skill, high turnover, poor working conditions, and limited legal 
protection’. Class differences in access to childcare imply that the Korean welfare 
regime does not function well in breaking down discriminatory class barriers.  
 
In fact, the Korean childcare policy, which is characterized by low public support for 
childcare facilities and childcare costs, greater dependence on private childcare facilities 
with loose state regulation (as discussed in the Korean welfare regime above), produces 
problems of access for working mothers, especially those with infants and those with 
low earnings. In this regard, Kim (2004:7
xxvi
) also argues in the study of married 
women’s employment using a large-scale panel survey, KLIPS (2001) that there is 
inequality of access to good quality childcare and childhood education, especially 
according to parents’ earnings and childcare and education present a considerable 
financial burden for poorer families due to the low level of Korean government support. 
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Furthermore, she points out that public childcare facilities (which are supposed to 
prioritise free places for low-income families) are mostly given to middle class families 
(around 76 per cent) rather than lower-class families (around 21 per cent). Considering 
that many childcare centres and child education institutes have separate extra-
curriculum activities charging extra fees, the household burden of costs can be very high. 
While it is still unclear how this affects Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour, the 
literature nonetheless suggests that the household burden of childcare costs is likely to 
affect Korean mothers’ decisions about whether to take paid work in their evaluation of 
the alternatives open to them, probably either full-time work or staying at home.   
 
2.2.3.3. Class differentiated attitude toward children’s education in Korea 
 
Koreans’ concern about child education is culturally unique, due to the historical 
background. Korean parents who experienced absolute poverty after the Korean War 
had a strong desire to escape from poverty and afterwards aim at upward mobility 
through their children’s education (Sung, 2009:317xxvii). The desire for social mobility 
through education attainment is still quite strong in Korean society (Hong and Kim, 
2006:14-15), because many came to believe that the possibilities for upward social 
mobility are through the attainment of higher levels of education, perhaps due to the re-
formulation of the classes after the Korean War (Abelmann, 1997:401-407). Again, the 
desire for upward mobility leads to an interest in private education, sometimes causing 
excessive spending on it, especially amongst upper class parents. In Korea, private 
education is perceived as a strategy for upper/middle class reproduction and the means 
for upward social mobility (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31
xxviii
). Regarding the excessive zeal 
or ardour of Korean parents for private education, some scholars attempt to explain this 
from the perspective of state education failure and Confucian-cultural specific traditions 
with an emphasis on education (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31).  
 
However, Kim and Yeom (2009:31) argue that it can be explained by the fear of 
downward mobility. In this regard, Hatcher (1998:11) has also argued in the study of 
British family: ‘the main concern of families is for their children to obtain sufficient 
education to preserve their present class position, or at least, to guard against any 
decisive downward mobility’. For this reason, families are strongly committed to 
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investing in their children’s education, even at the sacrifice of themselves, and most 
Koreans think upward mobility through education is most secure and fair. In addition, 
Kim and Yeom (2009:30) explain Korean’s class-differentiated efforts and expenditure 
on private education for their children by Goldthorpe’s rational action theory; that is, it 
is the result of class-based rational action rather than class-specific cultural practices: 
‘different socioeconomic locations give rise to different evaluations of costs, benefits 
and probabilities of success’ (Hatcher, 1998:9). Kim and Yeom (2009:31) particularly 
indicate that private education in Korea is closely related to economic inequality in 
society and the resulting class-differentiated spending on it. For instance, ‘As the costs 
of education bear more heavily on working-class families, their choices are more 
restricted in private education expenditure and reduced sharply, especially in an 
economic recession or especially if kids’ records of achievement are poor’ (Hatcher, 
1998:10).  
 
On the other hand, Byun (2001:41-44) argues that family strategies differ according to 
class. Middle and upper class families mostly sustain their family status by sharing 
resources with relatives and move their social status upwards through education (Byun, 
2001:41-44): their main concerns are child education and children-centralism, which 
make their marriages secure. However, in the lower/working class families, the gender 
role divisions seem very complicated (Byun, 2001:41-44): the family strategies are to 
maintain their living standards by maximizing their income through all the family 
members’ labour force participation (as many as possible) and by minimizing their 
consumption; thus, the main characteristics found in these families are women’s high 
economic activity rates and high economic interdependency between couples, much 
sharing of the dual burden of reconciling paid work and family work, and fewer kinship 
resources (such as estate inheritance).  
 
Similarly, in a study of Korean homemakers’ daily activities and use of time (Jang and 
Kim, 2000:64-72), there are significant differences by class and education level in the 
time spent on childrearing (including children’s education); upper class women spent on 
average 4.24 hours a day on childrearing while lower class women spent an average of 
2.48 hours a day. Furthermore, Jang and Kim (2000:68) indicated that child education is 
a big burden for Korean homemakers, especially for middle class women, because the 
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majority of women in the middle class are homemakers. Interestingly, nearly 60 per cent 
of homemakers had work experience before marriage or childbirth, and many of them 
left their jobs after marriage (32.5 per cent) and childbirth/childrearing (about 40 per 
cent), while more than half did not want to return to work, mainly due to childcare and 
child education (Jang and Kim, 2000:63). This has strong implications for their gender 
role attitude, which may be seen as either traditional or obsessed with cloning class 
practices. Jang and Kim (2000:68) point out that mothers, rather than fathers, are 
considered responsible for parenting. Shin (2001:97
xxix
) defines Korean motherhood as 
primarily caring for children, with a strong emphasis on the mother’s role as ‘a manager 
of children’s education’, and indicates that childbirth and childrearing are not seen in 
Korea as distinct, as is the tendency in many Western developed societies, which 
separate giving birth as women’s role from childrearing (including childcare and 
education), the latter of which is seen as a social role (Shin, 2001:102, 106-107, 112).  
 
Just as  Duncan (2005) and Vincent et al. (2008) argue that there are class differences in 
understanding mothering in the UK, so in the Korean literature, normative motherhood 
and concerns about child education are presumed to be different according to class 
(Choi, 2008; Byun, 2001). In particular, Byun (2001:43, 61-62
xxx
) supports this 
presumption by arguing that the gender role division is clearer in middle and upper class 
families than in lower class families, with both spouses’ high labour force participation, 
indicating that the role of childrearing and socialization has been concentrated on 
mothers and this gendered role in the family has been passed on from generation to 
generation. More recently, in a study of children’s education and married women’s 
labour force participation in Korea, Choi (2008:97-100
xxxi
) also found that commitment 
to private education and children’s school activities differs between well-educated and 
lower-educated women, suggesting a potential impact on married women’s employment. 
While Korean parents spend a considerable amount of money and time on children’s 
education in general, the expense of private tuition increases as women’s education 
level and household earnings increase (Choi, 2008:97-100). In addition, higher educated 
and higher earning families tend to participate in their children’s school events and 
parents activities, compared with the low participation rate of lower-educated and lower 
earning families (Choi, 2008:97-100). In short, the previous research argues that 
normative motherhood and class practices are somehow related to Korean women’s 
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labour force participation. 
 
 
2.3  Conclusion 
  
 
In summing up the theoretical debates in the Western literature: firstly, the debates 
continue regarding the gender division of labour between the neoclassical economists 
and feminist sociologists. The former explains it mainly from the human capital model 
and the self-selection model based on rational choice theory, while the latter is mainly 
based on the occupational segregation theory and the gender-role socialization theory 
under the assumption of socio-culturally patterned rationalities. The debates which 
attempt to explain the phenomenon of the labour market are closely linked to 
individualist and social structuralist/class debates to explain people’s behaviour and 
attitude towards market work and gender roles. According to neoclassical economics, 
people assumed to act rationally are self-selecting out of roles or jobs in order to 
optimize their lifetime earnings and/or their human capital, or couples allocate time and 
resources over their life course through the partnership negotiation. As a result, the 
gender division of labour takes place. However, many feminist sociologists argue that 
social structures define gender roles, and that socially and culturally patterned gender 
norms and roles are manifest in the labour market and people’s decisions are made by 
socially-negotiated rationalities. Furthermore, class theorists argue that there is a class 
differentiated experience of mothering due to different class constraints and 
opportunities.  
 
What do the Western debates lend to Korean research? From the structuralist critiques 
on the neoclassical arguments, Korean-specific culturally and socially constructed 
gender norms and motherhood appears to explain mothers’ labour market behaviour in 
Korea, a culturally-bound society. Also, the gender regime or class-distinct behaviour 
might provide an explanation for Korean mothers’ labour market participation. In 
particular, the class debates in the Western literature have strong implications for Korea 
where family wage gaps have increased in recent years (Won and Pascall, 2004:274-
275) as in Western societies, and childcare/education is still seen as mothers’ 
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responsibility under the cultural heritage of the meritocratic society. Indeed, the Korean 
literature (Choi, 2008:33; Won and Pascall 2004:275) has carefully documented 
evidence that more women tend not to work due to their childcare and childrearing 
responsibilities and that the number of women in this group has increased over recent 
years. Moreover, it is suggested that social prejudice and work commitment are 
becoming insignificant as women’s education levels approach those of men’s. So, what 
else can explain Korean mothers’ labour force participation?  
 
On the one hand, the Korean gender regime may more plausibly relate to Korean 
mothers’ labour force participation. The traditional gender assumptions of the Korean 
government policy logic see women as the main carers in the family, so public childcare 
provision has not expanded much, and legislation such as for maternity and parental 
rights has not changed dramatically. Furthermore, unequal working conditions and the 
big discrepancy between legislation and practice (the low levels of parents actually 
taking up welfare benefits) may influence mothers’ labour market behaviour. Indeed, it 
was found that particularly in the small-sized firms where married women are 
concentrated, rules and welfare violation is common. On the other hand, it appears that 
normative motherhood and the strong emphasis on children’s education both bring 
about class-distinct behaviour in Korea. The literature identifies that children’s 
education is a big burden to Korean women, especially middle class women (Jang and 
Kim, 2000:68), and also that children’s private education has a much greater effect on 
Korean women in the higher earning families because these women with fewer financial 
burdens are likely to stay at home to bring up their children and fit in with their 
schooling (Choi, 2008:99). This strongly implies that their gender role attitude is either 
traditional or concerned with cloning class practices in the ‘meritocratic society’ 
(Whitley, 1999:156-164). 
 
To conclude, from the structuralist perspectives, this thesis identifies both individual 
and cultural/structural factors in the Korean context in order to provide a contextual 
understanding of married women’s labour market behavior, such as Korean culturally-
bound gender norms and normative motherhood, Korean-specific workplace culture or 
the gender regime within workplaces, and different class experiences. Therefore, taking 
into account these Korean-specific factors, the thesis attempts to supplement the 
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literature on married women’s work strategies from a slightly different approach by 
focusing on mothers and also questioning to what extent these factors explain Korean 
mothers’ labour force participation. These questions will be explored in the analytical 
chapters which follow and answered in the concluding chapter.  
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Chapter 3 
Methodology 
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3.1  Quantitative or qualitative approach? 
 
 
Much of the feminist debate concerning the use of quantitative versus qualitative 
methods, especially in the 1980s, has arisen from criticisms of traditional quantitative 
approaches (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991:85; Stanley, 1997:205). The concern was that 
the quantitative research method distorts women’s experience; for instance, by 
simplifying individuals’ experience into categories predefined or biased by the 
researcher (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991:85). However, it seems there is now a 
consensus that both approaches have their merits and use; Jayaratne and Stewart 
(1991:100, 102) argue that there can be no single or prescribed method consistent with 
feminist values, either qualitative, quantitative or both methods, and the problems 
associated with each approach should be addressed. Kelly et al. (1992:152-153) also 
argue that feminist research must not necessarily be qualitative rather than quantitative, 
by pointing out that ‘by only using small-scale studies we can be misled into believing 
that we have baseline knowledge which has not actually been collected.’ In addition, 
Stanley (1997:199-200) warns that ‘binary ways of thinking about methodology are 
unhelpful...’ when gender is perceived as a matter of reading or seeing (particular 
interpretive frameworks), not as the product of a particular method.  
 
Besides these negotiating viewpoints, there has also been a concern about the heavy 
reliance on qualitative methods with the relatively small samples in feminist research 
(Cannon et al., 1991:107). Cannon et al. (1991:107) argue that ‘due to the relatively 
small and homogeneous samples of in-depth qualitative studies, it is limited to see the 
diversity of human experience.’ They (1991:114-116) found from their research that 
many qualitative studies may have biased results caused by a bias in the sample 
selection, unless it is the case of the deliberate exclusion of a particular group or region. 
Thus, they emphasize that qualitative research sampling strategy needs improving, for 
example by random selection of subjects and including race and class in qualitative 
research on women. Based on the past decades’ debate on methodology, it seems that 
the multi-method approach (using both methods) is considered the most desirable, as 
many scholars argue, especially in the case of women’s employment research 
(Crompton, 1998; Hakim, 2000): Crompton (1998:90-93) has indicated that large-scale 
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survey data analysis (often based on the unit of households) neglect non-working 
women, so female employment research coupled with case studies is most desirable. 
Also, Hakim (2000:34-35; 2003:340) has argued that in-depth interviews and case 
studies are appropriate for the studies of women’s own employment choices, while a 
variable-based analysis is appropriate for the studies of general (public) approval for 
women’s employment. 
 
Nonetheless, it appears common that research needs to be restricted to either one or the 
other according to what the study research aims are. As the thesis is concerned with 
aggregate differences (at the macro-level) rather than giving a voice to the research (at 
the micro-level), the quantitative approach is more appropriate here. In this regard, 
Kelly et al. (1992:152) support this view by pointing out that survey research 
concentrating on closed questions and attitude scales are the most amenable to the 
hypothesis testing approach. Furthermore, the thesis has a special interest in group 
behaviour such as social class groups, which necessarily requires a large-scale survey 
research with random selection.  
 
 
3.2  Conceptal discourses and the research question and 
hypotheses 
 
 
3.2.1.  Defining employmed and non-employed/non-working 
 
As the thesis is about women’s economic activity, first of all I need to define what 
‘employed’ means here. Put simply, employment is defined as ‘work for remuneration’ 
(Lain, 2008: 71-103). It appears that the term paid market work is also found in much 
feminist research to distinguish it from unpaid housework. International labour statistics 
often refer to either participation or economic activity. Generally, in terms of 
international standards, the concept of economically active includes employed and 
unemployed and also is differentiated from the concept of economically inactive. 
According to the International Labour Organization (ILO) definition: 
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A person is economically active if they are either employed or unemployed in a 
particular period – usually the survey reference week. Economically active people 
supply, or want to supply, their labour to produce goods and services within the 
production boundary, defined by the UN System of National Accounts. Therefore, 
economic activity is on the supply side of the labour market framework. Some 
countries refer to 'participation' to mean precisely the same as economic activity. 
(Office for National Statistics (ONS) website, 2010) 
 
By the ILO definition (ONS, 2010), employed denotes people aged 16 or over who have 
done at least one hour of work in the reference survey week or are temporarily away 
from a job, and includes four types of employment status: employees, the self-employed, 
unpaid family workers or participants in government-supported training schemes. The 
term unemployed refers to people aged 16 and over who are out of work, want a job, 
have actively sought work in the last four weeks and are available to start work in the 
next two weeks. On the other hand, economically inactive is defined as referring to 
‘those people who are not in employment, but do not fulfill all the criteria to be 
classified as unemployed’ (ONS website, 2010). Witz (1997:241) has stressed it is 
increasingly necessary to distinguish carefully between employed, unemployed and 
economically inactive because ‘women move between employment, unemployment and 
non-employment more than men do, and it has been suggested that there are new 
distinctly gendered mobility regimes emerging’. However, as this thesis attempts to 
explore mothers’ labour market behaviour, that is, whether or not being employed 
(economically active), the unemployed (referring to those who want a job and are 
seeking one actively) must be included in the analysis of the employment for this study. 
Therefore, for statistical analysis, the thesis uses the contrasting concepts of employed 
and non-employed/non-working, which here refer to economically active and 
economically inactive respectively, in accordance with the ILO definitions above.    
 
3.2.2.  Conceptual discourses of work attitudes and defining work commitment  
 
There are some useful definitions of career aspirations, work (job) values, work 
orientations, and work attitudes, although they appear not agreed-upon in the literature 
(Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:22-29). Domenico and Jones (2006:3) define career 
aspirations as ‘an individual’s orientation toward a desired career goal under ideal 
conditions (unfettered by reality),’ according to Gutek and Larwood (1987) viewing a 
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career as ‘a series of related jobs within an organization or different jobs within various 
companies.’ From the definition of career aspirations, it is differentiated with orientation 
toward work. The term orientation to work is referred to as ‘the central organizing 
principle in a person’s attitudes toward work’ (Blackburn and Mann, 1979:16). 
According to Walters (2005:197-8), orientation to work is told through assessing career 
aspirations and a set of attitudes: e.g. traditional or non-traditional attitudes to paid work, 
financial need to engage in paid work, attitudes towards the presence of young children, 
etc. Also, from the assumption in work value research that ‘a limited number of broad 
orientations towards work underlie people's ideas of what is important to them when 
making occupational choices’ (Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss, 1999:55), it is suggested that 
the orientations to work are shaped by people’s work values.  
 
Ros, Schwartz and Surkiss (1999:54-55) define work values as ‘specific expressions of 
general values in the work setting’, which are identified by three distinctive types of 
work value, that is, intrinsic (self-actualisation) values, extrinsic (security or material) 
values, social (relational) values. Johnson (2001:316) views job values as ‘values 
pertaining specifically to the domain of work and beliefs about the desirability of 
various work features,’ and argues that job values are often defined by referencing types 
of rewards derived from working, such as extrinsic, intrinsic, altruistic and social 
rewards: 
 
For example, extrinsic rewards include instrumental and status attainment-related 
rewards such as income, advancement opportunities, and prestige; intrinsic 
rewards reflect the inherent interest of the work, learning potential, and the 
opportunity to be creative; altruistic rewards are derived from doing things for 
others, such as directly helping others or making a contribution to society; and 
social rewards are interpersonal, and include positive relations with coworkers, 
the opportunity to make friends, and working with people. (Johnson, 2001:317) 
 
Much of the recent job values research has been concerned with whether men and 
women seek different rewards from working, e.g. extrinsic or intrinsic rewards and 
there are evidences of narrowed gender difference in job values (Johnson, 2001:316, 
337-41). Palmer (1962:2-6) points out that work attitude questions have been developed 
to measure the degree of satisfaction in and identification with a company or type of 
work:   
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Job satisfaction is measured by the degree of enthusiasm, liking, or preference 
expressed in response to a direct question; identification is referred to the 
psychological commitment a worker appears to have to an employing 
establishment or type of work.  
   
Lincoln and Kallberg (1990:24) define that job satisfaction is a generalized affective 
work orientation toward one’s present job and employer.’ From the presumed link 
between positive work attitudes and performance behaviour, job satisfaction is regarded 
as an indicator of the performance, productivity, absenteeism and turnover, etc (Dex, 
1988:11; Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:25; Hakim, 1991:102). Notably, as to commitment, 
Lincoln and Kallberg (1990:22-3) argue that commitment to work per se is 
differentiated with commitment to an employing organization defined as ‘identification 
with an organization and acceptance of its goals and values as one’s own,’ whilst seeing 
commitment to work as orientations to an occupational specialty or a career: 
  
People who are heavily involved in their work roles, who place great importance 
on the work component of their lives may well behave in ways that coincide with 
the interests of the firm and its management. But there is a difference between the 
worker who is highly motivated because of interest in and commitment to the 
work itself and one whose efforts are expended primarily out of devotion to the 
organization. The work-committed employee may be oriented to an occupational 
specialty and less inclined to accept alternative tasks for the good of the 
organization or for the sake of maintaining an employment relationship with it. 
(Lincoln and Kallberg, 1990:23) 
 
Unlike conventional research on workers’ attitudes at workplace, Bielby and Bielby 
(1984:235) argue that sex-role opinions and work behaviour need to be separated from 
the conceptualisation of work commitment, and define work commitment as ‘the 
centrality of the work roles as a source of intrinsic satisfaction relative to other adult 
roles’: they also indicate that ‘it may be expressed alternatively as plans, expectations, 
preferences, or aspirations for particular combinations of work and family roles.’ 
Attitude studies such as Dex (1988), Hakim (1991), Fagan (2001) and Walters (2005) 
(using quantitative data for the former two and using qualitative data for the latter two), 
usually basis on non-financial work commitment, which is measured by survey 
questions of whether respondents would carry on paid work in the absence of any 
financial need to do so.  
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In these attitude studies, work commitment is referred to as career commitment rather 
than organizational commitment. Likewise, instead of job satisfaction conventionally 
defined by job quality (e.g. extrinsic and intrinsic rewards), Walters (2005:210-2) 
highlights ‘satisfactions with being employed rather than satisfactions with a job, the 
actual work (job quality per se),’ noting that one may be in paid employment due to 
convenience factors such as shorter journeys to work and shorter work hours. In 
Walters’ (2005) research, measures of work commitment and job satisfaction are 
extensive, including non-financial employment commitment, desire for promotion and a 
career and future plans, in order to tap work commitment, and also assessing levels of 
satisfaction with a broad range of areas of jobs held previously as well as the current job 
(Walters, 2005:201).  
 
In this respect, within this thesis it is inappropriate to address the question of women’s 
work attitude as the data allows only the surveys of employees’ organizational 
commitment and job commitment at a present job (see Table 3.2, below). Thus, rather 
than dealing with work orientation or commitment to a career, this thesis is limited to 
examine workers’ ‘work commitment’ as human capital, operationalized from 
measuring organizational commitment and satisfaction (called job commitment in the 
thesis dataset).  
 
3.2.3.  Concepts of gender and discrimination  
 
Discrimination experiences are to be addressed in the analysis of gender regime 
provided in Chapter 5, and thus the concepts of gender and discrimination need to be 
illuminated here. First of all, the term “sex” is generally used to refer to biological 
differences between men and women and “gender” to refer to culturally constructed 
differences in many feminist theories (Rhode, 1989). However, particularly with 
discrimination, sex discrimination or gender discrimination appears to be used 
interchangeably in the literature. According to Levin and Levin (1982:51), 
‘discrimination can be defined as differential or unequal treatment of the members of 
some group or category on the basis of their group membership rather than on the basis 
of their individual qualities,’ which inevitably leads to either preferential treatment of 
people belonging to one’s own group (“positive prejudice”) or discrimination against 
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people who belong to out-groups (“negative treatment”). Neoclassical theorists define 
discrimination as an exogenously given “taste”, founded upon the notion of personal 
prejudice or aversion (Chiplin and Sloane, 1982:5). Meanwhile, Chiplin and Sloane 
(1982:5) suggest defining it in a broad sense: 
 
The meanings attached to discrimination involve some notion of prejudice, 
inequity or the use of irrelevant criteria in the differential treatment of individuals 
or groups in the society…Prejudice represents a desire or intention to discriminate 
which may be unfulfilled, discrimination could occur by mistake in the absence of 
prejudice.  
 
One example of discrimination is the automatic exclusion of a woman from a job 
because she is presumed to be incompetent by virtue of being female (Levin and Levin, 
1982:51). That is gender discrimination which occurs when a person is or people are 
treated unfairly because of gender (Crosby, et al., 2007:3). In the viewpoints of 
neoclassical theoriests, sex discrimination is seen as an aversion to contact (at least in 
the workplace) with women (Bergman, 2005:214-5). In the context of the labour market, 
sociologists often point out that sex discrimination is occurred by either the supply side 
or the demand side of labour market processes (Ridgeway and England. 2007:189-90): 
‘many supply-side processes are shaped by biases embedded in cultural beliefs about 
gender’; gender bias is often referred to as a preference or prejudice toward one gender 
over the other (Wisegeek, 2012). For instance, the widely held cultural belief is that 
males are better at math than females; although shaped by cultural assumptions, supply-
side processes are not classified as discrimination, but demand-side patterns of 
behaviour (e.g. employers’ behaviour or employment policies) is often involved with 
discrimination in the labour market (Ridgeway and England, 2007:189-90).  
 
In short, gender discrimination is often referred to as demand-side patterns of behaviour 
concerned with gender, whilst gender bias is referred to as supply-side (personal) 
prejudice about gender. Furthermore, gender discrimination is conceptually 
differentiated from gender disadvantages. Doucet (1995:273-4) refers to gender 
disadvantages as the difference gender makes, that is, what follows from gender 
difference. For instance, the gendered division of household labour is seen as gender 
disadvantages because they further inhibit gender equality outside the home; it is many 
women who have to make adjustments in their working time to balance both paid and 
88 
 
domestic work (Doucet, 1995:274), and hence many women are disadvantaged because 
of their gender. Important to note, discrimination in this thesis is not restricted to refer to 
gender discrimination only, as the thesis data of discrimination includes discrimination 
against a wide range of areas like sex, age, education, disability, region, etc. However, 
discrimination against sex is to be focused in the analysis. 
 
3.2.4.  Research questions and hypotheses 
 
I now turn to what should be taken into account in women’s labour force participation 
before setting up the thesis hypotheses. As Witz (1997:240) has indicated, women’s 
labour force participation is more likely to be affected by race, class, age and marital 
status as well as by dependent children, and thus it seems necessary to take these factors 
into account as basic analytical units in women’s employment research. As Duncan and 
Irwin’s research (2004) found, there are class differences in mothers’ moral exercise of 
childcare responsibilities, so class can affect, perhaps decisively, married women’s 
labour market behaviour. Besides, Hakim (2000:38) has stressed that we sometimes 
need to read respondents’ employment decisions ‘in the context of the family’s lifestyle 
goals, social aspirations, and attitudes to the sexual division of labour’. Thus, it is also 
necessary and useful to interpret labour market behaviour according to individual 
attitudes such as gender-role attitudes or commitment to a career. In fact, Korean 
quantitative research concerning women’s labour force participation tends to be 
repeatedly and heavily concentrated on human capital and child factors. Individual 
attitude factors like gender-role attitude or attitude to paid work, and social structural 
factors such as overtime work, welfare benefits and social class have been often 
neglected. It is very similar to what labour economists do: they only use job data such as 
work-hours, earnings, and positions in the workplace. Even where the data are available, 
attitude-related data are often ignored (Hakim, 2000:38).  
 
The problem is related to a specific Korean research context. It is partly due to the lack 
of survey data on, for example, gender-role attitudes and, on the other hand, to 
preferring objective measurements to subjective measurements such as class research. 
Specifically, there is no national survey of gender-role attitudes in Korea. Furthermore, 
class research has been undertaken mostly on the basis of occupational class as a matter 
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of objective measurement, and, as a result, this excludes economically inactive (non-
working) women. Recently, there has been some research into class measurement or 
definition discourses as the middle class expands; for instance, in the studies of Choi 
(2008) and KDI (2008). However, there are no studies identifying an association 
between labour market behaviour and class identity. Thus, with the aim of filling a gap 
in Korean quantitative research, the thesis attempts to include these factors that are 
lacking in other research, as far as the dataset allows. The research question, ‘What 
accounts for the lower level of maternal employment in South Korea?’, could be best 
explained by incorporating both structural and individual factors into the analysis. 
Either one on their own is biased. The structural factors focused on in my thesis are 
socio-cultural specific practices such as class-differentiated mothering and expenditure 
on children’s education, discrimination in the labour market or society, the long working 
hour culture, and welfare provisions. Discrimination and the long working hour culture 
could be important indicators of a workplace culture disadvantaging women, while 
greater dependence on family childcare and private education could be considered as an 
indicator of the policy logic of the gendered welfare regime. In particular, expenditure 
on private education is quite cultural-specific, and hence could show quite a different 
picture from that in Western countries.  
 
On the other hand, the individual factors focused on here are human capital factors such 
as work commitment, education and work experience, along with ‘situational factors’ 
such as dependent children and spouse factors, i.e. spouse job characteristics (pay, type 
of job or employment status); Crompton and Harris (1999a:118) classify ‘employment, 
education level, and relative income’ as material factors and ‘age, sex, and family 
composition’ as situational factors. In addition to dependent children, spouse’s job 
characteristics (as situational factors) have a potential impact on maternal employment; 
for instance, female spouses are highly likely to be non-paid family workers when male 
spouses are self-employed (Grubb et al., 2007), and this can be seen in a culturally-
specific, situational context. When it comes to education and job experience, there is 
much concern in the thesis, as most neo-classical labour research has considered these 
as indicators of human capital. On the other hand, as an individual factor, the gender-
role attitude seems crucial in married women’s labour force participation research, as 
suggested in Western studies using a gender-role attitude index provided by an 
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international social attitude survey programme (ISSP). Acknowledging that the analysis 
is limited, due to unavailability of the survey data of gender-role attitudes for Korea, 
alternatively, individual factors can be addressed from considering both human capital 
and situational factors. Despite of the limitation, these factors can be useful to examine 
the argument of human capital theorists who stress such individual factors as being 
decisive in gender differentials in the labour market. 
 
Overall, the thesis assumes that it is mainly the social structural factors such as class-
differentiated mothering, cultural-specific workplace practices and a gendered welfare 
regime that are significantly associated with Korean mothers’ labour force participation, 
rather than the individual and situational factors like work commitment, education 
attainment and spouse’s job. Based on this assumption, the thesis hypotheses to be 
tested are the following:  
 
 First, individual factors such as work commitment, education, and work 
experience are significantly associated with mothers’ labour market participation. 
 Second, situational factors like dependent children and spouse’s job 
characteristics are significantly associated with mothers’ labour market 
participation. 
 Third, Korean cultural-specific workplace practices are significantly associated 
with mothers’ labour market participation.  
 Fourth, the gendered welfare regime is significantly associated with mothers’ 
labour market participation. 
 Fifth, class-differentiated mothering is significantly associated with mothers’ 
labour market participation. 
 
The main concerns of all the hypotheses are to explore whether the explanatory factors 
are statistically significant, and to be specific, whether the factors to be tested are 
statistically significant, and further, to identify whether they are positively or negatively 
associated with maternal employment. More specifically, the first hypothesis examines 
whether individual factors such as human capital factors, work commitment, education 
and job experience are statistically significant and whether they are positively or 
91 
 
negatively associated with mothers’ labour market participation. In particular, it will 
examine whether work commitment and work experience are different by gender, and 
whether education attainment explains mothers’ employment decisions. The second 
hypothesis will consider how mothers’ labour market participation is restricted by the 
situational factors, dependent children and spouse’s job characteristics; that is, whether a 
spouse’s job characteristics (permanent, irregular work or self-employed) is associated 
with wives’ labour market participation positively or negatively and whether their 
labour market behaviour is associated with their children’s age cohorts, as reflected in 
the M-shaped labour force participation of married women. The third hypothesis 
examines whether discrimination experiences and working hours differ significantly by 
gender, and also whether discrimination and the long work-hour culture are statistically 
significant and whether they are positively or negatively associated with maternal 
employment. The fourth hypothesis examines whether there is any difference between 
the genders in receiving corporate welfare (employee benefits), including parental 
benefits, and any difference by employment status. Also, it explores whether parental 
welfare and childcare expenses are statistically significant and how they affect maternal 
employment, positively or negatively. Lastly, the fifth hypothesis examines whether 
there is any class-differentiated labour market behaviour with children’s ages taken into 
account, whether there is any difference between classes in social mobility beliefs and 
expenditure on child education, and whether these class factors are significantly and 
positively or negatively associated with maternal employment. However, examining 
these hypotheses is quite restricted by the availability of datasets, surveys and statistical 
techniques, and the statistical results will be restricted also by the study sample. Thus, 
first, the dataset and the study sample require explanation, and subsequently, the surveys 
(questions) selected and statistical technique issues are discussed as well.   
 
 
3.3  The dataset and study sample 
 
 
With regard to the question of which dataset is available for the thesis, a nationwide 
large-scale panel survey, KLIPS (Korea Labour and Income Panel Study) is selected, as 
it is relatively more accommodating for the research questions than other datasets which 
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have mostly quite limited surveys; for example, KLoWF (Korean Longitudianal Survey 
of Women and Family) collected from 2007 in KWDI (Korean Women’s Development 
Institute) has wide ranges of information about women’s job, household, family life, 
childcare, health, values towards family, etc (Yi et al., 2011); however, KLoWF does not 
contain class data and have very limited data of male spouse.  
 
More specifically, KLIPS, produced by the Korea Labor Institute, tracks annually 5,000 
households and their 13,000 members aged 15 or over in urban areas by random 
sampling. The survey has been conducted from 1998 up to now (from the 1st to 11th 
wave by August 2011), along with a retention rate of around 77 per cent across the 
waves. The data contains extensive individual and household information about jobs 
and income including demographic data, economic activity, education, job training, 
occupations, childcare provision, corporate benefits and tax, expenditure on private 
childcare and education for children of school age, debt, etc. However, although it 
provides a wide range of longitudinal labour data, which is not covered by other cross-
sectional datasets, the data has limitations for in-depth studies in some areas such as 
welfare, labour market discrimination, work orientation, and childcare for infants 
(KLIPS website, 2010c). 
 
The survey structure consists largely of two parts: a household survey and an individual 
survey including a new respondents’ survey, as shown in Table 3.1 below. There are 
additional surveys with special topics in a specific year (though not in all waves) such 
as old age or health. For the thesis, additional surveys are not used, thus they will be 
excluded from the discussion here. The individual survey is sub-divided into a survey of 
the employed and another of the unemployed, together with individual job histories. As 
summarized in the table above, the contents of the survey are somewhat different 
according to the type of survey. First of all, the household survey contains data about 
households, including household members, income, assets, children’s education, and 
housing. Next, the individual survey collects all the data concerning personal 
demographics, job details, work history and job-seeking activities. In addition, parents’ 
education and occupation, social insurance, life satisfaction, health status and financial 
difficulties are surveyed. 
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Table 3.1  The structure of the survey, KLIPS from the 1
st
 to 11
h
 waves (1998 to 2008) 
The structure (type) of the survey Contents of the survey (the common surveys) 
Household survey 
- demographic data of household members including household 
generation (i.e. by marriage) or extinction of household 
membership (i.e. by death) / Relationship with household head, 
economic dependency between parents and offspring. 
- housing, children' education and childcare 
- household income, consumption, assets and debts 
- financial situation of the household, including hardship details 
Individual  
survey 
Work 
history 
survey  
  
Preliminary 
survey 
- a job surveyed in the previous year’s survey 
- information of a new job taken after the previous survey  
For wage 
earners 
- any changes in the job held in the previous year 
- job type and company size, contract, work-hour, wage, social 
insurance coverage through a job, labour union, the reasons for 
leaving a job, industry and occupation, job-seeking route 
For 
employer / 
 self-
employed 
- any changes in the job held in the previous year 
- the number of employees and family workers 
- work-hours, annual sales and income, gross capital 
- reasons for leaving the job (business), job-seeking route 
- industry and occupation 
- difficulties in starting an enterprise 
For the employed 
- economic activity, employment contract, fringe benefits or welfare, 
work-hours, job satisfaction, current job training and job skill level 
- job-seeking activity, difficulties of job-seeking, desired job 
- certificate and job training, regular training or education related to 
a job 
- social insurance entitlement  
- marital status, education, age, parents' education and occupation 
- life satisfaction and financial difficulty 
For the non-employed 
- economic activity 
- job seeking activity, difficulties of job seeking, desired job 
- certificate and job training, social insurance entitlement  
- marital status, education, age, parents education and occupation  
- life satisfaction and financial difficulty   
For new respondents  the same surveys as the individual survey 
Source: p32, KLIPS surveys, KLIPS user guide, 2010d. 
 
However, in the individual survey, some questions are not collected annually, such as 
those concerning social mobility, social/economic status and discrimination experience. 
Social mobility questions were collected in the 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, and socio-economic 
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status questions in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves (that is, in 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005, 
and 2006). Discrimination experience was surveyed only in the 7
th
 wave. Regarding 
childcare and education in the household survey, the data are slightly differently 
collected. They were collected first in the 1
st
 wave, but restricted to children aged up to 
9 in the households. These questions were not collected in the 2
nd
 wave. The children’s 
age was extended up to primary school age (0 to 13 year-old children) in the 3
rd
 wave. 
Until the 3
rd
 wave household survey, the questions of childcare and child education were 
collected separately (with one question about childcare and the other question about 
children’s education). From the 4th wave, the questions of both childcare and children’s 
education became unified into one question, and the children’s age was extended up to 
high school age (18 years old). In addition, it is also noted that the 3
rd
 wave contains 
promotion-related questions and questions about the financial situation after the 
financial crisis of 1997. Most of these questions are included in the analysis of this 
thesis.  
 
On the other hand, four waves (3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
), which contain questions of both 
class identity and children, are the ones mainly used for the analysis. This is why the 
thesis is concerned with the impact of class identity and dependent children on mothers’ 
attitude towards labour market participation, as key factors. The question of class 
identity in the 2
nd
 wave is used only in the discussion of the measurement issue. Thus, 
the analysis is mainly based on the four waves (3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
), but with 
supplementary use of the 7
th
 and 4
th
 waves for the analysis of discrimination 
experiences and the financial burden for childminders and child education costs. Before 
elaborating the surveys selected for the analysis, the study sample must be defined. 
Sampling for the analysis is an important issue because analytical results may be 
different due to the size of the sample or sampling method. Hakim (1996:129) has 
criticized the common sample selection bias arising from a non-random sampling of 
previous social science research on women’s employment. In response to the criticism, 
McRae (2003:318) selected a British panel dataset with random sampling but restricted 
it to women with childbirth experience. Thus, McRae’s study could not include women 
who do not have children. 
 
The study sample of the thesis is from randomly-selected panel data and the main 
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(focus) analysis sample is restricted to married women who have children under the age 
of 19, along with a supplemented subsample of married men with children under the age 
of 19 for the gender comparisons. However, various further comparisons, such as 
comparisons between childless married people and people with grown-up children are 
not possible, due to the lack of data; that is, the survey, in relation to parenting, asks 
only: ‘Do you have children under 19?’ In addition, as the sample leans towards an 
older-age population, the study sample needs to be restricted by age in order to reflect 
correctly the behaviour of women who are potentially economically active. Past work 
experience is also taken into account because women’s behaviour is likely to be 
different depending on whether they have experienced a successful entry into the labour 
market or not. Therefore, parents without past work experience and aged over 65 are 
excluded. In short, the study sample of the thesis is mothers and fathers aged under 65 
and with work experience before 1998, when the first KLIPS survey started.     
 
 
3.4  Surveys selected and how the questions are asked in the 
questionnaires 
 
 
Based on the hypotheses to be examined, surveys are selected from the KLIPS 
questionnaires. First of all, questions of age, gender, marital status and job history data 
are required for the study sample, together with questions concerning the economic 
activity status. Next, for the main analysis explaining mothers’ labour market behaviour, 
relevant questions are selected from the two survey questionnaires for the individual 
and household surveys; questions of class identity, social mobility, work experience, 
education, discrimination experience, working hours, corporate welfare benefits, 
organizational commitment, and spouses’ jobs are selected from the individual survey, 
while the number of children by age, childcare and education costs and the burden, and 
household income, are selected from the household survey. Among these surveys, the 
questions of class identity are an issue to be noted because in the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves they 
are measured by two questions asking about a subjective sense of economic status and 
of social status. On the other hand, in the 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, the two survey questions are 
unified into one question, asking about a subjective sense of ‘socio-economic’ status. 
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Thus, in the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 wave data analysis, either one should be selected to avoid 
causing statistical problems of unifying the two sets of survey data. It seems women ’s 
labour market behaviour is more easily explained by their social status, based on the 
results of the correlation analysis concerned (see Table 3.3). Finally, the question of the 
subjective sense of social status is selected from the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves. The details are 
described more specifically in the following section where statistical issues are 
discussed. Similarly, questions related to the cost of children and children’s ages are also 
collected differently in different waves. In the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 wave data, questions of child 
costs and the burden are collected through two separate questions about childcare cost 
(including childminders) and (private) education costs for children up to 11 years old, 
while the 5
th
 wave data and the subsequent waves collect data for childcare/education 
costs in a single question extending to children aged up to 18 years old. For this reason, 
the children-related survey questions selected are different between the 3
rd 
and 4
th
 wave 
and the other three waves. The detailed survey questions about the costs of children are 
provided in Table 3.2 below.  
 
Table 3.2  The questions asked in the KLIPS questionnaires 
Surveys selected Questions and responses 
Employment status 
Do you have a job at present? 1. yes   2. no 
Job seeking activity 
Have you searched for a job in the last week? 1. yes 2. no 
If you had an offer, could you work? 1. yes 2. no 
Sex 
What is your sex?  
1. Male  2. Female 
Age 
What is your age? 
Education 
What is your level of education?  
1. before school age  2. no schooling  3. elementary school  4. lower secondary  5. upper 
secondary  6. 2 years of college, vocational, technical, associate degree  7. university (4 years or 
more)  8. post-graduate (Masters)  9. post-graduate (Doctorate) 
Marital status 
What is your marital status?  
1. never married  2. married (living with a spouse)  3. divorced   4. separated  5. widowed 
Children ages  
Please give all household members’ birth dates and gender, and relationship 
with the household head. 
Work status 
What is your current work status (for the main job)? 
1.permanent work  2. temporary work  3. daily work   4. employer/self employed  5. non-paid 
family worker 
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Continued from Table 3.2. … 
Work history 
Please tell us your work history since you were 15 years old.  
What are the start and end dates, the type of work, position in the workplace? 
Work hours 
How many hours do you work weekly on average? 
Discrimination 
experience 
-the 7th wave 
Have you experienced any discrimination in the following situations? (Write all 
instances where you have been discriminated against)  
     a- when seeking a new job, b- when receiving your wage or pay, c- when seeking 
education/job training opportunities, d- when being promoted, e- when leaving the job, f- when 
seeking further study or higher education, g- at home, h -in society in general. 
1.sex   2. education   3. age   4. disability   5. region   6. other (specify). 
Corporate welfare 
- Are you participating in the national pension scheme through your job? 
     a- special occupational pension, b- the national health insurance through work, c- the 
employment insurance, d- industrial accident compensation insurance 
1. yes  2. no  3. don’t know 
- What welfare benefits does your company provide? And which benefits are you 
entitled to?  
      a- statutory severance payment, b- cumulative severance payment, c- paid leave, d- 
menstrual leave, e- paid maternity leave, f- sick leave, g- parental leave, h- shutdown benefits, i- 
partial payment of meal expenses, j- partial payment of school tuition fees, k- support for housing 
(e.g. mortgage loans), l- corporate welfare fund, m- partial payment of family event expenses (e.g., 
for congratulations and condolences), n- assistance for recreation/vacation, o- partial payment for 
recreation (vacation), p- partial payment of childcare expenses, q- savings grant, r- employee 
stock ownership scheme, s- partial payment for private pension, t- partial payment for life 
insurance, u- partial payment for individual health/accident insurance 
1. yes  2. no  3. don’t know 
Work commitment 
(organizational 
commitment & job 
commitment)  
What do you think of your job? How far do you agree with the points below?  
     organizational commitment: a- this is a good company to work for, b- I’m glad to have joined 
this company, c- I would recommend joining this company to my friends who are seeking work, d- I 
take pride in being part of this company, e- I hope to continue working in this company if other 
things remain the same. 
    job commitment: a- I’m satisfied with the job I'm currently doing, b- I am doing this job 
enthusiastically, c- I enjoy this job, d- I feel this job is personally rewarding, e- I want to continue 
this job if other things remain the same 
1. strongly disagree  2. disagree  3. neutral  4. agree  5. strongly agree 
Social mobility 
Do you think it is possible for everyone to upgrade his/her socioeconomic status 
in our society?  
1. strongly agree 2. agree 3. disagree 4. strongly disagree 5. don’t know 
Class identity 
What do you think your socioeconomic status is considering your earnings, 
occupation, education and assets, etc?  
1. upper-  a. higher  b. lower  2. middle-  a. higher  b. lower  3. low-  a. higher  b. lower 
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Continued from Table 3.2.… 
Childminder and 
education (3
rd
 and 4
th
 
waves) 
 : childcare/education 
From the 5
th
 wave 
and after) 
- How many children under 19 years old do you have? 
- Are you using any childminder for children aged under 11? 
- If yes, how many and what type of childminder do you use? How much do you 
pay per child per month? 
- Are you using private education such as nursery, private institute, private 
tutoring or pre-school programme? 
- If yes, how many do you take part in per child per month? What type of 
education (per child)? How much do you pay per child per month?  
- How big a financial burden for childminder costs do you have?  
1. very burdensome  2. somewhat burdensome  3. fair  4. not too burdensome  5. no burden at 
all   6. no use  
- And how big a financial burden do you have in order to pay for the private 
education of your children?  
1. very burdensome  2. somewhat burdensome  3. fair  4. not too burdensome  5. not 
burdensome at all  6. no use 
Annual household 
income: 
Earnings, financial 
income, real estate 
income, social 
insurance benefits, 
and transfer income 
- Have your family member(s) had earnings in the previous year?   
1. yes   2. no 
- What are the average total earnings (unit: 10,000 Korean Won)?  
- Have you had income from savings and investments in the previous year?   
1. yes  2. no 
- What amount on average?  
1-interest from savings in bank and other financial institutions, 2-interest from non-institutional 
financial products such as personal loans, 3-net gains from the sales of stocks, 4-dividends, 5-
other financial income 
- Have you had any income from real estate in the previous year?  
1. yes  2. no 
- What amount on average?  
1- net monthly rent, 2- net gains from sales of real estate, 3- other income from renting land or lots, 
4- a premium or key money, 5- other real estate income 
- Were there any recipient(s) of social insurance benefits in the household in the 
previous year?   
1. yes  2. no 
- If so, how many recipients of social insurance are there?  
- What is the total amount of benefit from social insurance? 
- Have you had any transfers of income in the previous year?  
1. yes  2. no 
- What amount/how much on average?  
1- basic livelihood security benefits,  2- other support from the government,  3- support from 
social groups,  4- support from parents (including spouse's) who live elsewhere,  5- support from 
children who live elsewhere,  6- support from other relatives,  7- other transferable income 
Source: the 10
th
 release of KLIPS questionnaires, KLI, 2010a (from an English version). 
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Concerning discrimination experiences, the survey data are collected through multiple-
choice responses. Thus, the questions are complex. The questions are mainly asked 
about six areas of discrimination (sex, age, education, disability, region, and other), 
when seeking a new job, when receiving a salary or a payment, when seeking 
education/job training opportunities, when being promoted, when leaving a job, when 
seeking further study or higher education, when at home, and in society in general. The 
last point to note is that the questions of corporate welfare benefits are also different in 
different waves. The surveys concerned have been updated from the 4
th
 wave onwards 
by adding more welfare benefit items to those of the 3
rd
 wave. So the questions of 
welfare benefit in the 3
rd
 wave are different from the following waves (years). This 
means that the 3
rd
 wave data for welfare benefit can be dropped in the comparative 
analysis by cross-tabulation. Lastly, the analysis of social mobility beliefs by cross-
tabulation must be restricted to the data of 2005 and 2006 as the data are collected from 
the 8
th
 wave and after. In short, the questions posed in the survey questionnaires are 
provided in Table 3.2. 
 
 
3.5 Statistical techniques selected and statistical issues 
 
 
3.5.1.  Statistical techniques selected 
 
Which statistical model is appropriate could be an issue in quantitative research, as it 
varies in accordance with what the study’s aims are. Appropriate statistical models for 
this thesis were selected after reviewing models used in the relevant research. In Korean 
research, together with the cross-sectional analysis design using KLIPS data, Kim 
(2004) and Choi (2006) both used a logit regression model to explore the determinants 
of married women’s employment. With a longitudinal research design, Kim (1999) and 
Jang and Kim (2001) used a hazard model (duration model) with retrospective job 
history data, but using different datasets (KWDI and KLIPS respectively). In Western 
research, on the other hand, using cross-sectional survey data, Crompton and Harris 
(1999a) carried out a logistic regression with the GRA (gender-role-attitude) index from 
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the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP)’s Family and Gender Relations 
module in order to assess its impact on the domestic division. McRae (2003) opted for a 
longitudinal regression model to examine women’s work histories and women’s attitude 
to gender-role following the birth of their first child, using a Maternity Rights Survey. 
Similarly, Kan (2005) used a series of recursive regression models (a cross-lagged 
model) using BHPS (British Household Panel Survey) to investigate the relationship 
between gender-role preference and labour market behaviour. 
 
Most of the research mentioned used multivariate methods. However, there is some 
criticism of multivariate methods. Hakim (2000:34-35) criticizes multivariate methods 
fashionable with current social science researchers by pointing out that ‘the multivariate 
methods produce fragmented results rather than integrated results and also misleading 
results with the use of multiple controls.’ She argues that the impact of each variable is 
inseparable from that of all other variables, as human behaviour is connected to choices 
in the real world. For this reason, Hakim (2000:41) concludes that ‘studies based on 
multivariate analysis are not sufficient, in isolation, to draw conclusions about causal 
processes,’ and suggests cross-tabulation analysis as an alternative. Furthermore, Hakim 
(2000:38) criticizes labour sociologists’ statistical methods of analysis, by suggesting 
that it is sometimes useful to analyze survey questionnaire responses about employment 
decisions ‘as narrative documents case by case’ (Hakim 2000). Based on these critiques, 
combining multivariate methods and cross-tabulation along with descriptive analysis 
and frequency analysis is an alternative method. 
 
Taking into account the criticism of multivariate methods, the central argument of the 
thesis rests on a multivariate method, logistic and linear regression, but supplemented 
by cross-tabulation or other simple statistical models like the chi-square test and 
ANOVA analysis. A recursive test of the logistic-regression model with 4 waves of 
KLIPS (collected in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006) will contribute to finding social 
structural factors which have been neglected but explain Korean mothers’ labour market 
behaviour more coherently than the previous research, while the ANOVA analysis 
seems more appropriate for interpreting individual work commitment without multiple 
controls and linear regression analysis of employment interruption in order to 
supplement the weakness of the logistic regression technique. In fact, the logistic-
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regression model with economic activity status (employed or not) as a dependent 
variable is not appropriate for some specific variables such as work commitment, firm 
welfare, working hours and discrimination experience. There arises non-random 
missing data in the surveys of work commitment, working hours and firm welfare 
because the surveys only questioned the employed. For the analysis of these variables, a 
linear regression model is used with a different dependent variable: the number of 
employment failures during a specific period (before 1998 and between 1998 and 2006). 
 
Furthermore, as for the surveys of discrimination experiences, there may be a 
measurement issue of ‘oversimplification’ arising from the process of scaling the 
surveys collected by multiple-responses, by counting the number of affirmative 
responses (‘yes’). Instead of simplifying responses by recoding them into a scale 
variable, which is necessary for the multivariate models, multiple response analysis by 
frequency analysis or cross-tabulation could be more informative, as it shows a holistic 
picture of discrimination experiences across various arenas of society without 
downscaling the responses. Besides, as the research design is not a longitudinal analysis, 
there are limitations with the cross-sectional analysis. A longitudinal analysis is 
considered quite powerful, particularly in the case of employment research, because 
economic activity status is likely to change over time for some reasons, perhaps due to 
changes in conditions over time. However, the discrete analyses chosen in the thesis do 
not grasp the effect of covariates over time (the 7 year time scale) as a longitudinal 
analysis does. Nonetheless, the cross-sectional analysis seems to be able to capture any 
changes in a specific year among the selected years to study, with the analysis models 
tested recursively over the 4 waves of panel data. This will partly make up for the 
weakness of the cross-sectional analysis model.  
 
3.5.2.  Statistical issues  
 
3.5.2.1. Addressing multicollinearity and measurement issues by the correlation 
analysis 
 
When it comes to using the multivariate model, firstly, multicollinearity problems 
between the predictor variables selected here need to be addressed by conducting a 
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bivariate (pairwise) correlation analysis (Field, 2005:175). Basically, correlation 
analysis is generally appropriate for continuous (scale) variables, while categorical or 
ordinal variables are not acceptable. However, categorical variables are allowed if they 
are recoded into dummy variables (Field, 2005:179-181). Among the variables selected 
in the thesis, the economic activity status is a categorical variable, thus it is recoded into 
a dummy variable. A class identity variable is also categorical but ordered in terms of 
upper, middle and low. This variable could be considered an ordinal variable. According 
to Long (2009:275), ‘Although Pearson correlations are not appropriate for ordinal 
variables, they work fine as a rough indicator of whether variables are positively or 
negatively associated.’ Thus, the class variable (ordinal) is also put in the Pearson 
correlation model, together with other continuous variables.   
 
From the results of the correlation analysis (see models 1 & 2 of Table 3.A and 3.B in 
the Appendix), it seems there is no multicollinearity problem, in that there is no variable 
with too high a coefficient (more than .8 or .9) which means it is more likely that 
multicollinearity exists (Field, 2005:175). It should also be noted that statistics for firm 
welfare and working hours are not computed, due to the perfect correlation with 
economic activity status; if employed, there is highly likely to be a response in the 
surveys for welfare benefit and working hours, but if not employed, there will be no 
data in the surveys. It appears that corporate welfare is not an appropriate variable to be 
measured in the logistic-regression model. Besides, the correlation analysis shows 
clearly that the results differ according to different samples; that is, one cohort is 
married women with work experience, the other is married women with job experience 
and aged under 65. Notably, the results of the class variable are in contrast, suggesting 
that married women of potential work age (under retirement age) in the latter sample are 
more sensitive to class factors. This gives a rationale for restricting the study sample to 
ages eligible for potential work.   
 
On the other hand, different measurements across the waves can be addressed by 
correlation analysis as well. In the KLIPS 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves, class identity is measured 
by two surveys about social and economic status whereas it is measured by one (united) 
survey of socio-economic status in other waves. However, it seems difficult to unite the 
two subjective surveys because class identity surveys are categorical. Thus, averaging 
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or summing up the statistics for class identity surveys does not make any sense. Unless 
the two can be unified, either one can be selected for the analysis.  
 
Table 3.3  The correlation analysis between economic status and social status and 
economic activity status for married women with job experience (A) and those with 
job experience and aged under 65 (B)  
 (A)      
Employed 
or not 
Subjective 
social status 
Subjective 
econ.status 
(B)      
Employed 
or not 
Subjective 
social status 
Subjective 
econ.status 
Employed  or not 
1
a
           
(3289) 
  
1                     
(2881) 
  
Subjective 
social status 
.006         
(3289) 
1 
(3289) 
 
.045*
  
    
(2881) 
1         
(2881) 
 
Subjective 
economic status 
-.011 
(3289) 
.896** 
(3289) 
1 
(3289) 
.025       
(2881) 
.884**    
(2881) 
1       
(2881) 
Source: the 5
th
 wave (2002), KLIPS. Note: a.“1” is printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 
2005:174).  b. Class category values are 1 for upper class, 2 for middle class, 3 for lower class. Statistics 
are Spearman’s rho correlation coefficient (N).  Legend * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
 
In accordance with Spearman’s rho coefficient model, which is a correlation analysis 
method for ordered categorical variables (Field, 2005:179-81), there is very high 
correlation between the two surveys of social status and economic status, nearly ‘0.9’, 
which is very close to 1 (statistics for perfect correction) as shown in Table 3.3. This 
suggests that either can be selected because they are very similar. However, which 
survey of the two should be selected for the thesis? According to Table 3.3, in the 
sample of married women with job experience and aged under 65 (B), the social status 
variable is significantly associated with married women’s economic activity status 
(employed or not). Based on this, class identity in terms of the subjective social status is 
selected for the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 wave, leaving out the survey of subjective economic status.      
 
3.5.2.2. Categorization issues arising from the measurements of class in KLIPS 
 
The class data of this thesis is individual subjective class identification. Class identity in 
my dataset appears to be measured in parallel with either Weberian tradition by 
distinguishing between economic status and social status (in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves) 
or the approach of Bourdieu (who is reluctant to separate them) by incorporating both 
(in the 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves), that is, ‘socio-economic’ status groups that share the collective 
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identities in terms of both non-economic elements such as education or occupational 
status, and economic elements like earnings and household income. Generally, class 
analyses are divided into a realist approach and a nominalist approach; the former 
identifies class (class structure) from occupational or employment aggregates. In 
contrast, the latter defines class as a nominal concept of people’s perception of their life 
conditions and thus, grouping into certain numbers of categories is just for analytical 
convenience (Sorensen, 2005:134).  
 
The class analysis of this thesis is a nominalist approach, based on people’s subjective 
perception of class identity, which gives more room for manipulating class data; that is, 
grouping it into a certain number of categories for analytical purposes. Indeed, in the 
class research, the question How many classes? is an issue regardless of either the 
realist or nominalist approach. A popular categorisation is, for instance, upper class, 
upper middle class, middle class, lower middle class, lower class, underclass (Wright, 
2005:183). However, Wright (2005:19) suggests that ‘the number of class locations 
within an analysis of class structure depends on how fine-grained an account is needed 
for the purposes at hand’. Looking at the surveys of class in the 5 years’ dataset KLIPS, 
classes were categorized differently into four, five or six under the main categories of 
upper, middle and low. Considering this, a broad ‘three-class model’ seems more 
appropriate, so that it is useful to contrast between three major groups, especially 
between the middle class and working class. 
 
3.5.2.3. Addressing the under-representation issue of the upper class in the 
study sample 
 
There is an under-representation issue in relation to the data for the upper class. Only a 
very small number of people report belonging to the upper class, compared with the 
numbers for the middle class and lower class, and thus this may distort the statistical 
results. Through the process of restricting the sample by sex, marital status, job 
experience and age, the number of respondents in the study sample decreases overall, 
and hence the number of respondents identifying themselves as upper class who are 
available for analysis drops sharply. In the case of the 9
th
 wave, the total number of 
respondents in the study sample is 3,095. The number of upper class respondents is 55 
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(1.8%), for the middle class it is 1,848 (59.7%) and for the lower class it is 1,192 
(38.5%). In the multivariate model, the statistics for the upper class is less meaningful 
and highly likely to be distorted due to the under-represented sample size for the upper 
class. Thus, in order to obtain a meaningful statistic for the upper class, weighting the 
study sample may be a useful technique; however, weighting is not favoured by many 
statisticians, (Field, 2009:69, 692-693) as it could affect the statistical results; that is, the 
results might be different before and after weighting the data (which can be seen as a 
distortion of the data). For this reason, weighting is not considered in the thesis. Thus, 
all the three class data are included in the analyses. 
 
3.5.2.4. Restrictions arising from the different surveys in each wave of KLIPS 
 
There are survey data restrictions arising because not all waves contain the same survey 
questions, although the core questions are contained in all the waves. In other words, 
some of the surveys are not repeated in the following wave, or are re-surveyed some 
years later. For instance, the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 waves of KLIPS have no surveys of childcare 
costs, and the 1
st
, 4
th
, 6
th
, 7
th
 and 10
th
 waves do not have surveys of class identity. 
Furthermore, only the 7
th
 wave contains a survey of discrimination experience. This 
causes difficulty in comparing the results of the regression analyses with same predictor 
variables (the same conditions) across waves. To overcome this problem, by necessity, 
some survey data are repeated in other waves where they do not occur. Surveys of 
discrimination experience in the 7
th
 wave are repeated in the four study waves, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 
8
th
 and 9
th
. Surveys of social mobility surveyed after the 7
th
 wave are also repeated in 
the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves. 
 
When it comes to repeating data, it may be not such a trivial problem if some surveys 
are highly sensitive to time (year by year). For instance, social mobility agreements may 
differ from year to year. If people had experienced a sudden change in their social and 
economic status due to mass-unemployment or an economic crisis in a specific year, 
they are more likely to feel negative in the survey about social mobility for the 
following years. Thus, the social mobility agreement of 2000 is likely to be different 
from that of 2006, in that Korea had a financial crisis at the end of 1997 and it continued 
over the following few years until the economic recovery in the middle of the 2000s. 
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However, the difference between 2005 and 2006 KLIPS data is small, as the 
proportional difference in social mobility agreement is within 5 per cent. This suggests 
that caution is necessary when comparing waves with repeated data. Similarly, 
discrimination experience is also a concern. Some critics may suggest that repeating the 
discrimination experience data from the 7
th
 wave is still problematic even though it is 
repeated in the same way in the study waves, considering that discrimination 
experiences are likely to increase because of the surge of unemployment in the financial 
crisis periods. These problems could be limitations for the thesis. Nonetheless, these are 
statistically acceptable by and large, as KLIPS data comes from a panel survey – that is, 
the survey data is collected from the same persons every year. 
 
3.5.2.5. The issue of generalisation to the whole population  
 
In the statistical tests, generalisation to the whole population may be problematic when 
a model-goodness-fit test like the Hosmer & Lemeshow test of the logistic regression 
model is not significant or the adjusted R-square of the linear regression model is very 
low (Field, 2005:281). Therefore, this thesis mostly presents, as a reference, the analysis 
results from the logistic regression models with significance in the Hosmer & 
Lemeshow test within 10 per cent of p-value. In the case of linear regression models 
with a low adjusted R-square, although it is difficult to generalize from the analysis 
results to the population as a whole, they are presented in the analysis chapter (Chapter 
5) as the results are still valid for explaining the study sample (Field, 2005:214). 
 
3.5.2.6. Transforming and merging data 
 
In the statistical data analysis, there are always data manipulations including 
transforming data or the merging of datasets. There are a few main issues to be noted 
here. First of all, the survey of employment status (whether employed or not) alone 
cannot be used as the study variable to indicate whether someone is economically active 
or not, because the employment status in the questionnaire does not reveal which 
respondents have job-seeking status. Thus, according to the international definition of 
‘economically-active status’ as described in section 2 above, it has to be transformed by 
incorporating job-seeking status with employed status data. Probably, the most notable 
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issue is regarding class data. Surveys of class identity have different categories in 
different waves. In the 3
rd
 and 5
th
 waves, class identity variables have 5 categories: 
upper class, higher middle /middle middle /lower middle class, low class. In the 8
th
 and 
9
th
 waves, the variables have 6 categories: higher and lower upper class, higher and 
lower middle class, and higher and lower low class. Therefore, it is difficult to compare 
the data year by year due to these different measurements. To solve this problem, class 
variables are recoded into three categories of upper class, middle class and low class in 
all the study waves. 
 
In addition, the cost of bringing up children between the ages of 0 and 18 years is 
surveyed differently in certain waves. In the 3
rd
 wave, child costs are derived from two 
surveys, collecting data of childminder costs and child education costs separately. In the 
5
th
 wave and subsequently, these have been incorporated into one survey of children’s 
education costs including childcare costs. Therefore, child cost data in the 5
th
 wave and 
subsequently must be separated into childcare costs and child education costs as this 
seems necessary for the analysis. In order to separate child cost data, the data is 
deliberately split in terms of children’s age, that is, childcare costs for children aged less 
than 6, who are most likely to need childcare and child education costs for children aged 
over 6 who are least likely to require childcare in general (more detailed explanations 
are provided in the analysis chapters). Some may oppose the separation of child cost 
data because this might cause a statistical fault by deliberately manipulating the original 
data. This must be a limitation of my thesis. Concerning children’s ages, as the thesis 
pays special attention to the impact of child cohorts, children’s ages are recoded 
(grouped) into three: under 6 (below school age), aged between 6 and 11 (primary 
school children), and 12 plus (secondary school children), in order to examine the M-
shaped career path, whether mothers return or not to work when their children get older.   
 
In addition, the surveys concerning organizational commitment and satisfaction and 
social mobility agreement are measured by the Likert scale with 4 or 5 levels of 
agreement (strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree). For the 
regression analysis which requires numeric variables, these variables need to be recoded 
into either scale variables or dummy variables. As for work commitment transformation, 
work commitment is scaled by totalling all the response scores given to the sub-surveys 
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(10 questions) of both organisational commitment (comprising 5 questions) and job 
satisfaction (comprising 5 questions), as detailed in Table 3.2 above. By giving score 0 
for strongly disagree, 1 for disagree, 2 for neutral, 3 for agree and 4 for strongly agree, 
the scores should vary from 0 to 20 for each survey. In effect, work commitment scores 
will vary from 0 to 40 by totalling all the scores of the 10 sub-surveys, in the 
mathematical/theoretical sense, although in fact there may be no person having 40 by 
giving 4 for all the 10 questions. The score ‘0’ refers to ‘no commitment at all’ and ‘40’ 
to ‘the greatest work commitment’, along with ‘having more or less work commitment’ 
referring to scores between the two.  Work commitment measurement is based on the 
comparison of average scores between groups concerned. On the other hand, the 
variable of social mobility agreement using an ordinal measurement is transformed into 
a dummy variable (0 for strongly disagree/disagree and 1 for strongly agree/agree) for 
the regression model.   
 
Discrimination is measured by a multiple-choice question over six spheres of 
discrimination – age, sex, education, disability, region (as South Korea has 4 regional 
provinces with 4 different dialects, it is alleged there is discriminations against where 
people are from), and other. For the multivariate analysis, the multiple-responses with 
dummy values are computed by totalling all values to construct a scale, where larger 
values indicate more discriminatory experiences and smaller values indicate fewer. 
Lastly, as regards transforming the data, annual household income is computed for the 
logistic regression analysis by totalling the total amounts of earnings of family members 
(which is the major income source), financial income, real estate income, social 
insurance benefits, and transfer income (see Table 3.C in the Appendix). With regard to 
merging issues, as KLIPS data is divided into household, individual, and job data, a 
merging technique is very often used to produce the data for analysis. In the thesis, 
spouse factors like spouse’s pay, employment status and hours worked are taken from 
the sample for married men and merged into each study wave. Similarly, for the study 
sample restricted by job experience, data of job experience is extracted from the job 
history data and merged into each study wave. 
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3.6  Research Framework 
 
 
As far as the data allows, it is very important to put contextual factors along with the 
children factor into the analysis of maternal employment: as feminist critics of Hakim’s 
preference theory emphasize, contextual factors need to be counted in the analysis of the 
determinants of women’s choices between paid work and looking after the family. By 
including the contextual factors – both cultural and socio-economic (that is, ‘cultural 
gender norms’ and ‘class identity’) in the analysis – this thesis will be able to provide a 
more comprehensive understanding of maternal employment in Korea. In addition, 
regarding how best to approach women’s employment research, O’Reilly (1996:19) 
suggests that employment-systems analysis coupled with a gender perspective is a 
useful analytical framework. Thus, this research framework is a quantitative approach 
incorporating micro-level and macro-level analysis coupled with a gender perspective, 
which permits an inclusive analysis, counting individual human capital as well as 
cultural and structural factors without gender bias. In short, bearing in mind the 
limitations arising from the statistical techniques selected, the KLIPS data, and the 
statistical issues discussed above, the thesis provides three analytical chapters based on 
the hypotheses.  
 
Firstly, Chapter 4 examines the first and second hypothesis through the one way-
ANOVA analysis and linear-regression analysis; that is, whether there is any difference 
in work commitment by gender. As well as paying attention to education, the chapter 
discusses further whether labour market behaviour or employment interruption are 
related to the age cohorts of dependent children and whether married women tend to be 
in the job market as their children become older, as reflected in the M-shaped pattern of 
Korean women’s life-course careers, using a series of logistic-regression and linear-
regression analyses across the selected waves. With the supplementary analysis of 
situational factors, the chapter discusses whether the male spouse factor (the presence of 
a spouse, his type of employment status and wage) is associated with their wives’ labour 
force participation. 
 
Chapter 5 addresses the third and fourth hypotheses. First of all, the third hypothesis 
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examines culturally-specific workplace practices, discrimination experiences and work-
hours, using multiple-response analysis, cross-tabulation analysis and linear-regression 
analysis. The chapter poses the question of whether these practices differ according to 
gender, especially by employment status. In particular, to supplement the analysis of 
discrimination practices, the chapter analyzes the promotion experience surveys 
provided in the KLIPS 3
rd
 wave, based on a cross-tabulation analysis. Furthermore, the 
results of the logistic and linear regression models of the experience of discrimination 
with other covariates are discussed. With regard to the fourth hypothesis, parental 
welfare is analyzed, mainly by cross-tabulation analysis and a linear-regression model. 
Cross-tabulation analysis of firm welfare examines whether the Korean welfare regime 
is gendered or not. Furthermore, the linear-regression model identifies whether or not 
working hours and parental welfare are significantly associated with mothers’ 
employment interruptions as well as whether there is any gender difference in the 
statistical association. In particular, in relation to the long work-hours culture, a cross-
tabulation analysis of the hours worked and overtime work is presented by gender in 
order to examine whether there is a gender difference. Through the analysis, the thesis 
discusses the potential impact of the long work-hour culture on mothers continuing their 
careers. 
 
In Chapter 6, the last analysis examines the fifth hypothesis concerned with class-
differentiated mothering and labour market participation and whether there is any 
difference between the classes in their social mobility beliefs and their expenditure on 
children’s education, through recursive analyses with the logistic-regression model over 
4 KLIPS waves collected in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006, with a supplementary analysis 
of cross-tabulation including the chi-square test. 
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Chapter 4 
Individual factors and mothers’ labour 
market participation 
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Korean women’s labour force participation is still low, showing a clear M-shaped 
employment pattern, despite their educational attainment level now reaching men’s and 
at a time when the country has achieved rapid economic success. In the agricultural 
society before industrialisation in the 1960s, the majority of women stayed at home, 
while some working women were mostly non-paid family workers. That is, paid work 
was not typical for women. Since industrialisation, more women have entered the 
labour market, as the Korean economy has required women’s employment. Despite the 
dramatic increase in women’s employment, however, women’s employment continuity 
(after marriage and childbirths) has not improved much even though their education 
level is similar to men’s. Therefore, women’s life course employment pattern is still left 
dissimilar to men’s in Korea. Why is this so? This question has been addressed in the 
individualist theories and debates as discussed at length in Chapter 2. It is necessary to 
reiterate them briefly, in order to develop the arguments by questioning the individual 
factors again in this chapter. 
 
The prominent theory about the sexual division of labour, the human capital theory 
(Becker, 1985), explains the problem by attributing it to men’s and women’s different 
allocation of time and investment in human capital. The argument is that the division of 
labour has arisen from the differently specialized human capital of married men and 
married women. Similarly, Hakim (2000, 2002) explains the gender division of labour 
in terms of the preference theory, that is, women choose between home and paid work 
according to their lifestyle preferences, under the assumption that they have different 
work attitudes, values and aspirations from men (Hakim, 2002:428). In short, these 
theories are both based on the rational choice theory; that is, women make a rational 
decision between paid work and caring for the family, in order to be either economically 
optimised or to conform to their lifestyle preferences. However, these neoclassical 
arguments have been challenged by the idea that individual choices are still culturally 
ingrained and respond to culturally predetermined gender norms. Duncan and Irwin 
(2004:391) refute these assumptions by arguing that the rational choices women make 
between family and paid work are not separable from their social and moral decisions, 
as these are negotiated within wider social norms. Which of these conflicting arguments 
best explains the characteristics of Korean women’s employment patterns throughout 
their lives is, indeed, an issue in this thesis. In the human capital theory, married 
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women’s lower education investment in their careers, shorter work experience and 
interrupted careers are seen as the main factors sustaining the gender division of labour 
or sex segregation in the labour market. Based on this perspective, this chapter attempts 
to examine how far these human capital factors – educational attainment, job experience, 
career interruptions, as well as work commitment – are associated with Korean mothers’ 
labour market behaviour when taking into account their children’s ages and spouse-
related factors. Furthermore, this chapter provides discussions as to what extent these 
factors explain Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour, along with a greater 
understanding of Korean cultural-specific motherhood, in particular from a gender 
perspective. 
 
 
4.1  Human capital factors 
 
 
4.1.1  Age, education and employment  
 
In the analysis of married women’s labour market participation, the formation of the 
family and the child rearing period are seen as central. Having said that, the statistical 
analyses in this thesis have mainly focused on mothers with children aged less than 19 
years old and fathers in the same situation, to permit a comparison between the genders. 
To begin with, as people’s labour force participation is generally affected by their age or 
by the stage in their life that they are at, in particular, women’s labour force participation 
in the form of an analysis of employment from a life course perspective according to 
age or age cohort is necessary. Although Koreans can legally marry at 18 years of age, 
marriage has been increasingly delayed: on average, it was 28 for women and 31 for 
men in 2008 (Shin, 2009), along with more years in education for both sexes. 
Consequently, the family formation period is likely to be between the late 20s and mid 
30s for women, as shown in the Korean women’s M-shaped participation pattern 
observed by the previous literature.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the basic information on average age and economic activity status by 
gender for the years 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006. The average age in 2000 was 37 for 
114 
 
mothers and 40 for fathers. Both mothers’ and fathers’ employment levels have slightly 
increased over these years, showing a clear gender difference. The difference between 
mothers and fathers was nearly 50 percent in the studied years. The unemployment rates 
for mothers stayed at less than 1.8 per cent for the years 2000, 2002 and 2005 until a 
sharp rise in 2006 (2.2 per cent), rapidly catching up that for fathers (2.1 per cent). On 
the other hand, the unemployment rates for fathers stayed around 2.0 per cent, except 
for their high unemployment (2.4 per cent) in 2000, which showed the largest difference 
from mothers (1.6 per cent). 
 
Table 4.2  Average age and economic activity status over the years by gender in 2000, 
2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Average age 
(total N*) 
37.2 
(1929) 
37.1 
(1848) 
37.4 
(1909) 
37.6 
(1874) 
40.4 
(1786) 
40.5 
(1792) 
40.4 
(1830) 
41.8 
(1545) 
Employment %  
of total N 45.4 47.7 46.1 47.5 91.3 93.4 93.3 93.7 
Unemployment % 
of total N 1.6 1.4 1.7 2.2 2.4 1.8 2.0 2.1 
Non-working %  
of total N  53.0 50.9 52.1 50.2 6.3 4.9 4.7 4.3 
Row-total % 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: * N refers to the number of cases (the same 
hereafter). 
 
Employment by age cohort shows a very clear gender difference, as presented in Figure 
4.1 (as for unemployment by age cohort, see Table 4.A in the Appendix). Comparing the 
employment levels within the age cohort, there was around a 30 per cent gap by gender 
in all the age cohorts except the lowest age, 24, although the lifetime employment 
patterns were similar between the genders due to the characteristics of panel data (a 
clearer M-shaped pattern for women with cross-sectional data). While the gap between 
married women and married men could be explained by women’s withdrawal from the 
labour market to rear children and the continuing impact of this on their careers 
afterwards, the gender gap still leaves the question as to why this gap is over-
represented in Korea compared with Western developed economies (as discussed in 
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Chapter 2), and furthermore, whether it can be better explained by human capital factors 
or by structural factors. 
 
Figure 4.1  The gender difference in employment throughout life over the years, 2000, 
2002, 2005 and 2006 (per cent within age cohort) 
 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. Note: Statistics for this chart are provided in Table 4.B in the 
Appendix.  
 
From the perspective of economists as well as human capital theorists, educational 
attainment level is a key factor in explaining differences in the labour market such as 
individual differences in earnings, job mobility, and job entry. Thus, it is necessary to 
find out whether there is a notable gender difference in education and whether it is 
associated with employment patterns. First of all, Table 4.2 shows the different 
distributions in education level between mothers and fathers, with the number of highly 
educated individuals, both mothers and fathers, increasing over the years. Overall, 
mothers’ education attainment has fast approached that of fathers over the years; the 
proportion of mothers with upper secondary education is around 50 per cent, and 
roughly 45 per cent for fathers in the four years. The number of college and university 
graduates among fathers is around 10 per cent higher than those for mothers between 
2000 and 2005; however, the proportions of mothers are similar to those of fathers by 
2006, narrowing the gap to around 4 per cent. Nonetheless, the biggest gap between the 
genders is at post-graduate level: in 2000 there were four times more fathers with 
postgraduate qualifications than mothers despite the gap narrowing steadily over the 
years. 
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Table 4.3  The distribution by education level and gender over the years 2000, 2002, 
2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
% of total N  
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Primary and under 
8.2 8.2 4.2 3.7 5.5 4.5 2.5 2.4 
Lower secondary 
16.9 13.6 9.1 8.1 12.9 11.0 7.6 8.1 
Upper secondary 
55.8 54.0 53.0 51.4 48.3 46.9 42.8 45.2 
College/University 
18.3 22.9 31.8 34.5 28.8 32.7 41.4 38.9 
Postgraduate 
0.7 1.2 1.9 2.2 4.5 4.9 5.8 5.4 
Row-total N % 100 
(1929) 
100 
(1949) 
100 
(1909) 
100 
(1874) 
100 
(1786) 
100 
(1792) 
100 
(1830) 
100 
(1545) 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
, and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.   
 
Looking at the employment rate by education level (percentages of the total cases), 
according to Table 4.3, employed mothers and fathers with upper secondary education 
were predominant, reflecting the greatest numbers of both mothers and fathers 
completing upper secondary education, while the proportions for both genders were 
relatively stable over the years. The overall proportions for the employed fathers with 
upper secondary education and over were more than double those of mothers.  
 
Table 4.4  Employment by education level and gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 
(percentage) 
Employed %  
of total N 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Primary and under 4.7 4.4 1.9 1.7 4.6 3.5 2.0 1.9 
Lower secondary  10.2 8.5 5.7 5.2 11.6 10.2 6.8 7.5 
Upper secondary  22.4 24.1 23.7 23.7 44.6 43.9 39.9 42.0 
College/University 7.6 10.0 13.8 15.7 26.3 31.1 39.1 37.0 
Postgraduate 0.5 0.6 1.0 1.3 4.1 4.7 5.6 5.2 
Total N (cases) 1929 1949 1909 1874 1786 1792 1830 1545 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  
 
Apart from the gender difference in the absolute numbers overall, the employment trend 
in the studied years was a complete contrast between the lower and the higher educated, 
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as shown in Figure 4.2; the employment of both mothers and fathers with secondary 
education and under declined steadily, whereas those with college/university education 
and above increased over the years. These trends parallel the trend of increased numbers 
of highly educated people and the decrease in less educated people over the sample 
years as shown in Table 4.2.  
 
Figure 4.2  Gender difference in employment by education level and gender in 2000, 
2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. 
 
The employment during the data years in terms of education and gender is well 
illustrated by the employment rate within each education level (the proportions of 
employed people with the same education level) as shown in Table 4.4 and Figure 4.3. 
Overall, for both sexes, there is no big difference between years in employment levels 
within the same education level. For mothers, the number of employed upper secondary 
completers and college/university graduates was the lowest group, accounting for below 
50 per cent, while that of mothers with lower secondary education was highest, at over 
60 per cent in all the study years, followed by that of postgraduates, which declined 
sharply from 71 per cent in 2000 to 52 per cent in 2002, but recovered to 59.5 in 2006. 
In contrast, fathers’ employment was not so differentiated by their education level, and 
remained relatively stable at over 90 per cent over the studied years, although the lowest 
educated fathers’ employment rate was the least (around 80 per cent) in all the years and 
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college/university and postgraduates increased steadily. 
 
Table 4.5  Employment proportions within education level by gender in 2000, 2002, 
2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
Employed %  
within education 
level 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Primary and under 56.6 53.9 46.3 44.3 83.7 77.8 80.0 81.1 
Lower secondary  60.4 62.3 63.0 64.2 90.4 91.9 89.9 92.8 
Upper secondary  40.2 44.7 44.7 46.1 92.3 93.7 93.2 92.8 
College/University 41.4 43.6 43.3 45.4 91.3 95.1 94.5 95.0 
Postgraduate 71.4 52.2 55.6 59.5 91.4 96.6 96.2 97.6 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
 , 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  
 
Figure 4.3  Employment share within education level by gender (mother and father) in 
2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage)  
  
Source: statistics based on Table 4.4 above. 
 
Comparing employment levels by gender, it seems that college/university education 
does not advance married women’s employment as much as married men’s, while 
postgraduate education enhances both mothers and fathers’ employment, even though to 
a different degree (around 60 per cent for mothers and 97 per cent for fathers in 2006). 
Indeed, the employment of both mothers and fathers with postgraduate education 
increased most over the study years, implying that the highly educated might return to 
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the labour market more quickly than those with lower education levels. However, there 
is still a considerable gender gap in employment of more than 40 per cent difference, in 
accordance with the notable gender gap in postgraduate education. From this aspect, the 
neoclassical economist argument appears to have support in that sex segregation in the 
labour market has occurred due to the gender difference in human capital, in this case, 
due to women’s overall lower education level than men’s. Nonetheless, it does not 
explain why married women college/university graduates have lower employment 
levels than those with upper secondary education and under, and postgraduate education. 
 
In this regard, Hakim (2000:94-96, 159-163) sees that education has a function not in 
the labour market but in the marriage market, arguing that higher education does not 
change women’s preference for paid work over marriage (in effect, it does not lead to an 
egalitarian model of family roles), but that women use it as a means of upward social 
mobility through the marriage market rather than through the labour market (according 
to Hakim (2000:203), the ‘educational homogamy of spouses’). In this case, highly 
educated women differ little in their preferences from non-graduate women who prefer 
a lifestyle shared between home and career or marriage as a career. The above statistics 
for Korean mothers with upper secondary and college/university education employment 
levels (more than half mothers in this group stay at home) appear to support Hakim ’s 
argument. However, Hakim does not consider whether the better educated women 
return to the labour market (as the lower educated women do); that is, the probability of 
them changing their lifestyle preference after their children reach school age. Special 
attention is paid to this issue by this thesis providing further discussions concerning it in 
this chapter, and looking at the analysis by child age cohort, rather than women’s age 
cohort as Hakim did. 
 
4.1.2. Work experience and career interruption 
 
Together with educational attainment, the number of years of work experience is 
considered important as human capital, particularly in human resource management like 
recruitment and assessment schemes. From the perspective of human capital theory, 
employers assume women will leave their jobs when they have children. This is the 
basis of sex segregation and discrimination in the labour market. Disruption to careers 
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has been a big issue in the discourses surrounding women’s labour force participation. 
Thus, this thesis also attempts to examine whether work experience and interruptions to 
careers have a link to mothers’ employment and whether there is a gender difference in 
this statistical association, for which logistic and linear regression analyses are used. 
First, the average years of work experience and the number of employment break-offs 
that occurred during the years under study, including a retrospective work history is 
presented in Table 4.5.   
 
The number of employment break-offs refers to how many times intermittency occurred 
in the employment that workers have had during their career, regardless of the duration 
of unemployment or non-employment, implying career interruption or intermittency. As 
for work experience before 1998 when the survey started, mothers had about 7 years on 
average, which is half the fathers’ average work experience of 14 years. Looking at the 
work experience accrued between 1998 and 2006, there was a gender gap between 
mothers and fathers, of 4.5 years experience for mothers and 8 years for fathers. In the 
absolute number of employment break-offs, mothers had on average 2.03 over the years 
before 1998 and 1.11 for the years under study, while fathers had on average 2.7 over 
the years before 1998 and 2.59 for the years under study. These statistics do not permit a 
comparison between the two because the genders have different average years of work 
experience. 
 
Table 4.6  Average years of work experience and numbers of employment break-offs 
in career by gender  
 
Mother Father 
Job exp. 
(years) 
Employment 
break-offs 
Job exp. 
(years) 
Employment 
break-offs 
Before 1998
a
 6.9 2.03 13.9 2.70 
1998-2006 4.6 1.11 8 2.59 
Ratio of 
employment 
break-offs per year  
during total career
b
  0.27 0.24 
during 1998-2006 0.24 0.32 
Source: the 3
rd
 (2000) and 9
th
 (2006) waves, KLIPS.  Note: 
a
 statistics based on retrospective jobs held 
before 1998.   
b  
refers to all job history before 1998 and between 1998 and 2006. 
 
Consequently, it is necessary to calculate the number of employment break-offs per year 
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for each gender in order to compare them, as provided in Table 4.5. During their careers, 
including all the pre-1998 and recent years’ employment, mothers had more 
interruptions to their careers than fathers, 0.27 vs 0.24 respectively. However, in 
employment between 1998 and 2006, fathers had more interruptions to their careers 
than mothers, 0.32 vs 0.24, implying that fathers’ employment has become more 
unstable since the end of the1990s with the financial crisis in the Korean economy. In 
short, career interruptions were more pronounced for mothers, and were highly likely to 
be due to childbirth and childrearing as expected, and it is also notable that fathers’ 
interrupted careers also appear to have increased, highly likely due to the increasing 
economic instabilities in recent years. Neoclassical theorists have argued that women 
have more interruptions to their careers than men, suggesting that their work attitude is 
different from men’s and consequently this explains the sex segregation of the labour 
market. However, what does it mean if men’s career interruptions are also increasing? 
Could it be understood that men’s career aspirations are decreasing in the same way as 
understanding women’s simply from the employment interruptions? Now, along with 
the above analysis of career interruptions by gender, workers’ work commitment is to be 
analyzed by gender and the analysis results to be discussed. 
 
4.1.3.  Work commitment  
 
In neoclassical theories, work commitment is considered an important aspect of human 
capital and work commitment is seen closely linked with workers’ performance, 
productivity, etc. In light of the neoclassical economics, Kim (2008) measures work 
commitment using the surveys of organizational commitment and job satisfaction, 
although Kim does not provide a gender comparative analysis. As explained in Chapter 
3, this thesis is not to address work attitude or work orientation due to the unavailability 
of work attitude-related data in the thesis dataset, KLIPS. Instead, this chapter attempts 
to provide a gender comparative analysis of workers’ work commitment (organizational 
commitment and job commitment at the present job), querying that there is gender 
difference. It is also noted that as work commitment for non-employed mothers is not 
available (the data is restricted to a present job), this thesis is not able to provide a 
comparison of work commitment between employed and non-employed mothers.  
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To reiterate the measurement of work commitment from the methodology chapter, work 
commitment is scaled by totalling all the response scores given to the sub-surveys (10 
questions) of both organisational commitment (5 questions) and job commitment (5 
questions). By giving a score 0 for strongly disagree, 1 for disagree, 2 for neutral, 3 for 
agree and 4 for strongly agree, work commitment scores will vary from 0 at the 
minimum to 40 at the maximum theoretically. Actually, from the descriptive analysis, 
the scores vary from 0 at the minimum to 30 at the maximum, along with 11.8 in 
average for all respondents (both mothers and fathers). The score ‘0’ refers to ‘no 
commitment at all’ and ‘30’ to ‘the greatest work commitment’, along with ‘having more 
or less work commitment’ referred to scores between the two. The work commitment 
measurement is based on the comparisons of average scores between groups concerned. 
 
Before the multivariate analysis, the descriptive statistics for work commitment were 
presented by gender, and furthermore, the statistical associations were examined by the 
one-way ANOVA test (Table 4.6). The means for the work commitment of mothers and 
fathers were very similar: 11.9 for mothers and 11.7 for fathers. The statistical 
association between gender and work commitment was confirmed by the ANOVA test, 
which found that work commitment was not significantly associated with gender (in 
other words, it was not different by gender).  
 
Table 4.7  Work commitment by gender (2006) 
 Mother Father 
Mean 11.9041 11.7355 
Std. Deviation 6.29760 6.35855 
N  886 1346 
One-Way ANOVA  
F=.378 
(df1=1, df2=2230, mean square=15.179, sig.=.539) 
Source: the 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS.  Note: N refers to the number of cases (included in this analysis).           
Legend:  * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001  
 
In addition, mothers’ labour market participation is often assumed to be restricted – 
perhaps even more so than their own human capital – by situational factors such as their 
children’s ages and spouse factors (for instance, a spouse’s earnings may be considered 
123 
 
as an individual’s human capital), by virtue of the common phenomenon in many 
countries whereby women tend to work less than men during the period of childbirth 
and child rearing. Thus, any analyses which do not take into account children’s ages and 
spouse factors will be meaningless in the study of married women’s labour market 
participation. 
 
 
4.2  Situational factors  
 
 
4.2.1. Reasons for non-employment and the effect of children on the household 
 
An OECD paper points out the marital and child barriers to Korean women’s labour 
market participation: ‘Many women withdraw from the labour market at the time of 
marriage or childbirth and encounter difficulties when returning to the labour market 
after childrearing’ (Grubb et al., 2007:57). This argument is supported by the analysis of 
the results of the survey about the reasons for being non-working, as shown in Table 4.7. 
Non-employment due to child rearing was the dominant reason given by mothers (about 
57 per cent), while no fathers gave the reason as child rearing. It is also notable that 
non-employment due to being responsible for housework was reported by about 30 per 
cent of mothers, whereas none of the fathers stated this. 
 
Table 4.8  Reasons for non-employment (percentage of total N, 2000) 
 
Study 
Child 
rearing 
House
-work 
Retire-
ment 
Old 
age 
Health 
problem 
Taking 
a break 
Other 
reasons 
Column-
total % (N) 
Mother 
0.5% 56.7% 29.9% 0.1% 0.1% 7.8% 2.2% 2.7% 100% (860) 
Father 
8.2% 0% 0% 1.4% 2.7% 50.7% 17.8% 19.2% 100% (73) 
Source: the 3
rd
 wave (2000), KLIPS.  
 
In the discussions of married women’s employment issues, children are always taken 
into account. Past research has found that children, especially younger ones, are 
significantly associated with married women’s interrupted careers. Looking at the 
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surveys of children in the KLIPS household data, these were limited to children aged 
between 0 and 18 years old (Table 4.8), the average age was 9.5 and the average number 
of children per household was 1.7, indicating that only a small number of Korean 
families have more than two children. Presuming that women’s labour market behaviour 
is differentiated according to the ages of their children, in particular those of school age, 
for instance, between age 6 to age 12 (compulsory schooling in Korea is from 6 to 18), 
it is very important to analyze this by the children’s age cohort. Previous research of 
British women like Hakim’s (2004:103) observed that before their children reached 
school age, most mothers tended to stay at home whilst as their children became older 
and started school, mothers tended to return to the labour market. Furthermore, Gornick 
et al. (1997:49) argue that age 11 is critical to mothers’ employment (in the European 
countries) because it marks the end of primary schooling for children. Is this the case for 
Korean mothers’ labour market participation?  
 
Table 4.9  The percentages of having children by age group and the average number of 
children in the household
* 
in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2005 
% for the age group against other age groups 2000 2002 2005 2006 
The presence of children aged 0 to 5 34.2 36.1 37.7 37.8 
The presence of children aged 6 to 11 41.5 43.7 40.2 39.8 
The presence of children aged 12 to 18 48.4 46.4 45.9 45.8 
Average child age (under 19) 9.6 9.5 9.4 9.4 
Average number (total N) 1.7 (2174) 1.7 (1933) 1.7 (2061) 1.7 (2041) 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. * See Table 4.C in the Appendix: The number of children in 
the household by age cohort. 
 
As shown in Table 4.8, this thesis divides children into three cohorts by age; that is, 
before and after primary school age and those of secondary school age in Korea; that is, 
children aged less than 6, children aged between 6 and 11, and children aged between 
12 and 18. Table 4.8 shows the percentage of children per age group and number of 
children per household. Households with children aged under 6 account for roughly one 
third of all households, while around 40 per cent of households have primary school 
children aged between 6 and 11 and around 45 per cent of households have secondary 
school children aged more than 11 (see also the number of children by age cohort over 
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the study years, provided in Table 4.C of Appendix). 
 
4.2.2.  Mothers’ labour market participation, and situational factors  
 
The next question to be considered, focusing on mothers, is how mothers’ employment 
is associated with situational factors such as their children’s age and spouse factors? 
First of all, looking at employment by children’s age cohort, as shown in Table 4.9: 
overall throughout the years studied, mothers’s employment rate was getting higher as 
children ages get higher, although a small percentage of mothers were employed when 
their children were aged under 6 (around 10 to 13 per cent). When their children reach 
primary school and secondary school age, mothers’ employment steadily increases; for 
instance, in 2006 it went up to 18 and 27 per cent respectively, while mothers’ 
employment was, roughly speaking, stable in the research years. In short, the evidence 
suggests that mothers’ employment was very much restricted by the presence of young 
children but that mothers are more likely to take up paid work as their children reach 
primary schooling ages and over. 
 
Table 4.10  Mothers’ employment by children’s age cohort in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 
2006 (percentage) 
Employed % of total N 2000 2002 2005 2006 
By children’s age 
cohort 
with children aged 0 to 5 10.4 11.6 12.7 13.4 
with children aged 6 to 11 19.4 20.9 18.2 18.0 
with children aged 12 to 18 26.9 27.7 26.4 27.1 
Total N (the number of mothers) 1929 1848 1909 1874 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  
 
Furthermore, the question of whether mothers’ employment with younger children is 
different according to their education level was examined. As provided in the cross-
tabulation analysis of Table 4.10, the employment of highly educated mothers is overall 
higher than that of the less educated in all children’s age groups (but similar in 
children’s age group 12 to 18), and in addition, regardless of education level, the 
employment proportions of mothers were higher with children of school age; among 
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mothers with children under school age, employment rates differed most by education 
level: 27 per cent for less educated mothers and 40 per cent for better educated mothers. 
Among mothers with primary school children, the employment rate for the lower 
educated mothers and for the higher educated mothers was about 40 per cent and 50 per 
cent respectively. However, among mothers with secondary school children, the 
employment rate increased to nearly 60 per cent for both education groups. What is 
most important here is that there is a remarkable difference between the higher and 
lower educated groups in terms of mothers’ employment with the presence of younger 
children before school age. 
 
Table 4.11  Mothers’ employment by child age cohort and mothers’ education levels in 
2006 (percentage) 
Employment % 
‘within’ children’s age cohort 
children under age 6 children age 6 to 11 children age 12 to 18 
upper secondary, under- 27.4 42.5 61.1 
graduate and postgraduate 39.7 49.8 58.9 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.  
 
This suggests that higher education does make a difference to mothers’ labour market 
behaviour, especially those with younger children, although it seems that the children’s 
age cohort is the most important factor in maternal employment. In this, Hakim’s 
argument discussed above is not fully supported by the statistical evidence that the 
difference in employment rates between highly educated mothers and less educated 
mothers is highest with children under school age, and also that the difference between 
mothers of different education levels is negligible (1.2 per cent) once their children 
finish primary school. 
 
As for spouse factors, it has been well documented that the presence of a spouse has a 
link to married women’s labour market participation; in general, without a spouse, 
single parents are more likely to work. However, little attention has been paid to a 
potential link with the spouse’s pay and employment status. Presumably, a mother’s 
labour market behaviour is likely to have some relations with her spouse’s pay and job 
status. When a spouse earns enough to maintain a good standard of living, the other 
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spouse may be less likely to work, and couples might both prefer to work in case one 
becomes jobless or has a lower income or perhaps when one spouse’s job is more 
precarious if they are in irregular work or self-employed. Consequently, these spouse 
factors must be looked into as well. According to the analysis of mothers’ employment 
when there is a male spouse, and that spouse’s employment status (Table 4.11), it can be 
observed that mothers without a male spouse are more likely to be employed; that is, 60 
per cent (2006) compared with less than 50 per cent for mothers with a male spouse, 
suggesting that many mothers without a spouse have to work for a living, as expected. 
Furthermore, mothers with a male spouse employed in a permanent-contract job were 
less likely to be employed (under 40 per cent) than other mothers – nearly 48 per cent 
with a male spouse in irregular employment and about 58 per cent with a self-employed 
male spouse.  
 
Table 4.12  Mothers’ employment when they have a spouse and spouse’s employment 
status and earnings’ contribution to the household income in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 
2006 (percentage) 
 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Mothers 
employed % 
(against non-
employed %)  
 
 
By the presence  
of spouse  
(% of total N) 
with spouse 44.9 48.2 46.1 47.1 
without spouse 53.0 59.0 60.9 60.3 
By spouse’s 
employment status 
(% within 
employment 
status) 
permanent job 35.6 39.2 37.6 39.3 
irregular job 43.4 49.4 48.3 46.9 
self-employed job 43.5 58.0 56.4 58.5 
Proportions (%) 
out of total household income * 
the share of male 
spouse earnings 
81.9 74.9 79.2 76.8 
the share  of mothers’ 
earnings  
46.2 42.6 46.0 44.5 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: * Refer to Table 4.D in the Appendix; Average 
earnings and household income by year. 
 
Notably, mothers’ employment levels were far higher when their male spouses were 
self-employed, perhaps because mothers are more likely to be unpaid family workers in 
their spouse’s self-employed business or due to it being a low-earning business. Finally, 
looking at how much families depend on the male spouse’s earnings, along with the 
contribution (share) of mothers’ earnings to the household income, on average the male 
spouse’s earnings accounted for over 75 or 80 per cent of the total household income in 
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the years studied, while the mothers’ earnings share was around 43 or 46 per cent of the 
total household income. Overall, it is clear that the earnings of Korean families mostly 
come from the male spouses, while the female spouses’ contributions are less than half 
that of males. As suggested by the cross-tabulation analysis, spouse factors are 
important for understanding mothers’ labour market behaviour, along with children 
factors. 
 
In addition, as financial reasons are also likely to affect mothers’ labour market 
behaviour, the financial situation needs to be reviewed. The financial situation of 
households and the employment of mothers with financial difficulties over the years 
were examined by cross-tabulation analysis, as shown in Table 4.12. The financial 
situation reported by mothers was worst in 2000 and since then seems to have improved 
overall. Mothers’ employment when they were in a financially difficult situation peaked 
in 2000, suggesting that many of them had to work due to financial difficulties rather 
than for any other reason, further implying that many families were affected by the 
financial crisis at the end of the 1990s in Korea. However, employment figures of 
mothers in financial difficulty fell sharply by 17 per cent from 63 per cent in 2000 to 47 
per cent in 2002, suggesting that the financial situation of households improved in 2002.  
 
Table 4.13  Mothers’ employment due to financial difficulties and the financial 
situation in the study years reported by mothers in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 
(percentage) 
 2000* 2002 2005 2006 
Employment %  
within financial 
status 
financially coping  36.8 53.1 45.2 47.9 
financially difficult 63.2 46.9 54.8 52.1 
Row-total % 100 100 100 100 
Financial situation  
(% of all mothers)         
all right 40.8 54 49.3 50.7 
difficult 59.2 46 50.7 49.3 
Row-total % 100 100 100 100 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: *in 2000, the financial situation was surveyed by two 
categories, ‘financially difficult’ and ‘not difficult’, while in the other years, it was surveyed by five categories, 
‘very affordable’, ‘affordable’, ‘all right’, ‘somewhat difficult’ and ‘very difficult’. 
 
Subsequently, the difference between mothers in employment who are coping and those 
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who have financial difficulties appeared to have levelled out in 2005 (55 per cent) and 
2006 (52 per cent), implying that employment due to financial reasons was decreasing. 
Indeed, Baek (2008:2) describes how the economic situation of East Asia (NIEs) had 
rapidly declined since the 1997 financial crisis and was still in difficulties until the early 
2000s but improved around mid 2000s. The Korean economic situation in the early and 
mid 2000s appears to be reflected in the statistics of Table 4.12: the higher percentage of 
employment of mothers with financial difficulties in 2000 and the lower percentage in 
2006. Considering that the study dataset is a panel data collected yearly from the same 
respondants, it is most probably that mothers’ employment due to financial difficulties 
peaked in 2000 along with the national economic decline. 
 
In short, from the above analysis, Korean mothers’ labour market participation varies 
according to their children’s age cohort and their spouses’ earning capacity including 
financial difficulties. Thus, mothers’ labour market behaviour must take these factors 
into account as well as the human capital ones, and this needs further examination 
through an advanced statistical model: a multivariate analysis.      
 
 
4.3  Findings from the multivariate analysis 
 
 
Considering all the individual factors, mothers’ personal human capital and the 
situational factors discussed above, the thesis examined whether these factors were 
statistically associated with mothers’ labour market participation, along with providing a 
gender comparison. First of all, from the logistic regression analysis of mothers (Table 
4.13 & 4.14), education was not significant in 2000, 2002 and 2006, though it was in 
2005 (however, it was significant in 2002, 2005 and 2006 in the model without 
household income, provided in Table 4.G in the Appendix, implying that the difference 
has arisen from controlling the household income variable). Based on these results, it 
seems that more educated mothers are likely to be employed in 2005. Presumably, this 
is because higher education helps to secure employment especially during the job 
market instability (perhaps in the years between 2004 and 2005) since the ‘credit crisis’ 
in 2003 (Keum et al., 2006:45-46, 2009:7-9). Children’s age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 12 to 
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18 were significantly associated in the models across the selected years, while the age 
cohort of 6 to 11 was not significant in 2000, 2002 and 2005 though it was in 2006. 
Children’s age cohort of 6 to 11 became significant at the final step in 2006, while 
children’s age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 6 to 11 were negatively associated and children’s 
age cohort of 12 to 18 was positively associated. Mothers with young children under the 
age of 6 were most likely to stay at home (as the odds ratios were less than 1 and the 
significance was highest among the three age cohorts) whereas mothers with children of 
secondary school age were more likely to work (as the odds ratios were more than 1). It 
is very clear that the presence of pre-school children is the main barrier to mothers’ 
labour market participation in Korea.  
 
In all the models across the selected years for mothers, previous work experience was 
very significant, implying that the longer the work experience, the more likely mothers 
are to remain in the labour market and also that the past work experience is an important 
factor in women’s re-entry into the labour market. Household income works as a 
predictor of who is more likely to be in employment, reflecting the contribution that 
mothers’ earnings make to the household income. In particular, all spouse factors were 
significantly associated with mothers’ employment in all the models: mothers with a 
spouse who earned a high salary were less likely to be employed, and when the male 
spouse was self-employed (possibly including irregular workers) rather than having a 
permanent job, mothers were more likely to work (the p-value for male spouse’s 
irregular employment was 0.051 in 2000 as shown in Table 4.14). From the overall 
results of the age factor across the years, older mothers are more likely to stay at home: 
this supports the OECD statistics (2011), as indicated in Chapter 2, that fewer older 
women of working age are employed in Korea compared with other OECD countries, 
with the result that married older women are doubly disadvantaged by the cultural 
attitude to age and the gender system. However, when their financial situation was taken 
into account in this research, it was not such a good predictor of mothers’ labour market 
behaviour; the predictor, the financially difficult situation, was insignificant throughout 
the years studied. 
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Table 4.14 Logistic regression on whether employed or not for mothers 
(individual/situational factors) – stepwise analysis (See Table 4.E in the Appendix for 
‘enter-method’ analysis models) 
Statistics:  
odds ratios - Exp(B) Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6 Step7 Step8 
Children aged 0 to 5       .669** .506*** 
Children aged 6 to11        .711** 
Children aged 12 to18 1.612*** 1.535*** 1.540*** 1.595*** 1.518*** 1.730*** 1.592*** 1.289* 
Job experience 
(retrospective)    
 1.076*** 1.071*** 1.063*** 1.056*** 1.076*** 1.078*** 1.084*** 
Spouse pay (logged)    1.639*** .096*** .078*** .073*** .071*** .075*** 
Household income 
(logged) 
   9.715*** 12.054*** 13.205*** 13.320*** 12.978*** 
Spouse employment 
status (permanent is 
base case) 
  
 
 
*** *** *** *** 
 
irregular 
employment 
    1.364 1.425 1.414 1.473 
 self-employment     2.189*** 2.310*** 2.398*** 2.454*** 
Age      .960** .945*** .934*** 
Education (year)         
Financially difficult         
N
a
 1874 1874 1874 1874 1874 1874 1874 1874 
-2 Log likelihood 1563.55 1535.65 1513.29 1371.84 1343.65 1335.92 1327.53 1319.14 
Model Chi-square 
(goodness-of-fit)
b
  43.2*** 71.0*** 93.4*** 234.9*** 263.1*** 270.8*** 279.2*** 287.6*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a
 N refers to the number of cases 
included in the analysis (the same hereafter);  
b
 the models for Step 2 & 3 are insignificant in the 
Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-fit-test within 90%.  Legend: * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), 
*** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
 
In short, the presence of pre-school age children and a spouse’s higher pay level have a 
negative association with mothers’ labour market participation, whereas more years of 
previous work experience helps mothers to remain in the labour market. In addition, 
older women tended to be non-employed. The question arises here as to whether the 
situation is the same for fathers. 
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Table 4.15  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by 
year and by gender (individual/situational factors) – statistics presented for the last 
step only (See Table 4.F in the Appendix for all the steps and Table 4.G for the other 
model without the variable household income) 
Statistics: 
odds ratios - Ex(B) 
Mother By gender (2006) 
2000 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Children aged 0 to 5 
.590*** .480*** .535*** .506***  
Children aged 6 to11 
   .711**  
Children aged 12 to18 
1.462*** 1.326** 1.663*** 1.289*  
Job experience retrospective)    
1.098*** 1.085*** 1.077*** 1.084***  
Spouse pay (logged)  
.162*** .178*** .081*** .075*** .327** 
Household income (logged) 
7.640*** 4.310*** 8.859*** 12.978*** 12.185*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base) 
*** *** *** ***  
 irregular employment 
1.542(.051)! 1.348 1.453 1.473  
 self-employment 
2.363*** 2.410*** 2.054*** 2.454***  
Age 
.971* .975* .946*** .934***  
Education (year) 
  1.154*   
Financially difficult 
     
N 
1382 1404 1379 1329 582 
Model Chi-square  
(goodness-of-fit ) 337.47*** 300.62*** 312.03*** 287.55*** 58.75*** 
-2 Log likelihood 
1559.41 1641.58 1582.69 1319.14 251.24 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test  
x
2
 (sig.) 21.56** 22.05** 52.13*** 41.27*** 20.01! 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off. 
Legend:  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%) 
 
According to Table 4.14, for the gender comparison, the picture is quite different. For 
fathers, their children’s age and wife’s job status were not significantly associated with 
their labour market participation, suggesting that regardless of whether they had 
children or not, and the status of their spouse’s job, they were highly likely to be 
employed. Also, there was no link between age, education and past job experience for 
fathers, while household income worked as a predictor, reflecting the contribution that 
fathers’ earnings make to the household’s income as in the case of mothers. What does 
this suggest? It is highly likely that nearly all fathers work regardless of their age, 
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education or work experience, as also shown in the cross-tabulation analysis concerned. 
However, as with mothers, the spouse’s earnings was a significant factor. The 
observation that both mothers and fathers tend to have negative associations with their 
spouse’s pay is most important, suggesting that the male spouse’s pay does not 
necessarily have more significance. In addition, in order to examine whether children 
factors are associated with interrupted careers and work commitment, a linear regression 
model was used, as shown in Table 4.15 and Table 4.16.  
 
Table 4.16  Linear regression on the number of employment break-offs
a
 by gender 
(individual/situational factors) – stepwise analysis (See Table 4.H for the model 
without job experience in the Appendix) 
Statistics: 
standardized coefficients B 
Mother Father 
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step1 Step2 Step3 
The number of children       
Age        
Education (year)   -.123*    
Household income (logged) -.223*** -.239*** -.185***    
Job experience  
(retrospective before 1998) 
 .154** .136** .259*** .240*** .236*** 
Pay (logged)      -.214*** -.162*** 
Work commitment      -.111** 
Irregular employment (dummy) 
 
     
Married and living with spouse 
 
     
N 1874 1874 1874 1545 1545 1545 
F 24.36 18.34 14.41 59.36 52.24 38.19 
Adjusted R-square .05*** .07*** .08*** .07*** .11*** .12*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS in the year 2006.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a
 employment 
break-offs refer to the number of employment failures including job transitions during the career for all the 
recent and retrospective ones.  Legend :  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
 
First of all, the factors associated with interruptions to the career by the number of 
employment break-offs during the career were examined by the linear regression 
analysis in Table 4.15. From the gender comparative analysis, a different result (at the 
final steps) was observed. For mothers, their work commitment was not significantly 
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associated with the number of employment failures, that is, interruptions to their career. 
Education level and household income were negatively associated; higher education and 
higher household income reduced the number of interruptions to mothers’ careers. In 
contrast, for fathers, work commitment (within the 1 per cent significance level) and 
their pay (within the 0.1 per cent significance level) were negatively associated with 
employment interruptions; that is, higher work commitment and pay have a negative 
link with employment interruptions. For both mothers and fathers, the spouse factor and 
the number of children were not significant, while (past) work experience was 
significant and positively associated with their employment interruptions, impling that 
for both mothers and fathers their employment interruptions increased with more years 
of work experience. It is important to note here that work commitment was not a good 
predictor of maternal employment, whereas it was very accurate in the case of fathers. 
 
Table 4.17  Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work 
commitment – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 4.I for all the steps 
and also Table 4.J for enter-method analysis models in the Appendix) 
Statistics: standardized coefficients B Mother Father 
The number of children
1
   
Age -.113**  
Education (years) .150** .087* 
Pay  .356*** .351*** 
Irregular employment (dummy)  -.133*** 
Discrimination experiences -.097* -.069* 
The number of employment break-offs
2
  -.067* 
Job experience
2
    
Household income (logged)   
N 
1874 1545 
F 
44.30 54.43 
Adjusted R-square 
.26*** .26*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS (2006).  Note:  
1
 statistics with the number of children were very similar to 
those with the three children's age cohorts (see Table 4.J in the Appendix).
   2
 during the career for the 
recent years between 1998 and 2006.  Legend:  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001. 
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Lastly, from Table 4.16, it was found that mothers’ work commitment was significantly 
associated with age, education, their pay and discrimination experiences. That is, older 
mothers have lower level of work commitment, which is different from the general 
findings of previous studies that as people become older, work commitment increases 
(Kim, 2008; Bang and Kim, 2009). The more educated and the higher paid they were, 
the higher their work commitment was while discrimination experiences had a negative 
link to work commitment. However, the number of children they had, irregular 
employment, the number of employment breaks, work experience and household 
income were not significantly associated with mothers’ work commitment. For fathers, 
education and pay were positively associated with their work commitment (just as for 
mothers), while the children factor was not associated with work commitment for either 
gender. However, unlike mothers, irregular (casual) employment and the number of 
employment break-offs (which refers to either interruptions to their career or the 
number of job transitions) were significant and negatively associated with fathers’ work 
commitment. As with mothers, discrimination experiences were negatively associated 
with fathers’ work commitment. 
 
 
4.4  Further discussions from the statistical analyses   
 
 
Firstly, from the cross-tabulation analyses of human capital factors, it can be observed 
that there is a gender difference in employment by age, education, work experience and 
career interruptions, whereas there is no gender difference in work commitment 
between married people with children under the age of 19. Notably, based on the 
analysis of employment break-offs, interruptions to their career was not specific to 
mothers. Rather, fathers seemed to have had their careers increasingly interrupted in 
recent years (over the studied years), although the duration (of unemployment) might be 
shorter than that for mothers. Furthermore, an important finding regarding education is 
that higher education has not improved Korean mothers’ employment chances, 
particularly the college/university educated mothers, as much as those of fathers. 
Regarding the statistical results of the relatively low employment of Korean mothers 
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who are college/university graduates, this appears to be explained by Hakim’s argument 
(2000:94-96) that women use education as a marriage market tool; that is, women 
achieve upward social mobility more through the marriage market, and higher education 
gives them access to more successful partners than the labour market does, and hence 
higher education does not make a difference to married women’s preferences between 
career and home. Furthermore, mainly based on cohort studies to show whether there 
are any generational differences, by paying special attention to the age cohort of women 
aged 25 to 39, Hakim found that there was little difference in sex role attitudes by 
generation.  
 
From Hakim’s perspective, Korean mothers appear to use college/university education 
as a means for a marriage career (staying at home), from the finding that most Korean 
mothers with graduate level education are more likely to stay home after giving birth. 
However, Hakim has failed to address the issue of whether higher education makes a 
difference to mothers’ employment, especially where there are younger children, and 
also whether married women, regardless of their education level, tend to change their 
lifestyle preference after their children reach school age, as Crompton and Harris 
(1999:128-130) pointed out. Moreover, Hakim has failed to offer any suggestions as to 
why some women might change later, from staying at home to working or vice versa. 
This thesis finds that there is a remarkable difference between the higher and lower 
educated groups in mothers’ employment where there are pre-school-age children, along 
with the observation that mothers tend to be employed regardless of education level as 
children reach school age. 
 
Therefore, Hakim’s view regarding the function of higher education in the labour 
market and seeing a considerable number of women as home-centered is not sustainable 
from the thesis observations using a different analytical approach, by child age cohort, 
rather than by women’s age cohort and the presence of children, which Hakim (2004:91, 
132) used. Indeed, women’s lower employment levels from their late 20s to mid-30s is 
hardly likely to change dramatically over a few or even several decades, because the 
majority of women will continue to give birth at approximately those ages (even 
delaying to the late 30s) and hence having a child will continue to affect women’s 
employment in the future. Thus, this strongly suggests that a different analytical 
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approach, taking into account children’s schooling ages, rather than simply the presence 
of children, seems necessary in researching women’s, and particularly mothers’ labour 
market participation. Secondly, also from the multivariate analyses including child age 
cohort factors, it was found that their children’s ages are statistically critical to mothers’ 
labour market participation. Mothers tended to stay home while they had young children, 
but as their children reach school age, they are more likely to be employed. In addition, 
it is suggested that past work experience is very important for mothers by helping them 
join the labour market, and that higher education has a negative link to employment 
interruptions. More importantly, it was observed that there was no statistical difference 
in work commitment between the genders and also that mothers’ work commitment was 
not associated with children, irregular employment, household income, work experience 
or employment break-offs either. Rather, it was associated with age, education and 
experiences of discrimination.   
 
The overall observations here appear to support the arguments of the human capital 
theorists in the broadest sense, in particular from the statistical results that work 
experience was significant and that mothers had more employment interruptions than 
fathers. Generally, married women’s intermittent labour force participation is seen to be 
critical from the neoclassical perspective, in that neoclassical theorists see it as an 
indication of married women’s work attitude. However, based on the statistical analysis 
of work commitment and employment interruptions, there is a strong suggestion that 
work commitment was not associated with the children factor and that interruptions to 
mothers’ careers are associated with mothers who receive less pay and have more 
discrimination experiences rather than linked to their job commitment. Also, fathers’ 
career interruptions have also been increasing in the more recent years of the study 
(from the descriptive analysis), most probably due to the increased economic 
instabilities and labour market restructuring in Korea. Without taking into account these 
contexts (perhaps family life cycle for women and the labour market and national 
economy situation for men), some may interpret both male and female workers’ work 
aspirations as being decreased, simply from the increased employment interruptions. 
This contrasts with the arguments of human capital theory or preference theory, which 
assume that women make less effort to work, implicitly due to their having lower work 
aspirations (Polacheck, 1976, 1981:68; Hakim, 1991:101-121). In this regard, a 
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previous study (Johnson, 2001: 315-345) argued that job values change in response to 
the attainment of valued rewards, but not in response to their family roles, along with 
the observation that gender differences in job values narrow over time, for both males 
and females.  
 
In particular, Bielby and Bielby criticized the way neo-classical economists such as 
Becker (1976) and Polacheck (1976) address women’s work commitment and sex-role 
attitudes. The criticism is that they inferred inadequately operationalised work 
commitment from their data. That is, they inferred subjective work orientation from the 
(intermittent) patterns of labour force participation, where commitment was not at all 
operationalised and they also inferred opinions about sex roles simply from the 
employment patterns (Bielby and Bielby, 1984:234-235). Furthermore, the authors 
found that intermittent employment was not a consequence of unstable work 
commitment, but a consequence of ‘adjusting’ their labour market behaviour to 
accommodate the demands of bringing up children (Bielby and Bielby, 1984:234). This 
is well supported by the finding in this thesis that the children’s age cohort is critical 
and that Korean mothers tend to be employed as their children reach school age, 
suggesting clearly that married women adjust their labour market behaviour to the 
family life cycle. This phenomenon cannot be explained by the preference theory, which 
lacks analysis from the life course perspective using panel data. That is, lifestyle 
preferences adapt (change) in accordance with women’s life course, not because the 
majority of women simply prefer to stay at home or combine paid work with looking 
after the family. In short, the situation of Korean mothers cannot be explained fully 
either by the human capital theory or by the preference theory. 
 
On the other hand, the question is still unanswered as to why Korean mothers’ labour 
market behaviour is closely linked to the presence of young children in general (which 
has not changed much compared with mothers in the past, despite increased 
employment opportunities for women with economic success). Regarding this, some 
scholars argue that there is an association with culturally ingrained normative 
motherhood, which places a strong emphasis on women as the main carers of children 
(Won and Pascall, 2004:274). Won and Pascall (2004:283) argued that due to the 
unchanging traditional gender norms held in Korean families, mothers often withdraw 
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from paid work while fathers strengthen their breadwinning roles. Ridgeway and 
Correll (2004:511-512) indicated there is a gender system within widely held cultural 
beliefs where gender acts as a background identity. On the other hand, arguing against 
the grand theory of economic rationalisation, Duncan and Irwin (2004:391-399) 
demonstrated that mothers made decisions within socially negotiated accounts of what 
was morally appropriate, using ‘moral reasoning’, and also that their allocation of time 
to child care was usually subject to gendered expectations of what was psychologically 
or socially most suitable for men and women. The over-representation, in the non-
working sector, of Korean mothers with younger dependent children could be 
understood in terms of the culture-specific and socially patterned moral role of 
mothering. 
 
 
4.5  Conclusion 
 
 
In short, considering the empirical evidence of Korean fathers’ increasing number of 
employment interruptions and also no link between mothers’ work commitment and 
their career interruption, married women’s labour force participation cannot be fully 
explained from neoclassical perspectives, either by the human capital theory or by the 
preference theory. Importantly, the observation that mothers’ labour market participation 
is closely related to their children’s age supports strongly the argument that married 
women’s intermittent or interrupted careers are not a consequence of poor work 
commitment, but a consequence of adjusting to the family life cycle. Therefore, to 
conclude, it is important to understand or explain married women’s labour market 
behaviour from the life course perspective with panel data, as the overall trends of the 
labour force participation of married women from the cross-sectional data as well as 
from the women’s age cohort data show only what is skin deep, or the appearance, 
rather than the content or the reality of women’s work over the course of their lives. 
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Chapter 5 
Gender regime and mothers’ labour 
market participation 
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Previous studies have documented the labour market regime in terms of the 
concentration of women in irregular employment due to discriminatory practices in the 
workplace such as employing women for ‘female-type’ low-paid precarious work. Many 
consider the Korean labour market and welfare regime as gendered (Tesch-Romer et al., 
2008; Pascall and Won, 2004; Keum, 2002). Presumably, the gender regime reflects 
cultural-specific gender norms which may affect the labour market behaviour of married 
women, especially Korean mothers, because of either discriminatory practices against 
employing mothers or a lack of social childcare support. With this assumption, this 
chapter attempts to identify whether there are gender differences in terms of labour 
force status, pay, promotion, discrimination experience, work-hours and welfare 
entitlement, and also whether the assumption can be supported ‘within the statistical 
significance levels’ using multivariate analysis models. Based on the statistical analysis 
results, this chapter provides gender comparative discussions by focusing on mothers 
and fathers with children aged less than 19 years old.    
 
 
5.1  Mothers’ labour market status  
 
 
The characteristics of the Korean labour market regime show that Korean women have 
a lower status within the labour force, which is ‘gender segmented’. The literature 
suggests that women, in particular married women, are over-represented in irregular 
employment (Grubb et al., 2007:22) and also that long-term temporary workers account 
for over 52 per cent of women compared to 27 per cent of men (Jang, 2001:68). The 
low labour market status of women is linked to their working conditions; for instance, 
pay, promotion, corporate welfare benefits and work-hours. Therefore, these areas all 
need consideration in more detail. Unlike most of the previous literature, this thesis 
focuses on mothers along with a gender comparative analysis, that is, between mothers 
and fathers. 
 
First of all, looking at mothers’ and fathers’ employment status (Table 5.1), the 
proportions of mothers in permanent employment increased from 43 per cent in 2000 to 
49 per cent in 2006, along with a steady decrease in unpaid family employment, from 
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22 per cent in 2000 to 15 per cent in 2006. There appears to be a trade-off between 
permanent and unpaid family employment in the case of mothers. The statistics for self-
employed mothers stayed around 18 per cent and those for mothers in temporary and 
daily employment were respectively about 12 per cent and 7 per cent overall, remaining 
stable throughout the period. On the other hand, the proportion of fathers in permanent 
employment was over 50 per cent despite a steady decrease from 56 per cent to 51 per 
cent in 2006, while the proportion of temporary, daily employed and self-employed 
fathers remained relatively stable over the period, at about 3 per cent, 7 or 8 per cent 
and 36 per cent, respectively. In general, for both sexes, the share of self-employed and 
unpaid family employment was very high, reflecting the characteristics of the Korean 
job market; in other words, self-employment accounts for around a third of total 
employment, compared with less than 15 per cent in 2000 in European developed 
countries (Keum et al., 2009:9, 14). 
 
Table 5.2  Gender difference in employment status between mothers and fathers in 
2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
% of total N* 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Permanent 42.6 46.3 46.7 48.9 55.8 50.8 51.0 50.8 
Temporary 10.1 10.4 11.7 11.8 2.9 3.8 3.4 3.2 
Daily 7.4 7.3 5.9 6.4 6.9 7.3 7.9 8.7 
Self-employed 17.5 16.0 19.2 17.7 33.8 36.6 36.7 36.0 
Unpaid family worker 22.4 20.1 16.6 15.2 0.6 1.5 1.0 1.3 
Row-total % (total N) 100 
(1929) 
100 
(1848) 
100 
(1909) 
100 
(1874) 
100 
(1786) 
100 
(1792) 
100 
(1830) 
100 
(1545) 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
, and 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.   Note: * N refers to the number of cases. 
 
Importantly, the gender contrast was most notable in the percentage of unpaid family 
employment, followed by temporary employment; unpaid family employment was 
predominantly done by mothers and three or four times more mothers than fathers were 
employed in temporary work. The percentage of self-employed fathers was double that 
of mothers. In addition, the higher level of participation in unpaid family work by 
mothers could be explained by the reality that married women are highly likely to 
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participate as unpaid family workers in self-employed businesses, especially those run 
by their spouses. Overall, the concentration in temporary and unpaid family work by 
mothers shows clearly what Korean married women’s, in particular, mothers’, labour 
market status is. 
 
Along with mothers’ employment status in Korea, the payment gap is also considered a 
structural issue. Table 5.2 shows clearly that there was a considerable gender gap in the 
overall ratio between mothers and fathers, although there was a steady decrease over the 
period. More specifically, looking at the gender pay gap by employment status, the gap 
was greater in irregular jobs. Interestingly, the gender difference in self-employed work 
became much smaller in 2005 and 2006, implying that women in their own businesses 
seem to do as well as men, but those working for organizations might be disadvantaged 
by a biased wage structure. For instance, the seniority-based management system in 
Korea might have contributed to the gender pay gap, as married men tend to have more 
years in work than married women, who are more likely to have intermittent career 
breaks due to family care responsibilities.  
 
Table 5.3  The earnings ratio of mothers compared to fathers
*
 in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 
2006 
The gender ratio of earnings 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Permanent 0.58 0.60 0.60 0.59 
Temporary/daily 0.49 0.45 0.53 0.54 
Self-employed and employer 0.58 0.60 0.71 0.71 
Overall ratio of mothers compared to fathers 0.53 0.53 0.58 0.57 
Source: the 3
rd
, 4
th
, 5
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. Note: * the earnings ratio is calculated by the ratio of 
average earnings of the mother group compared to the father group. 
 
As a result, married men are better paid than married women according to seniority-
based payment schemes, as pointed out in Chapter 2, in the study of Korean labour 
market duality by Grubb et al. (2007). Furthermore, it relates to the pay gap between 
regular and irregular work, as also discussed in Chapter 2. In Kim’s study of the pay gap 
by employment status (Kim, 2006:68), it was observed that the pay gap between regular 
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and irregular work was much greater among female workers – double that of male 
workers. This suggests strongly that women are doubly disadvantaged by gender and by 
lower employment status. The gender pay gap between regular and irregular work is 
presumed to be because mothers are far more likely than fathers to be in low-paid 
irregular jobs, due to child rearing.  
 
Why do gender pay differences occur? It appears that this is closely related to the 
devaluation of female work and occupational segregation by sex (female-type work and 
male-type work). As discussed in Chapter 1, a move to female-type work (the kind 
traditionally done by females) usually involves downward mobility for both men and 
women, particularly for mothers with dependent children (Blackwell, 2001:159-160), 
and female-type work tends to be flexible jobs such as temporary, part-time and other 
casual employment, especially in small-sized firms, where married women are 
predominantly employed (Jang, 2001:90). In this situation, mothers take up flexible 
employment ‘involuntarily’ to find some balance between paid work and family 
commitments, while employers benefit from cheap labour by allocating such women to 
low paid jobs. When considering the low pay of female-dominated jobs, which is 
especially true in Korea, paid work might therefore have little attraction for Korean 
mothers. Unlike the expectation from the perspective of neoclassical theorists, Korean 
mothers might choose to stay at home because the jobs offered are more likely to be 
low-paid and also because such jobs do not give them much room for a better work-life 
balance. In short, this suggests that without understanding the labour market situation 
faced by mothers, we cannot fully understand Korean mothers’ behaviour or attitudes to 
work.     
 
 
5.2  Gender-biased workplace practices 
 
 
Together with married women’s low-paid and low-status employment, gender-biased 
workplace practices such as sex discrimination and the glass-ceiling phenomenon in the 
establishment, as long argued by feminists, may affect mothers’ labour market behaviour.  
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Experience of discrimination was surveyed just once, in 2004 (the 7
th
 wave) in KLIPS, 
using a multiple-choice measurement. Based on the multiple-response analysis, as 
shown in Table 5.3, it was observed that discrimination experience was differentiated by 
gender. Mothers and fathers both reported mostly about sex, education and age 
discrimination. A gender difference was clear in the experience of sex discrimination. A 
majority of mothers (57 per cent) reported sex discrimination experiences, whereas only 
4 per cent of fathers did. The above results suggest that sex discrimination has a 
potential link to mothers’ labour market behaviour. 
 
Table 5.4  Discrimination experience by gender (percentage, 2004) 
% of total N Sex Education Age Disability Region Other Total % (N) 
Mother 
57  
(121) 
25 
(53) 
14     
(29) 
0 
(1) 
1 
(3) 
2 
(5) 
100 
(212) 
Father 
4 
(29) 
62 
(506) 
24 
(198) 
2 
(19) 
5 
(43) 
2 
(17) 
100 
(812) 
Source: Surveys of discrimination experience, KLIPS 7
th
 wave, 2004.  
 
In addition, gender-biased workplace practices were clear in the gender differences in 
promotion-related experience. According to the percentage obtaining promotion and the 
likelihood of promotion in Table 5.4, below, there was a gender difference between 
mothers and fathers in promotion or the likelihood of being promoted. 
      
Table 5.5  Promotion and likelihood of promotion reported by group (percentage, 
2000) 
Wage-earners 
Promotion 
Total % (N) 
The probability of future 
promotion Total % (N) 
Yes No Yes No 
Mother 12.5 87.5 100 (527) 16 84 100 (457) 
Father 36.4 63.6 100 (1069) 31.8 68.2 100(679) 
Source: the 3
rd
 wave, KLIPS.                                                                                                                                      
 
Among mothers with children aged less than 19, about 13 per cent had been promoted 
whereas for fathers, the figure was more than 36 per cent. In the likelihood of future 
promotion, 16 per cent of mothers reported positively, whereas about 32 per cent of 
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fathers did so. In sum, roughly about three times more promotions were reported by 
fathers than mothers. The number of fathers who reported the probability of future 
promotion in their jobs was double that of mothers. In short, considering all the 
statistical results of sex discrimination and promotion-related experience by gender, it 
seems obvious that gender-biased practices are still at a considerable level in the Korean 
labour market. Thus, gender-biased workplace practices cannot be ignored in the 
employment issues of Korean married women, particularly of mothers with school age 
children.    
 
 
5.3  Long work-hour culture 
 
 
As well as the labour market situation disadvantaging married women, as discussed 
above, the long work-hour culture – including after-work extended social activities with 
workmates – may have an association with married women’s, particularly mothers’, 
labour market behaviour. It is highly possible that long work-hours cause work-life 
balance problems for mothers with school-age children. Previous studies in Korea were 
mainly about the time poverty of working families and mothers’ involvement (time) in 
their children’s school activities, which differed according to their employment status. 
However, not much attention has been paid by academics to any correlation between 
long work-hours and mothers’ withdrawal from the labour market. Therefore, this thesis 
attempts to raise the issue of the long work-hour culture as the main barrier to balancing 
work and family life for mothers. Taking into account the little change in average work-
hours during the period of economic recovery after the financial crisis at the end of the 
1990s, as shown in Table 5.5, long work-hours seem to be taken for granted in Korean 
culture. Since the 2004 legislation reducing the working week from 44 to 40 hours, 
there has been no dramatic fall in the actual average working hours, despite a steady 
decrease to around 50 hours, far more than the legal work hours, by 2005 and 2006. In 
the case of working mothers with young children in particular, this long work-hour 
culture may be the main barrier to continuing in their jobs. 
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Table 5.6  Average work-hours and overtime per week by gender in 2000, 2002, 2005 
and 2006  
 
Average work-hours Average overtime* 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Mother 53.0 51.1 49.3 47.9 17.4 17.8 14.1 14.1 
Father 56.8 56.2 53.3 53.1 15.0 16.0 15.0 14.9 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: *overtime is calculated by subtracting legal work-
hours from the reported work-hours. The legal working week was 44 hours before 2004 and was reduced 
to 40 hours from Sept. 2004. 
 
Korean women work longer on average than Western women, in the situation of 
workers who have regulated work hours (refer to the work-hours in OECD, 2010), 
which suggests strongly that this influence cannot be ignored. An important point to 
note is that there was no significant difference in the average weekly work-hours 
between the genders, although mothers tended to work 4 or 5 hours less than fathers. In 
addition, there was no significant difference in the overtime work between mothers and 
fathers. This is problematic because the long work-hours culture is a problem for 
mothers, not fathers; mothers have time pressure due to their greater commitment to 
childcare and housework than that of fathers, as indicated in Chapter 2. In addition, the 
average work-hours in irregular (temporary/daily) and part-time jobs, often considered 
as flexible jobs – either numerically or functionally or both – is very informative as an 
indication of a long work-hour culture. As shown in Table 5.6, the average work-hours 
of the temporary and daily jobs taken by mothers were over 40 hours per week overall, 
with no significant difference from permanent jobs. 
 
Table 5.7  Average weekly work-hours of casual jobs taken by mothers in 2000, 2002, 
2005 and 2006 
 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Permanent 50.4 48.1 48.3 47.4 
Temporary workers 42.2 44.1 42.9 41.3 
Daily workers 40.2 41.0 47.6 40.3 
Part-time workers 33.9 34.5 37.0 37.4 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. 
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The average work-hours of part-time workers also reached 37 hours, increasing over the 
years, which are similar to the average work-hours of full-time employees in developed 
Western countries; for instance, 37 hours on average per week is the legal working time 
in the UK and the Netherlands (OECD, 2010; Kim, 2006; Jeong, 2007:70). This implies 
that irregular or part-time employment in Korea seems less of a flexible arrangement (in 
the context of numerical flexibility) for working mothers who are most likely to take it 
in the hoping of creating a balance between family life and paid work. On the other 
hand, the long work-hour culture of Korea appears to be related to less work-hour 
flexibility (giving employees the authority to decide their work-hours) and the low 
incidence of part-time work in the labour market in general, based on the analysis of the 
work-hour flexibility offered to employees that follows. According to Table 5.7, for 
employment status, most self-employed and family workers of both sexes (over 80 per 
cent of them) reported that they had considerable work-hour flexibility, whereas 
permanent workers had the least flexibility. For work-hour type, for both mothers and 
fathers, part-timers had more flexibility in their working hours than full-timers had.  
 
Table 5.8  Work-hour flexibility by employment status and work-hour type (percentage, 
2000) 
% within employment 
% able to decide hours worked 
Mother Father 
Permanent workers 7.2 3.5 
Temporary workers 27.3 8.3 
Daily workers 23.1 10.7 
Self-employed/employer 88.9 85.1 
Non-paid family workers 83.2 100.0 
% of total employment  41.7 32.3 
Part-time workers 27.9 24.3 
Full-time workers 8.5 3.7 
Source: the 3
rd
 wave, KLIPS. 
 
However, although mothers employed in irregular (casual) jobs as well as part-time jobs 
tended to have more flexibility than fathers overall, it seems that irregular jobs and part-
time jobs do not offer much flexibility for the mothers who need it most. Compared to 
self-employed workers, of the over 80 per cent who responded, only a third of mothers 
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employed in these jobs had work-hour flexibility. Considering all the situations 
suggested by the above analysis (long work-hours as well as relatively low flexibility in 
irregular jobs and part-time jobs), flexible jobs in Korea do not seem to play a strong 
role in flexible work arrangements, because even though employers offer mothers 
reduced work-hours in the form of irregular, including part-time, work, such jobs in 
Korea do not allow employees to decide their work-hours by themselves. Furthermore, 
such work must be quite limited, as the incidence of part-time employment in Korean is 
very low, at around 10 per cent of total employment in 2009, half the average in OECD 
countries (OECD, 2011). In this regard, Grubb et al. (2007:22), focusing on temporary 
jobs, concluded that in Korea the temporary work taken by women is less related to the 
need to secure work flexibility in that the incidence of part-time work by temporary 
workers in Korea is very low compared to the over one-third of temporary workers in 
10 OECD countries and over half the workers in two OECD countries working part-
time.   
 
 
5.4  Parental welfare 
 
 
To reiterate the discussions of the welfare regime in Chapter 1, regarding any 
association between married women’s lifestyle preferences and childcare support, 
McRae (2003:331) suggested that, ‘a major structural constraint on women’s enactment 
of their work-family lifestyle preferences in Britain is the cost of childcare’. Moreover,   
Gornick et al. (1997:65) argued from the comparative family policy study of western 
European countries that ‘many women workers faced stiff penalties for work absences 
due to childbirth; without publicly subsidized childcare, many had few viable 
alternatives to the full-time maternal care of children’. In response to inadequate 
childcare support, Gornick et al. (1997:65) suggested it is more likely that women 
workers exit the labour force temporarily and/or repeatedly. Therefore, it seems 
necessary to examine the characteristics of the Korean welfare regime first. In a 
previous study of the coverage of compulsory welfare in Korea, as elaborated in 
Chapter 2, it was found that there was a considerable difference in the actual coverage 
of compulsory welfare such as social insurance as well as in the coverage of non-
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compulsory benefits by employment status, between permanent workers and irregular 
(casual) workers (Ban, 2006:33). However, little attention was paid to any gender 
differences in non-compulsory welfare. Therefore, this thesis pays attention to this issue 
by analyzing corporate welfare (employee benefits) by gender. Corporate welfare is 
defined commonly as workplace welfare or indirect compensation/remuneration, and 
consists of compulsory and provisional (voluntary) benefits (Ban, 2006:29-30). 
 
Compulsory benefits include such items as social insurance, severance pay and paid 
leave, while non-compulsory (provisional) benefits include housing support, private 
insurance support, tuition fees support, childcare support, support for meals and 
transport, and mutual aid. This thesis assumes that the gender difference in coverage 
would be much higher for the voluntary, non-compulsory benefits than the compulsory 
ones. According to the analysis of the corporate welfare benefits (Table 5.8), the 
proportion of employed mothers entitled to corporate welfare increased considerably 
from 36 per cent in 2000 to 55 per cent in 2006, but with a relatively small increase for 
fathers from 53 per cent in 2000 to 62 per cent in 2006. The gap between mothers and 
fathers decreased from 17 per cent in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2006. Despite mothers’ 
welfare coverage fast approaching fathers’ in recent years, a gender difference (of about 
7 per cent) is still observable in the coverage of corporate welfare benefits, suggesting 
that fewer mothers were employed in firms with fair working conditions.  
 
Table 5.9  Gender difference in the proportion of employees entitled to corporate 
welfare including fringe benefits (per cent having at least one such benefit) over the 
years, 2000, 2003, 2005 and 2006 
% of the employed  2000* 2002 2005 2006 
Mother 36.2 43.1 52.5 55.2 
Father 53.0 60.8 63.1 62.1 
Source: the 4
th
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. Note:  * data for 2000 is replaced by the data of 2001 due to 
the very limited surveys (some surveys are missing) in 2000.  
 
In addition, the analysis needs to focus on parent-related benefits which support the 
most needy mothers. According to Table 5.9, the percentage of employed mothers with 
entitlement to at least one of three parental welfare benefits – maternity leave, parental 
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leave and childcare support – was less than 25 per cent during the study period but 
steadily increased, nearly doubling from 13 per cent in 2001 to 24 per cent in 2006, as 
shown in Figure 5.1. However, the percentages of mothers with parental leave and 
childcare expense support, 17 per cent and 9 per cent respectively in 2006, suggests that 
jobs providing support to mothers for childcare after childbirth are in short supply and 
that parental welfare schemes remain at a low level in Korea. 
 
Table 5.10  Mothers with corporate parental welfare entitlement
a
 in 2000, 2002, 2005 
and 2006 (percentage) 
% of employed mothers
b
  2000 (2001)
c 
2002 2005 2006 
Maternity leave 11.3 13.2 19.3 23.3 
Parental leave 7.0 9.1 12.2 17.1 
Support for childcare expenses 3.0 2.9 5.9 9.0 
Having at least one of these    13.0 20.4 23.0 24.2 
Source: the 4
th
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: 
a  
statistics are not the percentages of beneficiaries; 
b 
 
the number of employed mothers was 890 in 2001, 882 in 2002, 882 in 2005, and 873 in 2006 ; 
c
 data for 
2000 is replaced by the data of 2001 due to the very limited surveys (some surveys are missing) in 2000.  
 
Figure 5.1  Working mothers with access to parental welfare over the years, 2001, 2002, 
2005 and 2006 (percentage) 
 
Source: Table 5.9 above, KLIPS. 
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In addition to parental leave, further legislation concerning work-life balance schemes 
was introduced in Korea in 2008. However, it is far from being available to the majority 
of mothers. Work-life balance support schemes, including leave of absence for child 
rearing (KDI, 2008:76), are available to mothers with children aged under 3 (KDI, 
2008:79-80) but only at their employers’ discretion. Thus, mothers with pre-school age 
children or primary school children at level one who attend school for half a day are 
excluded. This suggests that most mothers are highly likely to be excluded from any 
benefits. Crompton (1998:85) suggests that modern welfare regimes are gendered, in 
that women (housewives) are often excluded from welfare schemes because they 
receive welfare benefits via their male spouses, and as such, the Korean welfare regime 
is based on the male breadwinner model and thus seems neglectful of working mothers, 
including the potentially returning work force, despite the steady increase in dual-earner 
households (You, 2008:58).       
 
Furthermore, previous studies have observed a considerable gap in social welfare 
coverage between regular permanent employees and casual employees in firms. 
According to an analysis of KLIPS welfare datasets, there was around a 50 percent 
difference between permanent and casual/non-standard workers in social insurance 
coverage, and around 60 per cent difference in such items as severance pay, fringe 
benefits or paid leave (Ban, 2006:28). This has been an salient issue in the literature and 
policy discourses concerning the weak function of corporate welfare, as indirect 
compensation means that the pay gap between regular and irregular employment has 
grown, to the detriment of casual/non-standard workers, resulting in their 
‘marginalization’ in the labour market (Ban, 2006:28). In this respect, looking at welfare 
coverage by employment status, as shown in Table 5.10, in comparison with permanent 
employees a very small percentage of temporary workers received any parental welfare 
benefit entitlement and almost no parental welfare benefit entitlements are given to 
daily workers. This clearly shows the large gap in welfare provisions between those in 
regular, permanent jobs and those in temporary/casual work, despite the steady increase 
in temporary employment over the years studied.  
 
Comparing the share of temporary and daily workers with parental welfare with that of 
permanent workers, as presented in Figure 5.2, it seems that casual workers, especially 
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mothers, have little or no access to parental welfare provision. Regarding the low level 
of corporate support for casual workers, Ban (2006:38) suggested that businesses have 
little concern for casual workers’ welfare and voluntary efforts were severely limited. 
This issue needs more attention, with more focus on mothers, because it also contributes 
to Korean women’s low employment status (in terms of jobs with low childcare support), 
as most casual jobs are performed by women (Jang, 2001:79; Grubb et al., 2007:22; 
Kim, 2007:39). 
 
Table 5.11  Corporate parental welfare (entitlement) by employment status
1
 over the 
years, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006 (percentage out of all employed mothers) 
 
Maternity Parental leave Childcare support 
2000
2
 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Perm
3
 11.2 12.8 18.5 21.9 6.9 9.1 11.9 16.2 3.0 2.8 5.9 8.8 
Temp
4
 0.1 0.2 0.8 1.4 0.1 0 0.3 0.9 0 0.1 0 0.2 
Daily
5
 0 0.1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Row-
total% 
11.3 13.2 19.3 23.3 7.0 9.1 12.2 17.1 3.0 2.9 5.9 9.0 
Source: the 4
th
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: 1. except self-employed/employers/non-paid family 
workers;  2. statistics for 2000 are replaced by those of 2001 due to the limited availability of the data;  3. 
‘Perm’ refers to permanent workers;  4. ‘Temp’ refers to temporary workers; 5. ‘Daily’ refers to daily 
(casual) workers. 
 
Figure 5.2  Casual employment share of parental welfare benefits compared with 
permanent employees by year (percetage, 2001, 2002, 2005 and 2006) 
 
Source: Table 5.10, above.  
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5.5  The use of child minders and the burden of costs 
 
 
In Korean culture, childcare responsibilities rest with the family, especially the mother. 
Mothers’ different economic situations may affect their labour market behaviour, 
especially when the cost of childcare is expensive and public support is low, as 
indicated by McRae (2003:329, 334) and Gornick et al. (1997:60). For instance, 
childcare costs may affect mothers’ attitudes to work in two ways: on the one hand, they 
may take up paid work because they want to be able to afford the cost of childcare; on 
the other hand, they may stay at home or reduce their work hours because they prefer to 
look after their own children rather than pay expensive childminders. Particularly in 
residual welfare regimes such as in Korea, where the family is seen as the main 
childcarer (Jang and Bu, 2003:1-5; Shin, 2001:102-104), childcare costs can be an 
important predictor. As expected, mothers with children less than six years old are most 
likely to use childminders, day nurseries or other childcare facilities in Korea, so special 
attention needs to be paid to this group of mothers. Children aged under 6 are dependent 
infants before they start formal schooling, and thus they need the most childcare, which 
is why childcare costs included in the analysis were restricted to children aged less than 
6. Also, surveys of childminder costs for children aged between 0 and 11 are available 
only in 2000 and 2001 household data because surveys of childminder costs were 
integrated into the surveys of private childcare and education from 2002 onwards. Thus, 
childminder costs can only be analyzed in 2000 and 2001, and then overall childcare 
costs (for children under age 6) for the years 2002, 2005 and 2006 are analyzed and 
presented here. 
 
From the statistics in Table 5.11, it seems that childminders, including other family 
members or relatives, are not popular in Korea, perhaps due to the high cost or due to 
the fact that very few families live with their parents or other relatives. The use of 
childminders for children aged between 0 and 11 is very low, at less than 5 per cent, and 
costs the equivalent of an average of 120 to 150 pounds sterling per month. Furthermore, 
the amounts spent as a proportion of monthly household income were about 14 per cent 
in 2000 and 17 per cent in 2001.  
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Table 5.12  The use of childminders and childminding costs as a percentage of 
household income in 2000 and 2001 
      2000 2001 
The % use for children aged between 0 and 11  
(cases) 
2.3 
(50 of  total 2,216) 
4.3 
(78 of  total 2,105) 
The cost of childminders (average per month)* £120 £150 
Spending proportions of household income (%) 14.4 16.9 
Source: the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: * approximate currency exchange rate £1 per 2,000 Korean 
Won. 
 
In addition, as shown in Table 5.12, a considerable number of mothers see childminding 
costs as a burden, and this number showed a notable increase by about 14 per cent (39 
in 2000 and 53 per cent in 2001). The high financial burden of using childminders 
suggests the reality of the Korean welfare regime is that childcare is assumed to be a 
family responsibility, particularly for infants under the age of 6. Presumably, either due 
to the expense of using childminders or the difficulty in getting a good quality 
childminder from outside the family, mothers are more likely to use less expensive 
private institutions which combine childcare and education. 
 
Table 5.13  The percentages of mothers who see childminding costs as a burden in 
2000 and 2001 
% of mothers using childminders A burden All right Not a burden Column-total% 
2000 38.5 28.2 33.3 100 
2001  53.1 26.6 20.3 100 
Source: the 3
rd
 and 4
th
 wave, KLIPS. 
 
According to the average childcare costs for children aged under 6, from 2002 to 2006, 
as shown in Table 5.13, the overall childcare costs of Korean families was the 
equivalent of around 110 or 120 pounds sterling per month in 2002, 2005 and 2006. On 
the other hand, for households with children under 6, the average share of the monthly 
household income spent on childcare went down from 10 per cent to about 6 per cent, 
which seems to reflect the increase in household income in the mid 2000s. However, a 
small number of lower income families are supported by the government, based on a 
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means-tested benefit scheme which excludes applicants who earn more than the average 
wage of all urban workers and have children under 5 (KDI, 2008:72-73). 
 
Table 5.14  Childcare costs including childminder costs for children aged under 6 
 
2002 2005 2006 
Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean 
Childcare 
costs(£) 0 £1,115 £123.3 0 £850 £109.6 0 £795 £122.9 
Expenditure(%)    
of household 
income 
0 90 9.9% 0 160 5.6% 0 118 5.9% 
Source: 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. Note: * approximating currency exchange rate £1 against 2,000 
Korean Won. 
 
This implies that a higher childcare cost share of household income was experienced by 
lower income families, especially those receiving little or no childcare package for such 
families. As indicated by Grubb et al. (2007:57-58), childcare costs may be a barrier to 
starting or resuming employment, particularly for low-paid working families, and 
expensive childcare costs or a lack of good quality childcare in Korea may be the main 
difficulties faced by mothers wishing to resume their careers. It should be noted that the 
analysis of the burden of childcare costs is not provided, because surveys concerning 
the financial burden in KLIPS were restricted to child ‘education’ costs, thus excluding 
childcare costs. 
 
 
5.6  Findings from the multivariate analysis models  
 
 
The thesis has identified the Korean labour market and welfare regime as being 
gendered, and this is based on cross-tabulation (including frequency) analysis, in terms 
of women’s low employment status, higher sex discrimination experience reported by 
women, low parental welfare provision, long work-hours and a higher burden of 
childcare expenses. Furthermore, using multivariate analysis models, the logistic 
regression and linear regression analyses, this chapter examined whether these gender-
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bias related factors were associated significantly with mothers’ labour market behaviour, 
along with providing a comparative analysis by gender. From the logistic regression 
analysis model for 2006, the thesis has found, as shown in Table 5.14, that children’s 
ages and childcare costs were very significantly associated with mothers’ employment, 
but not associated with fathers’ employment. Household income was very significant 
across the steps for both genders as reflecting their earnings. In particular, as with the 
childcare cost factor, the statistical results for 2005 and 2006 in Table 5.15 show that the 
higher the childcare costs, the more likely mothers are to be employed.  
 
Table 5.15  Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether employed or not by 
gender – gender regime factors (See Table 5.A for ‘enter-method’ analysis) 
Statistics:  
odds ratios - Exp(B) 
Mother  Father 
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step1 Step2 
Children aged 0 to 5 
  .648*** .676** .511***   
Children aged 6 to11 
    .727*   
Children aged 12 to18 
   1.885** 1.851*   
Education (year) 
       
Age 
      .944*** 
Household income 
(logged) 2.270*** 1.944*** 1.908*** 1.916*** 1.923*** 17.182*** 17.614*** 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6
1
)  1.013** 1.014*** 1.015*** 1.017***   
Discrimination 
experience        
N 757 757 757 757 757 1575 1575 
-2 Log likelihood 965.84 953.35 940.48 933.21 928.02 644.03 631.19 
Model Chi-square 
(goodness-of-fit) 37.92*** 50.40*** 63.27*** 70.54*** 75.74*** 51.52*** 64.35*** 
Hosmer & Lemeshow 
goodness-fit-test x
2 
(sig.) 34.12*** 7.38 20.16 16.14* 5.07 18.59* 27.20** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  1 statistics for fathers are replaced 
by child costs for all age cohorts according to the goodness-of-fit model. 
Legend :  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%). 
 
However, this does not necessarily mean that childcare costs have improved mothers’ 
employment, because this may reflect the fact that employed mothers are more likely to 
pay for childcare. Nonetheless, it must be noted that childcare costs are significantly 
158 
 
associated with mothers’ employment, but not that of fathers. Furthermore, this model 
did not observe any significant association between discrimination and mothers’ labour 
market behaviour. As for the question that repeating the surveys might affect the 
statistical results, it was found that there were no notable statistical differences across 
the selected years with or without discrimination experience variable (see Tables 5.C 
and 5.D in the Appendix). Although repeating data is disputable, it could on the other 
hand be negligible, in that the surveys are panel data, as mentioned earlier in the 
methodology chapter. In addition, it is noted that the results of the logistic regression for 
2000 and 2006 were not significant in the fit to the Hosmer & Lemeshow test with these 
explanatory variables, whereas they were significant in the other (enter-method, not 
stepwise) analysis model (see Table 5.A in the Appendix). 
 
Table 5.16  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for 
mothers by year (gender regime factors) – statistics presented for the last step only 
(See also Table 5.B in the Appendix for all the steps) 
Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Children aged 0 to 5  .713* .522*** .511*** 
Children aged 6 to11   .687* .727* 
Children aged 12 to18    1.851* 
Education (year)     
Age     
Household income (logged) 2.003! (.050) 2.999*** 1.529** 1.923*** 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
  1.019*** 1.017*** 
Discrimination experience     
N 
194 531 809 757 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
25.50*** 48.76*** 70.70*** 75.74*** 
-2 Log likelihood 
205.84 657.66 977.92 928.02 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
7.65 15.93* 17.73* 5.07 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.   Note: statistics are rounded off.  
Legend:  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%) 
 
Irregular employment, pay, parental welfare and work-hour variables were not dealt 
with in the logistic regression analysis because data for these variables for the non-
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employed are unavailable, so a different model for these variables is necessary. For this 
reason, linear regression analysis models were chosen to examine these factors, but with 
a different dependent variable, the number of failures in employment (which refers to 
the incidences of career breakage, regardless of its duration), as shown in Table 5.16.  
 
Table 5.17  Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during 
the career by gender – statistics presented for the last step only (See also Tables 5.E 
and 5.F in the Appendix for all the steps) 
Statistics: 
standardized 
coefficients B 
Model 1
1 
 (without pay & 
irregular employment) 
Model 2
2  
 (without overtime) 
Model 3
1 
 (all the list variables)  
Mother Father Mother Father Mother
1
 Mother
2
 Father 
Children aged 0 to 5    -.066*    
Children aged 6 to 11        
Children aged 12 to 18        
Age  .143***  .165***   .158*** 
Education (year)  -.199***  -.114***   -.173*** 
Household income 
(logged)
 -.084*   -.104**    
Discrimination 
experience .114**   .079**    
Parental welfare
 
-.140*** -.195***  -.112*** -.235**  -.184*** 
Overtime work 
3
  .176***       
Pay (logged)   -.182***    -.092* 
Irregular employment 
(dummy)   .120**   .173*  
N 1874 1545 1874 1545 1874 1874 1545 
F 10.88 31.21 22.00 25.34 12.01 5.00 24.99 
Adjusted R-square .05*** .13*** .06*** .12*** .05** .03* .14*** 
Source: the 9
th
 waves (2006), KLIPS.   Note: statistics are rounded off;  
1 '
employment failure during 
career' refers to the number of breaks between jobs including retrospective ones;  
2 
‘employment failure 
during career' is replaced by the number of breaks between jobs held from 1998 to 2006 due to the 
goodness-fit-model for mothers (not for fathers);  
3
 overtime work refers to ‘whether they had overtime 
work or not’ for Model 1 and 3 (dummy) and average overtime work for fathers. 
Legend: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001 
 
The number of employment break-offs (that is, how many times workers have been out 
of the labour market) in the models for both mothers and fathers, during their careers 
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including the years before 1998 (or during the period between 1998 and 2006), is used 
as an indicator of career interruptions or intermittent careers. First of all, from the linear 
regression analysis model 1 in Table 5.16, it was found that household income, 
discrimination, parental welfare and overtime work were significant for mothers. 
Parental welfare benefits and household income are negatively associated with mothers’ 
career interruptions, while overtime work and discrimination are positively associated. 
That is, mothers with greater parental welfare – often offered by better jobs – tended to 
have less employment interruptions, and those with more overtime hours and 
discrimination experiences tended to have more employment interruptions. As for 
household income, mothers with higher household income (in other words, upper class 
mothers) tended to have fewer employment interruptions. For fathers, on the other hand, 
age, education and parental welfare were significant. While age was positively 
associated, education and parental welfare were negatively associated with interruptions 
to fathers’ employment. That is, while older fathers tended to have more number of 
employment break-offs, fathers with higher education and greater access to parental 
welfare tended to have fewer interruptions to their employment. 
 
Secondly, from model 2, mothers’ pay and irregular employment were very significantly 
associated with the number of employment break-offs; that is, lower-paid jobs and low-
status jobs were more significantly associated with interruptions to mothers’ careers 
than any other factors. By contrast, children’s age cohort of 0 to 5, age, education, 
household income, discrimination and parental welfare were significantly associated 
with interruptions to fathers’ employment. With older ages and more experiences of 
discrimination, fathers tended to have higher numbers of employment break-offs. 
However, pre-school children, education, household income and parental welfare were 
negatively associated with interruptions to fathers’ employment, meaning that fathers 
with younger children, higher education and higher income (in other words, upper class) 
as well as greater access to welfare benefits tended to have less employment break-offs. 
Thirdly, from model 3 with all the list variables, mothers’ career interruption was 
significantly associated with parental welfare (negative) or irregular employment 
(positive). For fathers: age, education, parental welfare and pay were significant; age 
was positively associated with their employment interruptions while education, parental 
welfare and pay were negatively associated. Considering all the models 1, 2 and 3, 
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overtime work and irregular employment were not associated with employment 
interruptions for fathers (in contrast to mothers) while education was significantly 
associated with fathers’ employment interruptions, but, not with those of mothers. 
However, as with mothers, parental welfare and pay were less associated with 
interruptions to fathers’ employment. Overall, these results suggest that if women are 
employed in regular work (paid fairly, and with greater access to welfare benefits) rather 
than casual work, and if they have less overtime work, they enter and leave the labour 
market less often. 
 
In sum, the statistically significant results for pay, casual employment, overtime work, 
discrimination and parental welfare for mothers, strongly suggest that mothers could be 
re-oriented towards employment if working conditions were improved, especially in 
casual work, in terms of pay, working hours and welfare, along with addressing 
discrimination issues. It must be noted, however, that although all the statistical results 
from these linear regression models for mothers were very informative, the regression 
R-square (adjusted) was low, meaning that it is difficult to generalize from this to the 
population as a whole – the low explanation levels for models for mothers as seen in the 
adjusted R
2 
means that the models are problematic to apply to the population as a whole 
– and hence the results could be limited to the study sample only (Field, 2005:214). 
 
 
5.7  Further discussions from the statistical findings 
 
 
Based on the above cross-tabulation analyses and the multivariate analysis results for 
mothers’ employment behaviour, the results and discussion converged mainly on three 
issues: inequality in the labour market, lack of childcare support, and the long working 
hour culture in Korea. Firstly, inequality in the labour market is revealed by the gender 
difference (between mothers and fathers, in this case) in the payment;  and the take-up 
of low-paid and low status jobs (as shown by the frequency analysis), along with 
discrimination, clearly tell us that mothers’ employment behaviour bears some 
relationship to the gender-bias characteristics of the Korean labour market. Along with 
the frequency analyses of promotion and discrimination experience, the multivariate 
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analysis (model 1) found a significant association between discrimination and mothers’ 
employment interruptions. Furthermore, the multivariate analysis (model 2 & 3) showed 
that the low employment status of mothers, as also seen by their concentration in low-
paid and irregular employment (from the frequency analysis), was more strongly 
associated with mothers’ interrupted careers than any other factors, implying that gender 
norms, especially about motherhood, exist in the Korean labour market.   
 
To reiterate the discussion in Chapter 2, when explaining sex discrimination and gender 
segregation phenomena in the labour market, human capital theorists and economists 
have related them to women’s child care responsibilities; that is, employers’ sex 
discrimination against women occurs because of the assumption that women are more 
likely to leave their jobs and have less concern about human capital investment than 
they have for rearing their children (England, 2005:273). However, England (2005:280-
281) emphasized that sex discrimination (in pay and jobs) as well as gender segregation 
is ‘not linked to motherhood’, but more linked to social norms on the supply and 
demand sides – workers’ cultural beliefs about which jobs are considered appropriate 
for women and employers’ preferences or gender beliefs which can devalue work done 
by women, both leading to a depreciation of female jobs in the organizations. Which 
explains the Korean case best? Based on the statistical results discussed above, the 
explanations in terms of cultural gender beliefs appear to be supported in the case of 
Korean mothers. Tesch-Romer et al.’s study (2008:346) discussed in Chapter 2 also 
provides evidence, by showing that in Korea, gender inequality in the labour market is 
widely accepted, along with the observation that gender-biased norms are prevalent in 
the East Asian labour markets, in contrast to Western countries. In short, the evidence 
strongly suggests that gender-biased workplace practices (in terms of pay, promotion, 
and discrimination) in Korea are closely correlated with Korean mothers’ labour market 
participation.   
 
Secondly, regarding the welfare regime, from the cross-tabulation analysis it seems that 
childcare costs are associated with mothers’ labour market participation in terms of the 
higher burden of childcare costs relative to household income, particularly among low-
income families. The assumption that the burden of childcare costs may have a negative 
association with mothers’ employment was examined by the logistic regression analysis. 
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However, childcare costs were positively associated with the likelihood of mothers 
being employed, rather than having a negative link to mothers’ employment. That is to 
say, the multivariate analysis models did not reveal much about the association of the 
childcare costs burden with mothers’ employment behaviour, apart from suggesting that 
more childcare expenses were paid by working mothers who needed childcare. However, 
an earlier study of Korean married women’s unemployment, using the Cox-hazard 
analysis (Jang and Kim, 2001:15-16) suggested that childcare costs were a problem 
faced by lower-income women in particular. Even though the multivariate analysis 
models have failed to show any association between the burden of childcare costs and 
mothers’ job take-up, it must be not be forgotten that mothers, particularly those with 
dependent children aged under 6, are more likely to have high burden of childcare costs 
in Korea where public childcare support is very limited and the family’s responsibility 
for childcare is taken for granted rather than considered a societal responsibility. 
However, parental welfare is observed to be closely related to mothers’ labour market 
participation from the linear regression analysis models. 
 
It seems clear that corporate parental welfare has a positive link to mothers continuing 
to work, as well documented in previous studies. Fraser (1994:601-602) emphasized the 
role of welfare schemes as employment-enabling services; for instance, day care for 
children and the elderly is crucial in order to help women take up full-time employment. 
Furthermore, the frequency analysis of corporate welfare by gender shows a gender 
difference in the entitlement to workplace welfare. As indicated by Fraser (1994:606-
607), mentioned in the literature in Chapter 2, comparable worth in a social insurance 
programme is required to bring women’s entitlement up to parity with men’s and to 
redress widespread devaluation of feminine skills and jobs including care-giving, which 
is central to workplace reforms for gender equality. In short, all the statistical results 
indicate that women bear a higher burden of childcare costs and there is a low level of 
support for parental welfare in the workplace, suggesting that the gendered welfare 
regime plays an important role in mothers’ employment behaviour by restricting 
mothers’ decision toward continuing their careers, particularly with dependent children. 
This could explain at least in part – but it is an important part – why Korean mothers’ 
labour market participation is relatively low compared to other Western countries. 
Thirdly, regarding the long work-hour culture, the statistical analyses, including the 
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frequency analysis and linear regression, show a significant association between the 
long work-hour culture and mothers’ labour market participation. From the frequency 
analysis, mothers worked almost as long as fathers and their work-hours were not much 
shorter, even in more flexible jobs such as casual and part-time jobs. In particular, the 
evidence of no great gender difference in work-hours suggests that long work-hours is a 
problem faced by mothers but not by fathers, because the pressure on mothers’ time 
rises with family care in addition to paid work. As a result, mothers are more likely to 
reduce their paid working hours or withdraw from the labour market, while fathers tend 
to remain in employment without reducing their working hours.  
 
The multivariate analysis confirms this by showing that long work-hours contribute to 
mother’s interrupted employment but not fathers’. Similarly, previous studies have also 
found a gender differentiated effect of long working hours. You (2008:56-58) found that 
a couple’s long working days impact on the employment behaviour of Korean couples 
differently: in the case of households with children, male spouses tend to increase their 
work-hours and female spouses tend to reduce them. Jacobs and Gerson (2001:46, 60-
61) also pointed out that long working hours have important implications for family 
welfare and gender equality, increased workloads and cultural pressures. Overall, the 
implication is that problems arising from Korea's long work-hour culture – such as 
difficulty in achieving a good work-life balance – are more likely to be faced by 
mothers rather than fathers, and thus Korean mothers with young children have little 
choice but to withdraw temporarily from the labour market. 
 
 
5.8  Conclusion 
 
 
The statistical analysis results showed that a considerable number of mothers, 
particularly those in low-status employment, reported having experienced 
discrimination, compared with their male counterparts, suggesting that gender 
inequality persists in the Korean labour market. Also, the statistical results indicate that 
women bear a higher burden of childcare costs, although the statistical models failed to 
find any significant association between the burden of childcare costs and mothers’ 
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labour market participation. Furthermore, there was a low level of support for parental 
welfare in the workplace and parental welfare was positively associated with mothers’ 
labour market participation. Lastly, the long work-hour culture was negatively 
associated with mothers’ labour market behaviour. 
 
Overall, the findings show that gender-biased workplace practices (in terms of pay, 
promotion and discrimination), low parental welfare support in the workplace and the 
long work-hour culture in Korea correlate negatively with Korean mothers’ labour 
market participation, thus suggesting that the gender welfare regime plays a significant 
role in mothers’ employment behaviour. To conclude, considering all the statistical 
results for mothers’ employment, there are three issues regarding Korean institutions 
which are relevant for policy makers: Inequality in the labour market is widely 
accepted; there is a lack of parental welfare including support for childcare expenses; 
problems arising from the long work-hours are faced by mothers but not by fathers. 
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Chapter 6 
Class identity and mothers’ labour 
market participation 
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As feminist scholars have pointed out, employment (occupation)-based class analysis is 
problematic because it ‘excludes’ women who are not in employment, and thus an 
alternative comprehensive measurement needs to be devised (Crompton, 1998:92-98). 
Taking this into account, in order to include all women, whether working outside or in 
the home, this thesis takes a social status identity-based approach to examine whether 
women’s social status identity is closely linked to their labour market behaviour, 
focusing on mothers in particular. In this thesis, class refers to socio-economic status 
within three nominal categories of upper, middle and lower status for analytical 
convenience. From the perspective that subjective class identification is considered 
important as a mediator to connect social structure and human behaviour (Kim, 
2000:262), this thesis assumes that women’s labour market behaviour is differentiated 
according to their class identity.   
 
It is an attempt to understand the ways in which class identity has an association with an 
individual’s labour market behaviour, just as class location impacts on the potential to 
sell one’s labour (commoditisation) in the labour market (Wright, 2005:20-1). 
Importantly, there is no Korean literature on class identification focusing on mothers. 
This chapter pays special attention to mothers with children less than 19 years old, 
along with a comparative analysis by gender. In short, the chapter sets out to explore the 
correlation between social class identity and mothers’ labour market participation, along 
with further examination of any association between children’s education in relation to 
social mobility and labour market behaviour. 
 
 
6.1  Class identification by gender 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the class Koreans see themselves belonging to has been well 
documented; generally, it was found that Korean married women tended to borrow or 
share their spouse’s social status, even when they were employed, whereas a female 
spouse’s status did not seem to affect her husband’s status identification (Lee and Shin, 
2009:285-286). Furthermore, in relation to employment status and class identification, 
Korean married men and women tended to report their class status as lower if their own 
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or their spouse’s employment status was a non-permanent contract, reflecting the fact 
that irregular employment jobs are placed in the lower hierarchy of the Korean labour 
market (Lee and Shin, 2009:285-286). Further to the previous observations of the 
characteristics of Korean married people’s class identification, this chapter provides a 
gender-comparative analysis of class identification between mothers and fathers, with a 
special focus on parenthood where there are dependent and school age children under 
19 years old, unlike the previous literature, which included all married individuals.   
 
First of all, looking at class identification by employment status (Table 6.1), the 
majority of mothers in permanent or self-employed work tended to identify themselves 
as middle class, compared with only 44 per cent of mothers in irregular employment. 
Also, lower class identification was the lowest among self-employed mothers (about 27 
per cent) than the others, even lower than permanent workers: 32.3 per cent for 
permanent workers and 56 per cent for irregular workers. As for fathers, permanent 
(about 75 per cent) and self-employed workers (about 69 per cent) identified their class 
as middle class, while only 41 per cent of irregular workers did so. Unlike mothers, 
more self-employed fathers tended to report themselves as lower class (about 29 per 
cent) than did permanent workers (about 24 per cent). 
 
Table 6.1  Mothers’ and fathers’ class identification by employment statusa (percentage, 
2006) 
% within employment status (the number of cases, N) upper class middle class lower class 
Mother 
Workers in permanent employment 
1.4 
(6) 
66.4 
(288) 
32.3 
(140) 
Irregular(nonstandard) workers 
0.6 
(1) 
43.5 
(70) 
55.9 
(90) 
Self-employed and unpaid family workers 
2.4 
(7) 
70.4 
(205) 
27.1 
(79) 
Sub-total % (N) 
1.6  
(14) 
63.5  
(563) 
34.9  
(309) 
Father 
Workers in permanent employment  
1.9 
(19) 
74.5 
(757) 
23.6 
(240) 
Irregular(nonstandard) workers 
0.0 
(0) 
40.7 
(59) 
59.3 
(86) 
Self-employed and unpaid family workers 
2.2 
(11) 
69.2 
(352) 
28.7 
(146) 
Sub-total % (N) 
1.8 
(30) 
69.9 
(1168) 
28.3 
(472) 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.  Note: 
a
 see also Table 6.A in the Appendix. 
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Therefore, middle class self-identification was higher among permanent workers than in 
any other group. Like mothers, fathers in irregular employment reported themselves as 
predominantly lower class. Overall, the class self-identification of both mothers and 
fathers clearly shows that irregular employment negatively influences workers’ 
perceived class identity. Previous studies regarding class identification mostly 
concentrated on employment or occupation based class identity like the above analysis 
of class identification by employment status, which provides only information from 
those who are employed, excluding non-working people, who are predominantly 
women. Nonetheless, Lee and Shin’s study of Korean married men’s and married 
women’s class self-identification (2009) paid attention to the ‘transition’ to being non-
working although it was mainly an employment aggregate based analysis including all 
ages of married individuals. 
 
To reiterate, Lee and Shin (2009:281) found that married women tended to upwardly 
report their status when their employment status changes from irregular employment to 
being non-working. Married men did the same when their spouse’s employment status 
changed from being irregular to being non-working. This implies that female spouses’ 
non-employment, as stay-at-home mothers, is considered a ‘legitimate culture’ in Korea. 
Although the study found that both married men and married women tended to report 
upwardly when the female spouse’s employment status changed from irregular 
employment to being non-working, there was no implication in the study that social 
class identity might correlate with mothers’ different labour market behaviour; that is, 
making a decision between paid work and staying at home. Furthermore, neither did the 
study show any variations between the employed and non-working, and in particular, it 
gave no indication as to whether mothers’ class identification might be associated with 
their spouses’ occupations or income rather than their own employment status, due to 
their (probably) interrupted careers. None of these issues have been examined in the 
literature; thus, they need to be examined in this thesis. Therefore, an inclusive analysis 
of class identification by both the employed and the non-working, and also both sexes, 
follows.  
 
As shown in Table 6.2 and Figure 6.1 of this chapter, class identification by economic 
activity status (either being employed or non-working, apart from unemployed) was 
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quite different between mothers and fathers. It was clear that mothers tended to identify 
their status as middle class, overall, regardless of their economic activity status. 
Interestingly, there was a tendency by non-working mothers to upwardly report more 
than employed mothers; nearly 70 per cent of non-working mothers reported themselves 
as middle class, while only 64 per cent of employed mothers did so. On the other hand, 
there was a clear difference between non-working and employed fathers: only 38 per 
cent of non-working fathers identified their status as middle class, whereas the majority 
of employed fathers, 70 per cent, saw themselves as middle-class. Comparing the class 
identification by gender of employed mothers and fathers, for those who saw 
themselves as lower class the proportions were higher among mothers than fathers. 
Furthermore, between non-working mothers and fathers, there was a clearer contrast 
both in middle class and lower class self-identification: most mothers, 70 per cent, 
identified themselves as middle class while only 38 per cent of fathers did so; while the 
number of mothers who identified themselves as lower class was half that of fathers. 
Presumably, this is due to the fact that although mothers are more likely to occupy the 
lower hierarchy of the labour market, they see themselves in class terms through their 
husband’s occupation. 
 
Table 6.2  Mothers and fathers’ class identification by economic activity status 
(percentage, 2006) 
% within economic activity status  
(the number of cases, N) 
Upper class Middle class Lower class 
Mother
a
 
Non-working 
1.7 
(17) 
69.9 
(681) 
28.3 
(276) 
Employed 
1.6 
(14) 
63.5 
(563) 
34.9 
(309) 
Sub-total % (N) 
1.7 
(31) 
66.9 
(1244) 
31.5 
(585) 
Father  
Non-working 
0.9 
(1) 
38.2 
(42) 
60.9 
(67) 
Employed 
1.8 
(30) 
69.9 
(1168) 
28.3 
(472) 
Sub-total % (N) 
1.7 
(31) 
68.0 
(1210) 
30.3 
(539) 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.  Note: 
a
 see Tables 6.B & 6.C in the Appendix. 
 
In short, from this statistical result, it is evident that mothers’ class identification is not 
affected much by their economic activity status, by contrast with that of fathers. Also, 
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the tendency to identify their class with reference to their own occupation or labour 
force status is stronger among employed mothers than among non-working mothers 
who seemingly borrow their spouse’s status. That is, the tendency to identify themselves 
through their spouse’s social status is more apparent among non-working mothers. 
Figure 6.1 shows more clearly the gender difference in class identification by economic 
activity status, with a particularly notable contrast between non-working mothers and 
fathers. 
 
Figure 6.1  Gender difference in class identification by economic activity status 
(percentage, 2006) 
 
Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS.  
 
 
6.2  Why have middle class status perceptions decreased 
sharply since 2005? 
 
 
In the past, members of the middle class in Korea in the 1980s were defined by their 
occupations; for instance, self-employed workers included unpaid family workers, 
service job workers, bureaucrats and rich agriculturalists (Seo, 1987:108-112). As 
capitalist industrial output became highly developed, the number of workers forming 
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the middle area of the hierarchy between labourers and capital owners has been 
increasing since the 1980s and contributing to the considerable expansion of the middle 
class. Along with the dramatic growth of this class, middle class identity or 
consciousness has become popular in contemporary Korean society, and as a result, 
class identity rather than class structure has been paid more attention than ever before. 
Class identity seems to be formed by a complicated mixture of elements; that is, 
economic and social status plus other variables such as education, occupation, living 
space (housing), disposable resources, age, parents’ education and occupation, regions, 
and culture (consumption) (Choi, 2008:73-74). 
 
As shown below in Figure 6.2, the middle class and lower class accounted respectively 
for over 80 per cent and under 20 per cent, until 2002, while since 2005 the middle class 
has been reduced to 66 percent and the lower class has risen sharply to over 30 per cent 
of the total. The most likely reason is the different measures used to determine class 
identity in the KLIPS waves. In relation to the measurement issue, past research has 
found that middle class identification or lower class identification differed according to 
the number and terminology of the categories used for class measurement (Kim, 
2000:243-244, 250).  
 
Figure 6.2  The sudden changes in class identification in 2005 and 2006 (percentage, 
1999, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006)  
 
Source: the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
, and 9
th
 wave, KLIPS  
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That is to say, middle class identification decreased when a fourth ‘working class’ 
category was added to the original three class categories of upper, middle and lower 
class, dividing the lower class into working class and low or underclass, while middle 
class identification increased again when an upper middle class category was added to 
the basic three categories, thus dividing middle class into upper and lower. In the 
previous social surveys of class (1981, 1988, 1991, 1994), using a six-category 
measurement (upper/lower upper class, upper/lower middle class, and upper/lower 
lower class), the proportions of those seeing themselves as middle class stayed around 
60 percent (Kim, 2000:250). The statistics observed by Kim’s study (2000) were similar 
to those of the KLIPS 2005 and 2006 surveys, using a six-category measurement, where 
middle class perceptions stayed around 66 percent. Regarding upper class identification, 
past studies also observed similar results to the KLIPS class data, that the proportion of 
people who identified themselves as upper class was very small (Kim, 2000:251). 
 
More specifically, the measurements of class identity used in KLIPS were different over 
the five years, as shown in Table 6.3. There were 4 categories in the 2
nd
, 3
rd
 and 5
th
 
waves, and 6 categories were used to measure class perceptions in the 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves. 
Whether this was due to inserting ‘middle middle class’ or dropping ‘upper lower class’, 
the size of the middle class grew in the years 1999, 2000, and 2002.  
 
Table 6.3  Differing measurements (sub-categories) of class identity by year 
(percentage, 1999, 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006) 
% for self-defined 
class 
1999 2000
a
 2002
b
 2005 2006 
Upper  
class 
Upper  
0.2 0.2 
(0.1) 
0.3 
(0.1) 
0.3 0.3 
Lower 0.8 1.4 
Middle 
class 
Upper 19.6 
3.8 
(2.8) 
4.1  
(3.0) 
22.3 21.6 
Middle . 35.6 
(32.4) 
45.8  
(42.5) 
. . 
Lower 60.9 40.2  
(42.8) 
36.5 
(40.1) 
44.3 45.3 
Lower      
class 
Upper 
19.3 20.2 
(21.9) 
13.3 
(14.3) 
21.1 21.7 
Lower 11.3 9.7 
Source: the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
, and 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.  Note: in the 2000 and 2002 waves (a, b) subjective 
class identity is divided into two, giving social status first and then economic status in brackets.    
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In addition, by adding ‘upper low class’, the size of the lower class increased 
dramatically in 2005 and 2006. This suggests strongly that perceived class size can be 
different according to different measurements. However, Kim (2000:252) also 
suggested that the proportion of people perceiving themselves to be middle class 
declined due to rapid socioeconomic change. For instance, middle class identification in 
1998 shrank considerably after the currency crisis at the end of 1997 (Kim, 2000:252; 
Hong and Kim, 2006:8-9). This is closely associated with the labour market 
restructuring in the early 2000s. Self-employed businesses increased steadily along with 
the increase in early-retirement, resulting from the restructuring of businesses after the 
financial crisis at the end of 1997 (the currency bailouts); however, the number of 
businesses declined after the credit crisis in 2003 and has continued to do so since then 
(Keum et al., 2006:45-46, 2009:7-9). The proportion of non-wage earners (employer, 
self-employed and unpaid family workers) declined by 3.1 per cent between 2003 and 
2007 while remaining around 30 percent of the total employment share (Keum et al., 
2009:14). With the collapse of small and poor self-employed businesses, unpaid family 
workers as well as self-employed workers became unemployed or entered irregular 
(temporary or daily) employment (Keum et al., 2009:7-9). Thus, the influence of socio-
economic change on class identification cannot be ignored.  
 
On the other hand, people’s class identity perceptions may be associated with their life 
cycle, because people lose their labour market power as they grow older. ‘Panel’ data 
from KLIPS showed that Korean married women’s class identity moved downwards as 
they aged. Most importantly, it should be noted that older women tended to have lower 
class identity due to their weaker labour market status, or because for most of their lives 
they had been outside the labour market, suggesting that women’s social class is more 
likely to drop in old age. In relation to this phenomenon, Lee and Shin (2009:281-282)’s 
study found that Korean married men and women identified their class status as going 
downwards in their 40s and 50s. According to the study, the recent restructuring 
practices of businesses and the recent dramatic collapses of self-employed businesses 
have contributed to the increase in middle-aged men’s job instability, causing them 
consequent downward economic status. 
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6.3  Misidentification of class 
 
 
The very small percentage of people who see themselves as upper class may simply be 
associated with the popularity of the middle class. Middle class is the preferred 
perceived class status, especially by the upper class and (upper) lower class, leading to 
misidentification issues. To examine respondents’ misidentification of their socio-
economic class, an objective economic measure (for instance, household income) is 
used, although it is disputable as people’s class is identified here in reference to their 
social status as well as economic status. That is, respondents’ subjective class 
identification was compared with their economic class, divided into higher, middle and 
lower income class in terms of the median income of the study population, in 
accordance with Choi’s definition of middle class (2008) as a group whose income 
accounts for between 150 per cent and 50 per cent of the median income. By the cross-
tabulation analysis, throughout the 5 waves, the proportions of those seeing themselves 
as upper class were very small, as shown in Figure 6.2. According to Table 6.4, under-
reporting was evident in the higher and middle income groups. In particular, higher 
income people identifying themselves as middle class reached over 80 per cent, and also 
middle income people reporting themselves downwardly accounted for nearly 40 per 
cent. Upper-reporting by lower income groups was also notable; around 22 percent of 
lower income group people identified themselves as middle class.   
    
Table 6.4  The percentages of subjective class identification by three income groups as 
defined by their household income
* 
(percentage, 2006) 
 
Subjective social class identity % of total N 
(1874) Upper class Middle class Lower class 
Higher income class 3.8 84.3 11.9 39.0 
Middle income class 0.2 60.9 38.9 53.6 
Lower income class 1.5 22.2 76.3 7.3 
% of total N (1874) 1.7 67.2 31.1 100 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS (mothers only). * Note: income class groups are divided into three by median 
household income. According to Choi (2008), middle income class is defined by a group whose income 
accounts for between 150 per cent and 50 per cent of the median income (25,800,000 Korean won). 
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Under-reporting of upper class respondents is explained by Granovetter (1988)’s class 
identification in terms of a reference group (Jang, 1996:190). That is, people identify 
their socio-economic status with reference to their social group rather than their income. 
Upper class people are more likely to interact with lower than upper class people and 
thus, they tend to place themselves in between the upper class and middle class because 
their reference group tends to be upper middle or lower middle class. That is why upper 
class people tend to identify themselves as middle class. Conversely, the higher-
reporting phenomenon occurs because lower class people tend to identify themselves as 
middle class because their reference group is more likely to be middle or upper class 
(Jang, 1996:190-191). However, Bourdieu (1984) explains this by the dynamics of 
distinction; that is, individuals’ dispositions are defined by the hierarchy of social 
structures, and hence individuals or groups tend to place their subjective class higher 
than their economic class to distinguish themselves from others. This can also be 
explained psychologically, in that most people tend to place themselves in the middle as 
a psychological self-defence mechanism (Jang, 1996:190; Hong and Kim, 2006:8). 
Keeping in mind the characteristics of Korean people’s class identification, class 
measurement issues, and class misidentification issues as discussed above, I now turn to 
the statistical analysis to explore any association between Korean mothers’ class identity 
(hereafter, ‘class’) and their labour market behaviour.     
 
 
6.4  Class and maternity divisions in labour market 
participation  
 
 
The charts below show that the percentage differences between the non-working (non-
employed) and the employed (calculated by subtracting the employed percentage from 
the non-employed percentage) over the years were very different when comparing all 
married women and mothers and were also different according to each class (see also 
Tables 6.B and 6.C in the Appendix). The difference between the non-working and the 
employed shares was highly positive for middle class mothers (Figure 6.3-2) and it was 
highly negative for working class mothers (Figure 6.3-1) throughout the five years. This 
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clearly suggests that the non-employment is over-represented among middle class 
mothers and also that middle class identity is strongly associated with non-working, 
while working class identity is strongly associated with being in work. Overall, these 
charts indicate that there are class divisions in mothers’ labour market behaviour. 
 
Figure 6.3  The difference between non-employment and employment for all married 
women (6.3-1) / only for mothers (6.3-2) by class over the years, 1999, 2000, 2002, 
2005 and 2006   
    
Source: the 2
nd
, 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves of KLIPS. 
   
Table 6.5  Mothers’ labour market activity by their class identity in 2005 (percentage, 
cases) 
% of Total N (4016) Work Family & work Non-working (family) Row-total % 
Upper class 0.4 (17) 0.0 (0) 0.9 (38) 1.4 (55) 
Middle class 22.1 (887) 4.5 (180) 32.3 (1298) 58.9 (2365) 
Lower class 17.2 (689) 3.4 (138) 19.1 (769) 39.7 (1596) 
Column-total % 39.7 (1593) 7.9 (318) 52.4 (2105) 100.0 (4016) 
Note: Divisions between work and family are based on the survey question ‘What was your main activity 
during the last week?’ in the 8
th
 wave of KLIPS.  Pearson x
2
(4): 25.616, ***p<0001 
 
Table 6.5 also shows clearly that the shares of non-working and employed people were 
greater in the upper and middle classes than in the lower class, where the share was 
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nearly equal. It also gives a broad picture of mothers’ low labour market participation 
overall, along with the low percentages of people who combine paid work and caring 
for their family. The class difference in mothers’ labour market activity was statistically 
supported by the chi-square test, which was highly significant. Based on these simple 
statistical analyses, this thesis now attempts to examine whether there is a significant 
association between class and mothers’ labour market behaviour in terms of a logistic 
regression model, along with providing a comparison between mothers and fathers. 
 
 
6.5  Gender and class divisions in labour market participation 
 
 
The stepwise logistic regression model for 2006 in Table 6.6 shows the odds ratios for 
mothers being employed, with class variable included. With strong significance at the 
model goodness-of-fit at the final step, children’s age cohorts, class identity, household 
income and education were significantly associated with the probability of mothers 
being employed. Of particular note here is that class identity was very significant; upper 
and middle classes were negatively associated, meaning that upper and middle class 
mothers tend to stay at home compared with lower class mothers. This model also 
shows that education was positively associated with the probability of being employed. 
 
The logistic regression models in Table 6.7 show the statistically different results 
between mothers and fathers and the results for mothers across the selected years. First 
of all, class identity was very significantly associated with both mothers’ and fathers’ 
labour market participation, indicating class-distinct labour market behaviour. 
Importantly, the contrast between middle class mothers and fathers is more apparent; 
that is, compared with lower class mothers, middle class ones are more likely to stay at 
home, whereas middle class fathers are more likely to work. As for children's age 
cohorts, those of 0 to 5 and 12 to 18 were significantly associated with mothers’ labour 
market participation compared with the insignificance of its association with fathers’ 
behaviour, while the children's age cohort of 6 to 11 was significantly (negatively) 
associated with both mothers and fathers. Furthermore, this gender comparative analysis 
shows that education was significant for mothers, but not for fathers, while age was 
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significant for fathers, but not for mothers. In short, middle class identity was negatively 
associated with mothers’ labour market behaviour, but positively associated with 
fathers’ labour market behaviour.  
 
Table 6.6  Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether employed or not for 
mothers – class factors  
Statistics:  
odds ratios - Exp(B) Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step5 Step6 
Children aged 0 to 5 
.446*** .546*** .544*** .555*** .599* .579*** 
Children aged 6 to11 
    .821** .822* 
Children aged 12 to18 
 1.362*** 1.358*** 1.346*** 1.300** 1.320** 
Social class  
(Lower class is base)   
 
** *** *** 
 upper class 
   .520 .432* .401* 
 middle class 
   .574*** .584*** .554*** 
Household income 
(logged)   1.280** 1.422*** 1.651*** 1.599*** 
Education (year) 
     1.109* 
Age       
N 
1844 1844 1844 1844 1844 1844 
-2 Log likelihood 
2460.43 2438.45 2418.07 2396.54 2390.99 2386.23 
Model improvement  
(Chi-square)
a
  92.47*** 114.41*** 134.79*** 156.32*** 161.87*** 166.63*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a
 the models for Step 2 & 5 are 
insignificant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-fit-test within 10% p-value. 
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
 
Apart from gender differences or gender inequality, is there any difference between the 
years, considering that the percentages of people perceiving themselves to belong to 
each class has changed over time, as discussed above? Looking at the statistical results 
of mothers’ class identity over time through recursive tests over four selected years 
(Table 6.7), there was not much variation in the results (except 2000), showing no 
significant correlation between class identity and employment probability. Nonetheless, 
notably, the association between being upper class and employed (which is negative) 
became significant in 2006 and that between being middle class and employed holds the 
high significance (p value) across the selected years. To conclude, from the logistic 
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regression results throughout the studied years it is evident that class is strongly 
associated with Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour. 
 
Table 6.7  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by year 
and by gender (class factors) – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 
6.D for ‘enter-method’ analysis model with child costs and Table 6.E for all the steps 
in the Appendix) 
Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B) 
Mother By gender (2006) 
2000 2002 2005 Mother Father
1
 
Children aged 0 to 5 
.529*** .555*** .613*** .579***  
Children aged 6 to11 
   .822* .722* 
Children aged 12 to18 
1.344*** 1.346*** 1.355*** 1.320**  
Social class  
(Lower class is base) 
 
** ** *** ** 
 upper class 
 .520 .418 .401* 1.098 
 middle class 
 .574*** .647*** .554*** 2.378*** 
Household income (logged) 
1.257** 1.422*** 1.457*** 1.599*** 2.754*** 
Education (year) 
   1.109*  
Age 
    .928*** 
N 1851 1828 1885 1844 1522 
Model Chi-square  
(goodness-of-fit) 154.80*** 159.65*** 145.03*** 166.63*** 95.44*** 
-2 Log likelihood 2396.86 2371.17 2457.58 2386.23 610.11 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(sig.) 24.52** 30.34*** 21.09** 22.22** 21.08** 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;   
1 
children age cohort of 6 
to 11 for fathers was not significant in the ‘enter-method’ analysis models (see Table 6.D in the Appendix). 
Legend:  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 
90%) 
 
In addition to the above statistical results showing the over-representation of middle 
class mothers in the non-working sector in Korea, a further analysis of Korean mothers’ 
labour market behaviour predicted by the interaction between class and children’s age 
cohorts provided far more interesting and important observations. The statistical results 
were consistently similar throughout the four periods, as shown in Table 6.8. When 
there were young children aged less than 6, Korean mothers tended to stay at home 
regardless of their class identity, whether middle or lower class. As to the interaction 
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between class and the children’s age cohort 6 to 11 (primary school age) there were 
negative associations for middle class mothers, whereas this was not the case for lower 
class mothers. The statistics for the middle class were very significant and negatively 
associated in 2005 and 2006 whereas those for the lower class were not significant 
overall, except 2002 which shows a positive and significant association. It suggests that 
lower class mothers tend to remain in the labour market when their children reach 
primary-school age (note also that statistics for the middle class are less than 0, whereas 
those for the lower class are more than 1).  
 
Table 6.8  Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour predictions from the interaction 
between social class and child age cohorts by year – statistics presented for the last 
step only (See Table 6.F for all the steps in the Appendix) 
Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B)  
Logistic regression (stepwise) analysis on whether 
employed or not  
Mother 
2000 2002 2005 2006 
Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class
1
 .532*** .564*** .535*** .529*** 
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class   .705*** .688*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class 1.247** 1.307**   
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class
1
 .539** .589* .439*** .517*** 
Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class  1.402*   
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 1.752*** 2.060*** 1.478*** 1.578*** 
Household income (logged) 1.344*** 1.415*** 1.446*** 1.643*** 
Age  
 
 
 
Education (year)    
 
N 
1851 1828 1885 1844 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
162.39*** 162.60*** 157.98*** 168.23*** 
-2 Log likelihood 
2389.27 2368.22 2444.63 2384.63 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2 
(sig.) 
22.40** 30.98*** 12.73 16.54* 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
1 
class variables are 
dummy.   Legend :  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
 
Finally, when there are children aged over 11, Korean mothers from both the middle and 
lower classes are more likely to be in work; statistics for middle class were insignificant 
in 2005 and 2006, and furthermore, the significance levels were greater for lower class 
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mothers than middle class ones (note that the odds ratios for the lower class were 
greater than those for the middle class in 2000 and 2002). The statistical results reveal 
more about Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour; that is, mothers’ labour market 
behaviour is likely to be differentiated by the interaction between children’s ages and 
class. Furthermore, the statistical evidence that Korean mothers tend to be employed 
after childrearing strongly suggests that married women’s labour market behaviour 
cannot be fully explained without considering family life cycle (reflected by children’s 
age cohorts in this thesis, instead of women’s age cohorts). 
 
Mothers’ labour market behaviour may be explained by the traditional Confucian 
gender norms, which put greater emphasis on mothers’ responsibilities for rearing 
children, as more fully discussed in Chapter 4. Won and Pascall (2004:274) believe the 
traditional Confucian assumptions about gender relations still hold good in Korean 
families, based on the contrasting roles of motherhood and fatherhood: ‘motherhood 
frequently brings withdrawal from paid work while fatherhood strengthens men’s role 
as breadwinners’ (Won and Pascall, 2004:273). However, this does not explain fully the 
over-representation of middle class mothers’ withdrawal from the labour market and 
their later return (as shown in Tables 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8) in Korea, where gender equality 
ideas have become widespread with the narrowing of the gender gap in education. Thus, 
a ‘classful’ perspective (according to Duncan’s terminology, 2005:73) seems useful to 
explain Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour; for instance, McRae (2003) indicated 
the importance of structural constraints such as class. McRae (2003:334) argued that 
women’s employment after childbirth depended greatly on how they understood the 
constraints and on their ability to overcome these constraints, which were patterned by 
social structures manifested through differing qualifications, social networks or income 
levels. That is, women’s interpretations of the courses of action open to them could 
differ according to their class location (McRae, 2003:330). Nonetheless, McRae did not 
provide any further explanations as to why class-differentiated behaviour occurs. 
Therefore, the reasons why class-differentiated behaviour occurs, particularly that of the 
‘middle class’, need to be explained in this chapter and are elaborated next. 
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6.6  Children’s education expenditure, social mobility beliefs 
and mothers’ labour market participation 
 
 
From the above statistical results, it is clear that Korean mothers’ labour market 
behaviour cannot be fully understood without taking class into account. So why does 
Korean mothers’ behaviour differ according to their class perceptions? It appears to be 
associated with cultural-specific concerns or investment in children’s education. In the 
Korean cultural context, their children’s education is always important for parents, 
especially for mothers. Apart from state schooling, private education – which refers to 
extra courses through crammers and catch-up classes after regular attendance at state 
school – is always a concern for Korean parents, as are social issues such as the burden 
of the expense and inequality in private education between classes. The popularity of 
private education in Korea seems unrelated to the quality of state education (although 
there are arguments about the failure of state schooling) in that parents want to support 
their children’s academic ability through private education to improve the academic 
performance from attending state schools alone. As mothers are seen as the children’s 
education managers (Shin, 2001:97) and also bear the burden of education expenses, 
this is likely to have a link to mothers’ behaviour or attitude in their daily lives. For 
instance, they may take up paid work in order to be able to afford the costs of private 
education for their children. Alternatively, they may stay at home to devote themselves 
to caring for their children and helping their education. This explanation needs 
examining because it could reveal more about mothers’ class-differentiated labour 
market behaviour.   
 
First of all, in KLIPS the data for children’s education is combined with childcare data. 
Thus, childcare costs need to be excluded from the surveys of child care/education costs 
in KLIPS. In order to restrict the data analysis to child education costs alone, children’s 
age is restricted to those aged over 6 because that is when children start primary school 
and when they do not need so much childcare so are more likely to take private ‘catch-
up’ classes in addition to formal state education. The statistics in Table 6.9 below show 
the amounts spent on each child’s education and its percentage of the total household 
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income. It shows that the monthly average expenditure on private education in a family 
has more than doubled over the years, increasing from the equivalent of 85 pounds 
sterling in 2000 to 198 pounds sterling in 2006. Looking at the share of household 
income, the proportion remained at over 10 per cent throughout 2000 to 2006. 
Speculating about the large proportion of the total household income, especially from 
the indications that some families have spent most of their income on private education, 
and even taking into account that some of them may have reported their household 
income inaccurately, it reveals a great deal about how much concern Korean families 
have for their children’s education.   
 
Table 6.9  Private education costs for children per household and the proportion of 
household income spent (monthly average costs for households with children aged 
between 6 and 18) in 2000, 2002, 2005 and 2006  
 
2000
a
 2002 2005 2006 
Min Max mean Min Max mean Min Max Mean Min Max mean 
Education 
costs (£
b
) 0 2,400 £85 0 3,500 £171 0 1,175 £178 0 1,215 £198 
Spending 
(%) out of 
household 
income 
0  120 
10.0
% 
0 138 
13.5
% 
0 92 
10.6
% 
0 150 
10.6
% 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
, and 9
th
 wave, KLIPS.  Note:  
a
 statistics for 2000 were calculated from the 2001 
data due to the data availability;  
b
 pounds were computed by an approximate currency exchange rate  
£1: 2,000 Korean won, and pounds and percentages are rounded off. 
 
Looking at the spending on private education by class (Figure 6.4), the upper class 
spends far more than the other classes, on average around 930,000 Korean won (£465), 
compared to around 588,000 Korean won (£294) by the middle class and around 
223,000 Korean won (£112) by the lower class. The upper class and middle class spent 
respectively more than four times and nearly three times as much as the lower class. The 
box-plot analysis shows clearly the considerable difference between the classes and the 
range was widest in the upper class and smallest in the lower class. The fact that lower 
class spending was concentrated at the bottom tells us that many lower class families 
did not spend any money on education or only a little, implying that either they could 
not afford to do so, or were not much concerned about it. 
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Figure 6.4  Spending on children’s private education by class in 2006 (10,000 Korean 
Won) 
 
Source: Statistics for spending on children’s private education, the 9th wave, KLIPS. 
 
The proportion of the household monthly income spent on children’s private education 
has more implications for differences between the classes. According to Table 6.10, 
below, the upper class spent on average 14 per cent  in 2005 and 10 per cent in 2006 of 
their household income, while the middle class spent around 13 per cent (both in 2005 
and 2006), while the lower class spent about 11 per cent in 2005 and 10 per cent in 2006. 
 
Table 6.10  The percentage of household monthly income spent on children’s private 
education by perceived class identification 
a
 (percentage, 2005 and 2006
b
) 
% out of household income  
2005 2006 
Min. Max. Mean Min. Max. Mean 
Upper class 3.7 40.3 14.4 0 41.9 10.4 
Middle class 0 86.0 12.5 0 63.4 13.3 
Lower class 0 92.0 11.2 0 60.0 9.8 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: 
a
 statistics for households with children of primary 
school age and above (aged between 6 and 18) and are rounded off;  
b 
statistics for 2000 and 2002 were 
not provided, due to the different class categorisation from2005 and 2006. 
 
The difference in the percentage of household income spent looks small between the 
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classes. However, considering their financial situation, the relative actual amount from 
their total income might be much greater for the middle class and even more so for the 
lower class, compared to the upper class; for instance, if the same amount was spent by 
families from the three different classes, the burden would be very different for each 
class; in other words, in terms of total household income level, it is a small sum for 
upper class people, but greater for the middle class and greatest for the lower class. The 
statistics of the amounts spent on children’s education per class suggests strongly that 
class divisions are highly likely to be sustained or reinforced by the different amounts 
invested in children’s private education in Korea. 
 
Having seen the differences in the amounts spent by each class, how did mothers from 
the different classes feel about the burden of costs? Table 6.11 shows how the expense 
was considered by each class. First of all, overall, around half the mothers (54 per cent) 
reported the costs of private education to be a burden, while 23 per cent of mothers did 
not use any private education institutes for their children’s education. Secondly, more 
middle class mothers (57 per cent) reported the costs a burden compared with the 
women in other classes (33 per cent of upper class and 43 per cent of lower class). 
Lastly, the percentage not spending any money on private education was highest in the 
lower class (38 per cent), while the percentages for middle class and upper class 
accounted for 19 per cent and 0 per cent respectively. That is, in the study population, 
nearly 40 per cent of the lower class spent no money at all on private education whereas 
most of the middle class (over 80 per cent) and all the upper class spent some money on 
their children’s education.  
 
Table 6.11  The percentages of mothers who see children’s education costs a as a 
burden, by class (percentage, 2001) 
 A burden All right Not a burden No spending (no use) Column-total% 
Overall % 54.4 18.8 4.1 22.8 100 
% within 
class 
Upper class 33.3 33.3 33.3 0.0 100 
Middle class 57.2 19.5 4.5 18.8 100 
Lower class 43.8 15.8 2.1 38.3 100 
Source: the 4
th
 wave, KLIPS.  Note:  
a 
statistics are for children aged more than 5 (between 6 and 18).  
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This suggests a wide gap between the classes in investment in their children’s education, 
as well as suggesting that many children from the lower class are excluded from private 
schooling – which is extremely popular in Korea – after attending state schooling. 
However, the most important thing to note is that more than half of the lower class use 
at least one private institute (while 38 per cent of the lower class do not use any), 
suggesting that they spend some money on their children’s private education even 
though it is presumed they have limited funds. From this, it seems that lower class 
mothers’ attitude toward their children’s education is divided, rather than uniform. In 
this regard, a study found evidence that working class people have high aspirations for 
upward class mobility as do the middle class (Hatcher, 1998:15). It seems that many 
Korean mothers of the lower class are also under the Korean cultural-specific emphasis 
on children’s education, while it is highly likely that many of the lower class just cannot 
afford to pay extra for their children’s education. The statistical results raise the 
question: Why do Korean mothers spend money on their children’s education, 
especially private education, despite the burden it places on the family income? 
 
To recapitulate the literature discussion in Chapter 2, in Korea private education is 
perceived as a strategy for class reproduction and a means of upward social mobility 
(Kim and Yeom, 2009:31). The desire for social mobility through educational 
attainment is still quite strong in Korean society (Shin, 2001:234-235). Again, the desire 
for upward mobility has led to an interest in private education, sometimes causing 
excessive expense on it, especially amongst upper and middle class parents, as shown in 
the above statistics. As to why upper class families have an interest in private education, 
this is explained by a (British) study finding that ‘affluent middle class parents believe 
that paying for private education would provide their children with an edge in the 
competitive world of academic success and high-status careers’ (Hatcher, 1998:13). 
Likewise, Korean families from the higher classes have a greater interest in private 
education; that is, as educational opportunities have expanded in Korea, more children 
seek higher education as well as higher status occupations, and hence the competition 
becomes greater. As a result, parents from the higher classes need more secure (from 
downward mobility) measurements through greater investment in informal private 
education as distinct from formal education. This explains also why class differences 
have remained in Korea, perhaps worsened by the increasing gap in private education 
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investment between the different classes. 
 
On the other hand, Kim and Yeom (2009:31) explain Korean parents’ great interest in 
private education as being due to the fear of downward mobility, rather than from the 
perspective of state education failure or Confucian-cultural specific traditions with a 
strong emphasis on education. Kim and Yeom (2009:34) argue that families from all 
classes try to avoid downward mobility but families’ responses to the risk of downward 
mobility differ according to class. This is why there are class differences in private 
education investment, although the difference in access to material resources seems 
most likely (Kim and Yeom, 2009:35). This argument is also supported by a Western 
study conducted by Gillies (2005:849-850), finding that ‘a deep-seated fear of failure or 
downward mobility’ was identified among middle-class families. Similarly, Hong and 
Kim (2006:14) also found that both the fear of downward mobility and the strong desire 
for upward mobility were greater among middle class families in Korea than among 
upper or lower class families, and argued that for this reason, middle class families were 
strongly committed to investing in their children’s education, even at the sacrifice of 
themselves. Further, this may be reflected in middle class mothers’ labour market 
behaviour, many of them tending to stay at home (perhaps, temporarily during the 
period of child rearing) rather than continuing their career. 
 
In addition to children’s education expenditure, whether or not women perceive there is 
a possibility of upward social mobility is an important factor to be addressed here. 
Looking at whether there is a belief that upward social mobility is possible by class in 
the years 2005 and 2006 (surveyed in these two years only), the overall positive view of 
both mothers and fathers increased by around 5 or 7 per cent from 2005 to 2006 (Table 
6.12). Middle class mothers (increasing from 36 to 42 per cent in the two years) tended 
to believe in the probability of upward social mobility, compared to the lower class 
mothers who tended not to believe in it. The class differences in this belief are very 
similar between mothers and fathers. The important thing to note here is that there is a 
class difference in social mobility beliefs. It is highly likely to be related to different 
class concerns or inclinations about investing in private education for upward mobility. 
This may also explain why lower class families spent less on private education while 
upper and middle class families spent comparatively more.  
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Table 6.12  Social mobility beliefs by gender according to class identity (percentage, 
2005 and 2006) 
% of total N Class identity 
2005 2006 
Believe Don’t believe Believe Don’t believe 
Mother Upper class 0.8 0.2 1.2 0.5 
 Middle class 36.3 30.2 41.7 25.2 
 Lower class 10.9 21.5 12.5 18.9 
 Row-total %  48.1 51.9 55.4 44.6 
Father Upper class 0.8 0.2 1.6 0.1 
 Middle class 37.5 28.6 40.2 25.7 
 Lower class 10.9 22.1 11.7 20.8 
 Row-total %  49.1 50.9 53.5 46.5 
Note:  for mothers, in 2005, Pearson x
2
(2) =80.852, sig. =.000 ***;  in 2006, Pearson x
2
(2) =84.980, 
sig.=.000 ***;  for fathers, in 2005, Pearson x
2
(2) =95.666, sig. =.000 ***;  in 2006 Pearson x
2
(2)=102.342, 
sig.=.000 ***  
 
Based on the findings of class-differentiated children’s education spending and social 
mobility beliefs, this thesis assumes that these are associated with mothers’ labour 
market behaviour somehow. Therefore, the thesis next examines whether there were any 
links between these variables and upper and middle class mothers’ labour market 
participation when taking children’s ages into account (Tables 6.13 & 6.14). The logistic 
regression (stepwise) analyses of mothers’ labour market participation in Table 6.13 and 
in Table 6.14 show that child education costs and social mobility beliefs were 
significantly associated with the probability of mothers being employed (note models 
for 2002 which were significant – though not significant in the rest years – in the 
Hosmer & Lemeshow test). Child education costs were negatively associated in 2005 
and 2006 from Model A (Table 6.13) and in 2002 from Model B (Table 6.14), and social 
mobility beliefs were also negatively associated in the years 2001 and 2002 from Model 
A (Table 6.13), and in 2006 from Model B (Table 6.14).  
 
Roughly, mothers’ labour market participation was negatively associated with child 
education costs and also with social mobility beliefs; that is, mothers who spend more 
on private education for their children and believe in social mobility are more likely to 
stay at home than those who do neither of these. It should be noted that the analysis 
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results for lower class women (‘within lower class’) are not presented here, due to the 
insignificance in the Hosmer & Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test for all the years of study. 
It should also be noted that there were no correlations between the social mobility 
factors and lower class mothers’ labour market behaviour in the study years (See Table 
6.J in the Appendix). 
 
Table 6.13  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for 
mothers by year (social mobility factors) – statistics presented for the last step only 
(See Table 6.G for all the steps) 
Model A 
Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B) 
Mother (including all classes) 
2000
1
 2002 2005 2006 
Children aged 0 to 5 .516*** .391*** .567*** .590** 
Children aged 6 to11  .769**   
Children aged 12 to18 1.322***  1.392*** 1.504*** 
Social class  
(Lower class is base) 
 
*** ** *** 
 upper class    .242** 
 middle class
1
 .744* .377*** .632** .574*** 
Household income (logged) 1.354** 1.580*** 1.317** 1.493*** 
Age  .963**   
Education (year)     
Child education costs  
(for children over 6)
 2
 
  .995* .996* 
Social mobility belief (positive) .794* .649**   
N 1851 1828 1885 1844 
Model Chi-square  
(goodness-of-fit) 142.12*** 76.96*** 73.83*** 96.21*** 
-2 Log likelihood 1925.16 1308.87 1793.18 1746.22 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(sig.) 3.66 15.07! (.058) 10.72 12.42 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
1  
statistics for social class 
in 2000 are replaced by those for middle class (dummy) due to the goodness-of-fit model;  
2
 statistics for 
child education costs in 2000 are replaced by those for total child costs including children under 6, 
according to the goodness-of-fit model. 
Legend:  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 
90%) 
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Table 6.14  The probability of being employed, for mothers within the upper/middle 
class – statistics presented for the last step only (See Table 6.H for the ‘enter-method’ 
analysis and Table 6.I for all the steps in the Appendix) 
Model B 
Statistics: odds ratios - Ex(B) 
Upper/middle class mother 
2000 2002 2005 2006 
Children aged 0 to 5  .606*** .386*** .646* .607* 
Children aged 6 to 11   .758**   
Children aged 12 to 18  1.400***  1.424*** 1.561*** 
Age  .959**   
Education (year)     
Household income (logged)  1.490**  1.651*** 
Child education costs 
1
 
(for children aged over 6)  .996*   
 
Social mobility belief (positive)    .627** 
Interaction between education costs  
and social mobility    
 
N 645 885 882 882 
Model Chi-square (x
2
 ) 37.00*** 58.34*** 31.04*** 61.16*** 
-2 Log likelihood 851.77 1165.73 1168.45 1133.60 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(sig.)
 2
 1.43 21.31** 1.75 6.66 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
1,2
 in Table 6.H for the 
‘enter-method’ analysis model, child costs include both childcare and child education costs and the models 
for 2002, 2005 and 2006 were significant following the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. 
Legend :  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
 
Overall, the analysis results concerning child education and social mobility beliefs 
indicate that upper and middle class mothers’ labour market behaviour is closely  
associated with children’s education and social mobility beliefs, which explains rather 
clearly why upper/middle class women are more likely to stay at home, reflecting the 
tendency to buy time for social mobility-related activities such as arranging and 
managing their children’s education by trading off time for this against reduced work 
hours. 
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6.7  What can we learn from mothers’ class-differentiated 
labour market participation? 
 
 
As for the gender difference in labour market participation between the classes, as 
shown in the above logistic regression analysis Table 6.7, it is best explained by 
Crompton’s (1998:93-94) argument, discussed in Chapter 2, that the interactions 
between class and the gender system bring different consequences to each gender. This 
is closely related to Hartmann’s (1981) ‘dual systems’ theory, which sees women as 
suffering a double disadvantage due to both class and patriarchy systems – by virtue of 
their sex as well as in their employment (Crompton, 1998:93-94). The statistical results 
show clearly the consequences of the interaction between class and gender systems. In 
the middle class, seemingly most evidently, mothers are more likely to stay at home 
whereas fathers are far more likely to work. Apart from the gender difference by class, 
the over-representation of non-working mothers in the middle and upper classes rather 
than in lower class must be explained.  
 
Regarding women’s labour market behaviour, the three main explanations are: classless 
preference theory (2000), class-based rational action theory (1998, 2000), and cultural 
perspectives. However, Hakim’s preference theory (2000), which ignores the class 
factor, is insufficient here, as my thesis argues that mothers’ labour market participation 
is closely associated with class identity. The statistical results of this thesis show that 
social class is a significant predictor of mothers’ labour market behaviour, which does 
not support, at least in the case of Korean mothers, Hakim’s argument (2002:434) that 
lifestyle preferences (in modern affluent societies) cut across educational levels and all 
social classes and that ideal family role models do not impact on women’s career 
choices.  
 
Given that Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour cannot be fully understood 
without taking class into account, why different classes behave differently and the over-
representation of middle class non-working mothers needs to be explained. When it 
comes to class-differentiated behaviour, Goldthorpe (1998)’s rational action theory 
(RAT) seems to provide one answer, although its methodological approach of focusing 
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on utilitarian individuals has been subject to a similar critique to Hakim’s neoclassical 
individualist approach because it attempts to reconcile the individualist and structuralist 
approaches; that is, it links the economic explanation of micro-level, individual actions 
to macro-level, class structure (Duncan, 2005:61). According to RAT, people are 
assumed to behave rationally on the basis of cost-benefit calculations to maximise the 
utility of their decisions, and these rational utilitarian choices differ according to class 
level (Hatcher, 1998:10-20). In the case of mothers making a decision between family 
and paid work, mothers will behave according to their cost-benefit calculations (the 
opportunity costs of child care) between paid work and looking after the home. 
However, the opportunities and constraints that mothers face are different according to 
their class. More specifically, due to the different job opportunities and career prospects 
of the classes, their decisions between staying at home to look after the family and 
following a career are different. If married women’s work is likely to be in low-paid and 
low-status jobs with long working-hours, as in the case of Korea, the rewards for 
continuing their career will not be high, particularly, for lower class women.   
 
This is also supported by Hartmann’s argument (1981a:391) that ‘given women’s 
restricted access to decent jobs and wages, women maintain their interests in men’s 
continued contribution to family support’. For lower class mothers, staying at home 
could be a more rational option because the opportunity costs of childcare will not be 
very worthwhile for them, considering their limited socio-economic capital (for 
example, lower educational attainment). For instance, good quality childcare might be 
out of their reach, due to their low income from low-status jobs or from low-paid or 
irregular work, which is most likely to pay a similar rate to the job they did before they 
had children or married. However, most lower class mothers tend to work after giving 
birth compared to middle class mothers, as shown in Table 6.8.  
 
Furthermore, middle-class mothers, who are more likely to have started their career in 
better paid jobs before giving birth, due to their better human or economic capital and 
who therefore can afford to pay for good quality childcare, will have more benefits or 
rewards from continuing their career than lower class women. In other words, the 
opportunity costs of child care would be much better for middle class mothers compared 
with lower class mothers. However, in reality (in the statistical evidence) the opposite 
194 
 
appears to be true. Middle class mothers are more likely to stay at home until their 
children reach secondary school age, as shown in Table 6.8. Korean mothers’ labour 
market behaviour, both lower class and middle class, was found overall to go against the 
expectations of Goldthorpe’s version of class-differentiated utilitarian RAT. If Korean 
mothers’ labour market behaviour contradicts class-based RAT, this suggests strongly 
that RAT does not explain fully Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour. Therefore, a 
more appropriate explanation seems necessary. 
 
In relation to this, Duncan (2005:73) argues that the cultural perspective is more fruitful 
in explaining mothers’ behaviour as a response to their class conditioning. Duncan 
(2005:62) questions how to explain the ‘primarily’ mothering role taken by most high-
income middle class wives despite their higher human capital, and further doubts 
whether these groups of mothers act rationally, based on his qualitative research 
observation of British case that although middle and upper class mothers, with their 
greater ability to obtain higher paid and more satisfying jobs under better conditions, 
had a far greater choice of employment than the working class, many of them stayed at 
home. Most importantly, Duncan (2005:68) pointed out that the traditional class 
hierarchy was disrupted in terms of career orientation, from the evidence that a 
considerable number of mothers from the working class had higher career orientation 
than middle class (high-income) wives. This suggests strongly that ‘the class patterning 
of values and choices do[es] not always follow the class patterning of resources’ 
(Duncan, 2005:62). Consequently, Duncan (2005:68) argued that gendered moral 
rationalities about combining paid work with mothering were over-represented in the 
middle class rather than in the lower class. In this respect, Vincent and Ball (2006:163) 
also found in their research that traditional gendered division of domestic responsibility 
seems more apparent amongst middle class women. 
 
In short, the gender difference being more evident in the middle class could be seen as 
the result of the interaction between gender norms and the class system. This explains 
why middle class women tend to stay at home, because they value mothers’ own care 
more than continuing their careers through paying for market-based childcare, whereas 
middle class men carry on with their careers. However, the question of why middle 
class women are over-represented in the non-working group remains unanswered. 
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Regarding this, Duncan’s class-differentiated ‘cultural construction’ understanding of 
motherhood’s underlying preferences and rationality seems more fruitful than theories 
focusing on classless individualised preference (Hakim) and class-based rationalities 
(Goldthorpe). Duncan’s class-based culturally bound motherhood explains more 
adequately Korean middle class mothers’ labour market behaviour. 
 
 
6.8  Conclusion 
 
 
From the frequency analyses and recursive cross-sectional logistic regression analyses 
over the sample years, it was found that there are gender inequalities and class divisions 
in labour market participation. Firstly, middle class mothers were more likely to stay at 
home while their partners – fathers – engage in paid work. Secondly, middle class 
mothers were more likely to stay at home compared to lower class mothers, whereas 
middle class fathers were more likely to be employed than lower class fathers. Lastly, it 
was observed that there was class-differentiated investment in children’s education and 
the belief in social mobility. Upper class and middle class mothers spent more money on 
their children’s education, whereas the majority of lower class mothers did not pay for 
any private education for their children, reflecting their lack of available funds to do this. 
Most importantly, middle class women tended to believe in the possibility of upward 
social mobility whereas lower class women tended not to. In addition, it was observed 
that the greater the spending on children’s education and the greater the belief in social 
mobility, the more likely they were to stay at home. The statistics from the logistic 
regression analysis was significant only for the upper/middle classes, not the lower class, 
which implies that it is the middle class mothers, rather than the lower class ones, whose 
behaviour seems more related to social mobility efforts.   
 
In sum, there was ‘class-differentiated’ labour market behaviour among Korean mothers 
and also middle class mothers’ labour market behaviour was found to be closely 
associated with upward social mobility efforts. It seems that socially and culturally 
bound normative motherhood is more evident in the middle class in Korea. Overall, the 
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analysis of Korean mothers’ class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts the 
expectation that middle class women with better human capital expect to combine 
motherhood with substantial employment opportunities. This behaviour is explained by 
the class-based culturalist perspective; that is, the class-specific cultural construction of 
the understanding of motherhood.   
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
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This thesis applied a quantitative approach, using large-scale survey data, the Korea 
Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS), to examine the research question: what factors 
account for the low level of maternal employment in Korea? The literature review 
revealed that that has been little research taking a comprehensive approach through 
incorporating individual factors such as human capital and the spouse’s job, in addition 
to children, and structural factors including class, in particular. Thus, this thesis 
explored the research question from a theoretical basis and developed hypotheses 
accommodating both individual and structural factors to permit an enquiry into which 
factors – individual or cultural/structural – offer the best explainations and finally set 
out to provide an understanding of maternal employment in Korean-specific cultural 
and structural contexts, in line with the structuralist perspectives.  
 
Chapter 2 illuminated individual factors such as work attitudes and culturally-specific 
gender-role attitudes, and structural factors such as labour market, welfare regimes and 
class difference within the Korean context, based on the relevant theoretical debates. In 
light of structural perspectives, the thesis paid particular attention to Korean-specific 
developments in the labour market structure, such as the low incidence of part-time 
employment and high incidence of self-employment, which may have a potential impact 
on mothers’ labour market behaviour, although it is hard to examine whether they are 
associated with maternal employment, due to the limitations of the KLIPS where no 
related questions are available. Chapter 3 elaborated the survey data and various 
statistical models chosen for examining the hypotheses regarding the labour force 
participation by Korean mothers below the age of 65 with work experience and children 
age under 19. Again, it was acknowledged that there were research limitations arising 
from the restrictions of the survey data; for instance, the unavailability of questions for 
assessing gender-role attitude and work attitudes as well as questions for non-working 
women’s work commitment (possibly from a job held previsously), and other statistical 
issues such as repeating and splitting data and the very low values of the model chi-
square. 
 
Chapter 4 examined whether there is any link between individual factors, including 
situational factors such as human capital, children and spouse’s job, and Korean 
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mothers’ labour market participation. Chapters 5 and 6 examined whether structural and 
cultural factors, measured by workplace practices, corporate welfare (employee 
benefits) and childcare/education costs, and class identity, are associated with mothers’ 
labour market participation. With the full recognition of the statistical issues mentioned 
above, as well as the generalization issues in some results from the linear regression 
models in the analysis chapters – although they are still meaningful to the study sample 
– Chapter 7 now presents the main findings from Chapters 4 to 6, discusses the 
implications for the policy debates and the research contributions, and lastly suggests 
areas for future research. 
 
 
7.1  Individual factors and mothers’ labour market participation 
 
 
Chapter 4 examined the first and second hypothesis through the one way-ANOVA 
analysis or logistic and linear regression analyses, whether individual factors such as 
human capital factors, work commitment, education and job experience, and situational 
factors such as children's age and spouse’s job, were statistically significant and 
positively or negatively associated with Korean mothers’ labour market participation. 
The chapter also identified whether there was any difference by gender, in terms of 
motherhood and fatherhood. The statistical results showed that work commitment was 
not significantly associated with maternal employment, apart from work experience, 
which was significant throughout the study years. However, situational factors such as 
spouse’s job and children age were significantly associated with maternal employment. 
Thus, the first hypothesis of human capital factors was not supported fully but only in 
part, whereas the second hypothesis of situational factors was strongly supported. 
 
Firstly, while there was no gender difference in the work commitment of mothers and 
fathers from the one-way ANOVA analysis, which found the statistics insignificant, 
there were gender differences in employment by age, education, job experience and 
career interruptions, from the cross-tabulation analyses of human capital factors. 
Mothers with older ages and higher education levels were far more likely to be in non-
employment than fathers in the same situation. It was also found that overall, mothers 
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had less work experience and more career interruptions than fathers. Secondly, the 
logistic regression analyses throughout the study years found that education and work 
commitments were not statistically significant overall, but work experience was 
positively associated with the probability of mothers being employed. With regard to 
work commitment from the linear regression analysis, it was observed that mothers’ 
work commitment was not significantly associated with the number of children, 
irregular employment, work experience or employment interruptions. Rather, it was 
linked to age, education and experiences of discrimination. Also, it was found that work 
experience and higher education are negatively associated with employment 
interruptions. More importantly, as seen from the logistic regression analysis, children’s 
age cohorts were found to be statistically critical to mothers’ labour market participation.  
 
It appears that regardless of the education level, mothers’ labour market behaviour is 
linked to children's age. Children’s age cohorts of 0 to 5 and 12 to 18 were, respectively, 
negatively and positively associated in the models across the selected years, while the 
age cohort of 6 to 11 was not significant overall (in 2006, it was significant but 
negatively associated). That is, mothers were less likely to take up employment while 
they had younger children under the age of 6, but as their children reach school age, 
particularly after primary school age, mothers tended to take up employment. This 
suggests clearly that lifestyle preferences change in accordance with the family’s life 
cycle. With regard to the pre-schooler effects, perhaps more mothers with younger 
children could keep their employment when adequate childcare leave or flexible work 
arrangements were provided, considering that they might be willing to leave older 
dependent children in the care of someone else or the school but might not be willing to 
leave younger dependent children in the same way. Lastly, all spouse factors were 
significantly associated with mothers’ employment in all the models; male spouse’s pay 
was negatively associated (this is the case with the counterpart) while a spouse in self-
employment rather than permanent employment was positively associated, presumably 
due either to the fact that self-employed businesses are more likely to be precarious in 
Korea or that both husband and wife work together. The lower paid and precarious 
employment of the male spouse was more likely to make mothers take up employment, 
which has class implications. 
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The rationale for these hypotheses was to provide a critical investigation into the 
neoclassical individualist arguments, particularly the human capital theory and 
preference theory. Superficially, the arguments of the human capital theorists appear to 
be supported, looking from the statistical analysis results that work experience was 
significant in the take-up of employment and that mothers had more employment 
interruptions than fathers. However, the regression analysis on work commitment and 
employment interruptions showed the results that employment interruptions were linked 
not to mothers’ work commitment but to the family life cycle, and this could support the 
structuralist arguments. These contrast with the arguments of the human capital theory 
and preference theory, which assume that women make less effort to work, implicitly 
due to their having lower career aspirations. 
 
In short, their children’s age is critical and Korean mothers’ lifestyle preferences change 
according to the family’s life cycle. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that 
work commitment is not different between the genders and is not one of the factors 
closely related to mothers’ interrupted careers. Therefore, married women’s labour force 
participation cannot be fully explained from the neoclassical perspective, either by the 
human capital theory or by the preference theory. 
 
 
7.2  Gender regime and mothers’ labour market participation 
 
 
Chapter 5 examined the third and fourth hypotheses. First of all, the analysis of the third 
hypothesis examined whether culturally-specific workplace practices such as the 
experience of discrimination and work-hours (overtime work in the multivariate 
analysis) were significantly associated with mothers’ labour market parcipation, through 
a multiple-response analysis, cross-tabulation analysis and linear regression analysis. 
Chapter 5 paid attention to whether these practices differed according to gender and, in 
particular, by employment status. In relation to the fourth hypothesis, parental welfare 
and childcare expenses were analysed, mainly by cross-tabulation analysis and linear-
regression analysis. The statistical results confirmed the third and fourth hypotheses to 
be supported overall, either by logistic or linear regression analysis. 
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Firstly, the analysis of the third hypothesis from the cross-tabulation analyses found 
gender differences in the take-up and payment of low-paid and low status jobs, along 
with discrimination and promotion experiences, strongly suggesting that mothers’ 
employment behaviour bears some relationship to the gender-biased characteristics of 
the Korean labour market. The multivariate analyses showed that mothers’ pay, irregular 
employment and discrimination experiences were significantly associated with the 
number of employment break-offs; pay was negatively associated with mothers’ 
employment interruptions while irregular employment and discrimination experiences 
were positively associated. This suggests that the low employment status of mothers, as 
seen by their concentration in low-paid and irregular employment, has a negative link to 
mothers’ careers. In other words, if women are paid fairly and employed in regular 
rather than casual work, they enter and leave the labour market less often.  
 
In addition, the statistical analyses, including the frequency analysis and linear 
regression, indicated that there was a significant association between the long work-
hour culture and mothers’ labour market participation. The frequency analysis found 
that mothers worked almost as long as fathers and the work-hours in flexible work such 
as casual and part-time jobs where mothers are concentrated were not much shorter than 
those of full-time jobs. In particular, no great gender difference in work-hours was 
found, which suggested that long work-hours are likely to be a problem for mothers but 
not fathers. The multivariate analysis confirmed this by showing that overtime work 
was positively associated with mothers’ career interruptions and that long work-hours 
contributed to mothers’ interrupted employment but not fathers’.   
 
Secondly, concerning the fourth hypothesis, the cross-tabulation analysis of childcare 
costs found that there is a higher burden on childminding costs and a higher childcare 
cost share of household income, implying that high childcare costs due to a lack of 
adequate government support may be a significant barrier faced by mothers wishing to 
resume their careers. However, the logistic regression analysis models showed that 
childcare cost was positively associated with mothers’ labour market behaviour, unlike 
the expectation that it might have a potential negative association, while suggesting that 
more childcare costs were paid by working mothers who needed to pay for childcare. 
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With regard to parental welfare, the frequency analysis results of corporate welfare 
showed there was a gender difference in the entitlements to corporate welfare 
(employee benefits) including parental welfare benefits. According to the linear 
regression model, parental welfare was significantly associated with mothers’ labour 
market behaviour, finding that parental welfare was negatively associated with mothers’ 
employment interruptions. 
  
In short, the overall analysis results suggest that there is inequality in the labour market, 
as well as higher childcare costs, and a long work-hour culture in Korea. Workplace 
practices (in terms of pay, promotion, discrimination and low support for parental 
welfare) were found to be highly gender-biased. It is suggested that these are possibly 
significant barriers to mothers’ labour market participation, and also that mothers could 
be re-oriented towards employment if working conditions were improved, especially for 
irregular/casual work, in terms of pay, work-hours and welfare, along with addressing 
discrimination issues. 
 
 
7.3  Class differentiated mothering and mothers’ labour market 
participation 
 
 
The last analysis in Chapter 6 examined the fifth hypothesis – which was concerned 
with class-differentiated mothering and labour market participation and whether there is 
any difference between the classes in expenditure on children’s education – mainly 
through a logistic regression analysis, with the supplementary analysis of cross-
tabulations, including the chi-square test. The study found that class-differentiated 
mothering is significantly associated with Korean mothers’ labour market participation. 
Thus, the fifth hypothesis is supportive in that class identity was a strong predictor of 
the probability of mothers being employed. 
 
Firstly, from the cross-tabulation analyses and cross-sectional logistic regression 
analyses recursively tested over the study years, it was observed that there are gender 
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inequalities and class divisions in labour market behaviour. Middle class identity was 
negatively associated with mothers’ labour market behaviour, but positively associated 
with fathers’ labour market behaviour. That is, middle class mothers are more likely to 
stay at home compared to lower class women, whereas middle class men are more 
likely to be employed than lower class men. A further analysis of Korean mothers’ 
labour market behaviour predicted by the interaction between class and children’s age 
cohorts observed that all the classes with children aged 0 to 5 were negatively 
associated with maternal employment, implying that regardless of their class identity, 
middle class and lower class mothers both tend to stay at home when they have young 
children under the age of 6. As to the interaction between class and the children’s age 
cohort 6 to 11 (primary school age), middle class mothers’ employment tends to have 
negative association while lower class mothers’ employment tends not to, implying that 
lower class mothers are far more likely than middle class mothers to be employed when 
their children reach school age. Finally, all the classes with children aged 12 to 18 were 
positively associated with mothers’ labour market participation. Korean mothers from 
both the middle and lower classes are more likely to be in work; however, the 
significance level was greater for lower class than middle class mothers. Overall, lower 
class mothers are fare more likely to be in the labour market after their child reaches 
primary school age, while middle class mothers tend to delay their employment for 
longer. 
 
Secondly, class-differentiated investment in children’s education and beliefs in the 
possibility of social mobility were observed from the cross-tabulation analysis. Upper 
class and middle class mothers spend more money on their children’s education, 
whereas the majority of lower class mothers do not spend or pay for any private 
education for their children, reflecting their lack of available funds to do so. Most 
importantly, middle class women tend to believe in the possibility of upward social 
mobility whereas lower class women tend not to. In addition, from the logistic analyses, 
it was observed that roughly, child education costs and social mobility beliefs were 
negatively associated with mothers’ labour market behaviour. That is, mothers who 
spend more on private child education and believe in social mobility are more likely to 
stay at home than those who do neither. The child education costs and social mobility 
beliefs may explain rather clearly why upper/middle class women are more likely to 
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stay at home, reflecting the tendency to buy time for social mobility-related activities 
such as arranging and managing their children’s education. 
 
Overall, the statistical analyses strongly suggested that socially and culturally bound 
normative motherhood was more evident in the middle class in Korea, providing 
evidence that Korean mothers’ class-based labour market behaviour clearly contradicts 
the expectation of the rational action theory (RAT) that middle class women with better 
human capital expect to combine motherhood with substantial employment 
opportunities. In sum, there is ‘class-differentiated’ labour market behaviour among 
Korean mothers and also middle class motherhood seems to be highly associated with 
upward social mobility efforts. Particular attention was paid to the phenomenon of 
middle class mothers’ over-representation in the non-working sector in Korea, with the 
argument that this is better explained by Duncan’s class-based cultural perspective 
rather than Goldthorpe’s RAT. 
 
 
7.4  Concluding discussions from the main findings and 
implications for the policy concerning married women’s 
employment 
 
 
First of all, to summarize the relevance of the thesis’ hypotheses proposed in the method 
chapter: apart from the first hypothesis of individual factors, the rest were found to be 
supportive overall; for the first hypothesis of individual factors, it was found that work 
commitment did not have a significant association with mothers’ take-up of employment 
nor with employment interruptions, apart from work experience. Therefore, the first 
hypothesis of human capital factors was not fully supported in this thesis. On the other 
hand, the second, third, fourth and fifth hypotheses of situational and structural factors 
were found to be supported either by logistic or linear regression analysis: situational 
factors such as children’s age and spouse’s job characteristics (the second hypothesis), 
workplace practices such as discrimination experiences, a long work-hours culture and 
discriminatory welfare provision by employment status (the third and fourth 
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hypotheses), and lastly the class factors (the fifth hypothesis) were observed to be 
significantly associated with mothers’ labour market participation. 
 
Synthesizing the observations from the analysis results of Chapters 4, 5 and 6, Korean 
mothers’ labour market behaviour is closely linked to children’s ages, particularly, pre-
school ages, but this is differentiated by class. Overall, the pre-schooler effects are 
similar between classes; that is, a non-working tendency is found to be pronounced with 
mothers across classes who have young children under the age of 6. However, when 
their child reaches primary school age, lower class mothers tend to be employed 
afterwards, while middle class mothers tend to be delaying their return for longer, 
probably due to culturally-constructed middle class motherhood or upward social 
mobility efforts. Most of all, it is due to the different reality faced by each class; that is, 
middle class mothers can afford to delay whereas lower class mothers cannot. 
Furthermore, presuming from the evidence of Korean mothers’ careers being interrupted 
because of unreliable employment conditions and the pressure to work overtime, the 
gender biased workplace and welfare regimes could be a significant barrier for middle 
class mothers’ taking up jobs, while they are able to delay employment because they are 
in a better economic situation relative to the lower class. Therefore, Korean mothers’ 
labour market behaviour is closely linked to culturally-bounded motherhood, including 
class-based motherhood and structural constraints such as gender biased workplace and 
welfare regimes, and these factors therefore lead to the low level of maternal 
employment in Korea. 
 
The implications for the policy from the findings of the thesis are largely threefold: 
firstly, policy mechanisms supporting maternal employment must be developed linked 
to children’s ages, particularly pre-school and primary school ages, and necessarily 
enhance the currently available nursery school system as well as after-school care 
schemes. Secondly, a range of workplace reforms are required in order to encourage 
mothers to continue working or return to work after short breaks to have children by 
removing the obstacles to equality and enhancing the measures to tackle the long work-
hour culture as well as legally reinforcing the right to take up parental welfare packages. 
Thirdly, the class difference in maternal employment points to a policy that is essential 
for reducing the class gap in mothering experiences by legally reinforcing the right for 
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all working mothers to take up parental welfare packages. More specifically, in order to 
reduce the pre-schooler effects pronounced across classes and on gender, a workplace 
culture where both mothers and fathers are encouraged to take up childcare leave (leave 
of absence) or flexible work arrangements is crucial. Extended childcare leave or 
benefits and flexible work arrangements could be the alternative to one-to-one care on 
their own, particularly valued by middle class mothers, and could also relieve the work 
and family conflict of lower class mothers. Furthermore, to help parents with primary 
school children, measures to extend the school hours of the lower level primary school 
children or lower the age to start primary school could be significant, as the current 
situation is that Korean children start primary school at age 7, and children in the 1st 
and 2nd year who need after-school care finish school earlier in the day than children at 
the higher level of primary school. With primary school children, therefore, it seems 
necessary to extend support for families to enable them to access good quality after-
school clubs.   
 
In conclusion, the thesis demonstrates a strong implication that culturally constructed 
class-specific motherhood, emphasizing women as the main childcarers and managers 
of children’s education, has contributed to Korean mothers with younger dependent 
children being over-represented in the non-working sector and consequently 
aggravating the social class differences in women’s labour force participation and in 
their children’s care and education. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the 
class gap and gender-bias in Korean society today. 
 
 
7.5  Contribution of this DPhil and possibilities for future 
research 
 
 
This thesis is important and unique as the first attempt at a comprehensive research 
permitting the examinination of both individualist and structuralist perspectives 
concerning women’s labour force participation in Korea, using a quantitative approach 
without gender bias and using large-scale survey data. Empirically, this thesis carefully 
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developed a study of maternal employment, taking a different approach from the 
conventional research into married women’s employment by focusing on mothers with 
dependent children under 19 and providing a comparison between employment and 
other patterns of mothers and fathers, whereas previous research of women’s 
employment was focused on married women, not on mothers; for instance, the research 
by Kim (1999) or Jang and Bu (2003), as there are very few mothers in Korea who are 
not married. Furthermore, the thesis provided a more comprehensive research 
framework which accommodatd both individual and structural variables, quering which 
factors best explain Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour. Finally, the thesis makes 
a contribution to the literature by finding evidence more in agreement with the 
structuralist arguments; that is, identifying that the low level of maternal employment in 
Korea is closely related to a gendered labour market and welfare regime such as the 
long work-hour culture and low parental welfare. In particular, the thesis’s unique 
perspective is in linking mothers’ labour market behaviour to their class identity, which 
is rarely explored in the literature, and thereby finding that class identity is a significant 
predictor of maternal employment.  
 
In short, despite the data limitations, this thesis makes a contribution to the structuralist 
arguments surrounding women’s labour force participation. It also provides a critique of 
the policy logic of the Korean gender-biased labour market and welfare regimes, and 
how class works in Korean society, factors which have contributed to the low level of 
maternal employment in the country overall as well as the class division in mothers’ 
labour market behaviour. Lastly, future work could address the methodological and data 
limitations encountered by this research as a result of using the quantitative approach 
(given that coupling the quantitative research with a qualitative approach might better 
explain women’s labour market behaviour) and the limitations of the dataset (the 
unavailability of questions of attitudes). As noted earlier, national and historical-specific 
developments in labour market structure have a potential impact on women’s labour 
force participation, and so the research could be extended by exploring whether the 
availability of employment-flexibility (that is, part-time work) is associated with 
maternal employment taking a qualitative approach.   
 
In addition, there is an argument to note here for future research: according to Hakim 
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(2008:87), changes in mainstream industries such as from agriculture to manufacturing, 
and from manufacturing to service industries, mean that role segregation patterns have 
also changed from the egalitarian family role model (in the era when agriculture was the 
main industry) to the sex-segregated role model (in the era of the manufacturing 
industry), and to a compromising role model (in the era of the service industries). That 
is, agricultural work allows labourers a considerable amount of flexibility whereas 
manufacturing work does not, and while service work again allows workers greater 
flexibility compared with work in the manufacturing industry, it is not as flexible as 
agricultural work. Under this assumption, further research could examine the 
relationships (association) between industrial changes and women’s gender-role 
attitudes or the gender division of labour. Such research would be extremely interesting 
if it were possible to identify whether industrial changes are related to women’s labour 
market behaviour. 
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Table 2.A  Male employment rate by employment status from 1982
*
 (except the 
farming/fishing sector) 
 
Non-wage workers Wage workers 
Self-
employed 
Nonpaid family 
workers 
Sub-total Permanent Temporary Casual(daily) Sub-total 
1982 29.5 1.9 31.4 52.0 7.0 9.6 68.6 
1988 25.9 1.1 27.1 48.1 15.9 8.8 72.9 
1989 25.2 1.2 26.3 48.4 16.5 8.8 73.7 
1990 25.0 1.1 26.1 48.3 16.3 9.3 73.9 
1997 27.8 0.9 28.7 46.3 16.2 8.9 71.3 
1998 28.5 1.0 29.5 45.9 16.6 8.0 70.5 
1999 28.4 1.2 29.6 42.5 18.1 9.9 70.4 
2000 28.5 1.2 29.6 41.9 18.6 9.8 70.4 
2001 29.0 1.3 30.3 42.3 18.4 9.0 69.7 
2002 29.1 1.2 30.3 41.2 18.4 10.1 69.7 
2003 29.3 1.0 30.2 42.9 18.0 8.9 69.8 
2004 28.8 1.0 29.7 43.5 17.9 8.8 70.3 
Source: Table <2-4>, Keum et al. (2006 :12-3).  Note: * Some years dropped from the original table.  
 
Table 2.B  Female employment rates by employment status from 1982
*
 (except the 
farming/fishing sector) 
 
Non-waged workers Waged workers 
Self-
employed 
Nonpaid 
family workers 
Sub-total Permanent Temporary Casual(daily) Sub-total 
1982 25.5 19.7 45.2 37.3 12.2 5.3 54.8 
1988 21.2 15.1 36.3 26.2 26.7 10.8 63.7 
1989 18.0 13.7 31.6 27.1 27.1 14.1 68.4 
1990 16.9 13.8 30.8 26.8 28.1 14.3 69.2 
1997 18.6 13.4 32.0 26.5 31.0 10.5 68.0 
1998 18.2 14.7 32.9 23.7 32.4 11.0 67.1 
1999 18.5 13.7 32.2 21.5 31.4 14.9 67.8 
2000 17.9 13.3 31.3 21.8 32.3 14.6 68.7 
2001 18.2 12.7 30.9 23.3 32.4 13.5 69.1 
2002 18.0 12.1 30.0 23.9 32.5 13.6 70.0 
2003 16.5 11.9 28.3 25.7 34.5 11.5 71.7 
2004 17.4 10.6 27.9 26.9 33.7 11.5 72.1 
Source: Table <2-5>, Keum et al. (2006 :14).  Note: * Some years dropped from the original table.  
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Table 2.C  Labour force participation rates of older women aged between 55 and 59 in 
the selected OECD member countries 
 2000 2002 2005 2006 2009 
Australia 47.1 50.3 54.5 58.2 63.3 
Austria 25.8 33.7 39.0 41.9 49.7 
Canada 53.1 54.5 60.4 62.3 67.1 
Denmark 67.7 73.5 79.9 79.2 78.0 
Finland 66.7 71.8 72.5 74.8 79.0 
France 52.0 53.3 54.1 54.7 59.4 
Germany 55.7 58.2 64.5 65.7 68.9 
Iceland 80.2 86.9 87.3 88.6 87.5 
Ireland 35.2 37.8 46.0 48.4 52.1 
Japan 58.7 58.1 60.0 60.3 62.5 
Korea 51.3 49.6 49.1 49.7 51.9 
Netherlands 38.6 42.8 47.1 50.9 62.0 
New Zealand 59.6 62.4 71.9 71.7 74.6 
Norway 71.8 74.6 71.9 71.7 75.2 
Portugal 47.7 50.6 53.1 51.4 55.6 
Spain 28.2 30.6 37.7 39.6 48.0 
Sweden 79.5 79.7 79.7 80.4 81.6 
Switzerland 67.1 67.9 70.8 71.9 74.4 
United Kingdom 57.6 59.5 63.6 64.3 67.2 
United States 61.4 63.8 65.6 66.7 68.5 
G7 countries 55.4 57.3 60.1 61.0 64.1 
North America 56.0 58.0 60.3 61.4 63.4 
OECD countries 49.4 51.1 53.7 54.6 57.7 
Source: LFS, OECD Stats (2011).  
 
Table 2.D  The expense of private tuition paid by married women (aged in their 30s 
and 40s) for education, and total household earnings per month (total N: 1,025) 
Approximate amount spent by married 
women’s education level 
The level of total household earnings (in pounds sterling*) 
Secondary education 
and lower 
£250 
Less than £15,000 
(lower earning class) 
£130 
College or university 
graduates and upper 
 
£300 
£15,000 and above but below £25,000 
(upper middle class earnings) 
£240 
£25,000 and above but below £35,000 
(lower middle class earnings) 
£320 
£35,000 and above 
(upper earning class) 
£360 
Source: derived from Figure 3-17, Choi (2008:39).  Note: * applied by Korean and British currency 
exchange rate (2,000 won: 1 pound)  
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Table 2.E The use of private education institutes or (state/private) nurseries by 
employed and non-employed women with pre-school age children (aged under 7) 
 Employed (%) Non-employed (%) Total cases 
Non-using 30.1 44.5 1,047 
Using 69.9 55.5 1,490 
The number 
using education 
institutes or 
nursery  
1 25.2 74.8 1,243 
2 26.3 73.7 173 
3 25.1 74.9 39 
4 75.6 24.4 5 
5 0.0 100.0 1 
Total (cases, N) 568 1,969 2,537 
Source: <Table V-5-36>, Park et al. (2008:187).  Note: 30 respondents refused to answer for the number 
using institutes or nursery. 
 
Table 2.F  The use of private education institutes by children’s school level and 
mothers’ employment (percentage, N) 
 The number of private education 
institutes (including private tutors) 
Total  
(cases, N) 
1 2 3 4 
Employed Children at primary school 55.5% 31.6% 12.1% 0.7% 621 
Children at middle school 80.1% 16.9% 3.0% 0.0% 270 
Children at high school 90.0% 9.6% 0.4% 0.0% 192 
No-school  56.9% 24.9% 18.1% 0.0% 7 
Non-
employed 
Children at primary school 49.4% 37.8% 11.9% 0.9% 1,245 
Children at middle school 85.7% 12.8% 1.6% 0.0% 350 
Children at high school 90.2% 9.8% 0.0% 0.0% 221 
No-school 78.4% 21.6% 0.0% 0.0% 4 
Total  Frequency (cases, N) 1,875 796 225 15 2,911 
Percentage 64.4% 27.3% 7.7% 0.5% 100% 
Note: 23 respondents refused to give the number of private education institutions used. 
Source: p189, <Table V-5-39>, Park, S-M. et al. (2008).   
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Table 3.A  Pearson correlation model 1 for married women with work experience (up to 
June 1998)  
 
Employed 
or not 
Age 
Educa-
tion 
Class 
identity 
Child 
aged 0 
to 5 
Child 
aged 6 
to11 
Child 
aged 
12 to18 
Child 
cost 
House-
hold 
income 
Employed  
or not 
1
a
       
3491         
Age 
-.171
**
 
3491 
1 
3491        
Education 
.118
**
 
3490 
-.710
**
 
3490 
1 
3490       
Class 
Identity 
b
 
.031 
3450 
.239
**
 
3450 
-.362
**
 
3449 
1 
3450      
Child 
aged 
0 to 5 
-.225
**
 
1535 
-.360
**
 
1535 
.145
**
 
1535 
-.067
**
 
1523 
1 
1535     
Child 
aged 
6 to11 
-.064
*
 
1535 
-.073
**
 
1535 
.019 
1535 
-.013 
1523 
-.214
**
 
1535 
1 
1535    
Child 
aged 
12 to18 
.221
**
 
1535 
.305
**
 
1535 
-.123
**
 
1535 
.069
**
 
1523 
-.503
**
 
1535 
-.405
**
 
1535 
1 
1535   
Child cost 
.069
**
 
1535 
.005 
1535 
.227
**
 
1535 
-.330
**
 
1523 
-.145
**
 
1535 
.161
**
 
1535 
.198
**
 
1535 
1 
1535  
Househ'd 
income 
.076
**
 
3295 
-.151
**
 
3295 
.257
**
 
3294 
-.332
**
 
3260 
-.076
**
 
1521 
.060
*
 
1521 
.018 
1521 
.392
**
 
1521 
1 
3295 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N);  a.“1” is 
printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174);  b. class identity category values are: 1 for 
high class, 2 for middle class, 3 for low class.  Source: KLIPS 9
th
 wave (2006)                             
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Continued from Model 1 in Table 3.A... 
 
Employed 
or not 
Job 
exp. 
N. 
jobs 
Discrimi
-nation 
Corp. 
welfare 
Metro
- area 
Soc-
mobil 
Sp: wt 
Sp: 
pay 
Sp: 
wage 
job 
Employed  
or not 
1
a
       
3491 
         
Job exp. 
-.034
*
 
3491 
1 
3491 
        
Discrimi-
nation 
.011 
2991 
-.031 
2991 
.077
**
 
2991 
1 
2991 
      
Corporate 
welfare 
.
b
 
731 
-.027 
731 
-.064 
731 
-.016 
654 
1 
731 
     
Metro-area 
-.037
*
 
3491 
-.222
**
 
3491 
.075
**
 
3491 
-.017 
2991 
.059 
731 
1 
3491 
    
Social 
mobility 
-.017 
3491 
.038
*
 
3491 
-.008 
3491 
-.023 
2991 
.014 
731 
-.030 
3491 
1 
3491 
   
Spouse 
work hours 
.043
*
 
2194 
-.026 
2194 
.049
*
 
2194 
.013 
1895 
-.032 
493 
.002 
2194 
-.012 
2194 
1 
2194 
  
Spouse 
pay 
-.069
**
 
2137 
-.115
**
 
2137 
-.029 
2137 
-.042 
1845 
.194
**
 
488 
.087
**
 
2137 
.044
*
 
2137 
.016 
2132 
1 
2137 
 
Spouse: 
waged job 
-.205
**
 
2200 
-.243
**
 
2200 
.025 
2200 
.049
*
 
1901 
.035 
494 
.073
**
 
2200 
.016 
2200 
-.137
**
 
2194 
-.035 
2137 
1 
2200 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N);  a.“1” is 
printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174);  b. “.” is printed if a coefficient cannot be 
computed.  Source: KLIPS 9
th
 wave (2006)                             
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Table 3.B  Pearson correlation model 2 for married women with job experience (before 
the 1st survey) and aged under 65 
 
Employed 
or not 
Age Education 
Class 
identity 
No. of 
children 
aged 0 
to 5 
No. of 
children 
aged 6 
to11 
No. of 
children 
aged 
12 to18 
Child 
cost 
Annual 
income 
Employed  
or not 
1
 a
 
2931 
        
Age 
.021 
2931 
1 
2931 
       
Education 
-.033 
2931 
-.545
**
 
2931 
1 
2931 
      
Class 
identity 
b
 
.076
**
 
2909 
.136
**
 
2909 
-.327
**
 
2909 
1 
2909 
     
Children 
aged 
0 to 5 
-.241
**
 
1474 
-.492
**
 
1474 
.177
**
 
1474 
-.064
*
 
1465 
1 
1474 
    
Children 
aged 
6 to11 
-.067
*
 
1474 
-.148
**
 
1474 
.052
*
 
1474 
-.010 
1465 
-.212
**
 
1474 
1 
1474 
   
Children 
aged 
12 to18 
.233
**
 
1474 
.458
**
 
1474 
-.173
**
 
1474 
.066
*
 
1465 
-.507
**
 
1474 
-.407
**
 
1474 
1 
1474 
  
Child cost 
.064
*
 
1474 
.080
**
 
1474 
.227
**
 
1474 
-.312
**
 
1465 
-.151
**
 
1474 
.158
**
 
1474 
.208
**
 
1474 
1 
1474 
 
Household 
income 
.047
*
 
2801 
-.051
**
 
2801 
.277
**
 
2801 
-.355
**
 
2781 
-.077
**
 
1460 
.053
*
 
1460 
.021 
1460 
.384
**
 
1460 
1 
2801 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N);  a.“1” is 
printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174);  b. Class identity category values are: 1 for 
high class, 2 for middle class, 3 for low class.  Source: KLIPS 9
th
 wave (2006)                                                        
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Continued from Model 2 in Table 3.B... 
 
Employe
d or not 
Job 
exp. 
N. 
jobs 
Discrimi
-nation 
Corp. 
welfare 
Metro
- area 
Soc-
mobil 
Sp: wt 
Sp: 
pay 
Sp: 
wage 
job 
Employed  
or not 
1
a
       
2931 
         
Job exp. 
.135
**
 
2931 
1 
2931 
        
Discrimi-
nation 
.018 
2522 
-.012 
2522 
.089
**
 
2522 
1 
2522 
      
Corporate 
welfare 
.
a
 
716 
-.004 
716 
-.066 
716 
-.007 
639 
1 
716 
     
Metro-area 
-.054
**
 
2931 
-.116
**
 
2931 
.047
*
 
2931 
-.008 
2522 
.049 
716 
1 
2931 
    
Social 
mobility 
-.020 
2931 
.017 
2931 
-.007 
2931 
-.029 
2522 
.020 
716 
-.019 
2931 
1 
2931 
   
Spouse 
work hours 
.035 
2101 
.006 
2101 
.047
*
 
2101 
.010 
1817 
-.033 
492 
-.008 
2101 
-.001 
2101 
1 
2101 
  
Spouse 
pay 
-.073
**
 
2049 
-.078
**
 
2049 
-.037 
2049 
-.056
*
 
1772 
.193
**
 
487 
.071
**
 
2049 
.043 
2049 
.006 
2045 
1 
2049 
 
Spouse: 
wage job 
-.204
**
 
2106 
-.213
**
 
2106 
.004 
2106 
.048
*
 
1822 
.036 
493 
.048
*
 
2106 
.022 
2106 
-.154
**
 
2101 
-.051
*
 
2049 
1 
2106 
Note: Pearson correlation coefficient; 2-tailed Sig. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 / Cases (N);  a.“1” is 
printed if variables are perfectly correlated (Field, 2005:174);  b. “.” is printed if a coefficient cannot be 
computed.  Source: KLIPS 9
th
 wave (2006)                             
 
Table 3.C  The components of household income and the share (proportion) of each 
component (by household in the 9
th
 wave) 
Household income components Case (N) % of N total The share (%) of total 
household income 
Earning income 4266 66.2 81.2 
Monetary income 504 7.8 1.4 
Premium income 498 7.7 5.2 
Social insurance/benefit income 694 10.8 2.2 
Tax income 2520 39.1 4.7 
Other income 545 8.5 5.2 
Total 6449 100 100 
Source: the author’s analysis of KLIPS, 2005. 
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Table 4.A  The number of unemployment by age cohorts and gender 
Age cohort Lowest to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 to 54 55 to 64 Total N 
Mother 2000 0 10 17 4 0 31 
 
2002 0 8 14 4 0 26 
 
2005 1 10 17 4 0 32 
 
2006 1 12 23 6 0 42 
Father 2000 0 11 27 4 1 43 
 
2002 0 7 17 8 1 33 
 
2005 0 11 18 7 0 36 
 
2006 0 2 23 7 0 32 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. 
 
Table 4.B  The proportions of employment within age cohorts by gender (percentage) 
% within age cohort 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Lowest to 24 28.0 28.0 24.4 36.5 14.0 16.3 13.3 13.0 
25 to 34 42.6 48.1 48.9 50.8 77.8 78.2 77.5 76.9 
35 to 44 55.5 58.1 55.4 55.1 90.7 92.0 91.6 92.2 
45 to 55 52.8 58.6 56.5 57.7 86.1 90.0 87.2 87.9 
56 to 64 35.2 37.6 36.5 38.2 64.0 68.8 70.0 70.6 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. 
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Table 4.C  The number of children in the household by age cohort (percentage, N) 
% (cases, N) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
The number of children 
aged 0 to 5 
0 
64.4 
(1243) 
62.7 
(1159) 
60.7 
(1159) 
60.7 
(1138) 
1 
24.7 
(477) 
28.0 
(518) 
29.4 
(562) 
29.9 
(561) 
2 
10.3 
(198) 
9.0 
(166) 
9.6 
(184) 
9.1 
(171) 
3 
0.6 
(11) 
0.3 
(5) 
0.3 
(5) 
0.2 
(4) 
The number of children 
aged 6 to 11 
0 
57.5 
(1110) 
56.0 
(1034) 
59.9 
(1145) 
60.0 
(1124) 
1 
27.0 
(521) 
29.8 
(551) 
27.1 
(518) 
27.1 
(508) 
2 
14.5 
(280) 
13.7 
(253) 
12.3 
(235) 
12.0 
(225) 
3 
0.9 
(17) 
0.5 
(10) 
0.6 
(12) 
0.9 
(17) 
4 
0.1 
(1) 
. . . 
The number of children 
aged 12 to 18 
0 
52.8 
(1019) 
54.4 
(1006) 
55.1 
(1053) 
55.4 
(1038) 
1 
29.7 
(573) 
28.7 
(530) 
26.9 
(513) 
26.1 
(489) 
2 
16.6 
(321) 
16.1 
(297) 
17.1 
(326) 
17.2 
(322) 
3 
0.7 
(14) 
0.8 
(15) 
0.9 
(18) 
1.3 
(25) 
4 
0.1 
(2) 
. . . 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  
 
Table 4.D  Average earnings and household income by year (unit: 10,000 Korean Won) 
 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Male spouse’s earnings (monthly average) 
160.7341 211.0352 251.8770 265.3719 
Mothers’ earnings (monthly average) 
85.1545 109.7321 145.8000 151.7135 
Household income (yearly average) 
2291.8597 3133.4125 3642.3465 4006.3929 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS. 
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Table 4.E  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by 
year (individual/situational factors) - ‘enter-method’ models 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 
2000 2002 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
The number of children aged 0 to 5 .603*** .60*** .454*** .454*** 
The number of children aged 6 to11 1.041 1.02 .930 .930 
The number of children aged 12 to18 1.514** 1.49** 1.272* 1.274* 
Age .974 .97! .975! .976! 
Education (year) 1.054 1.06 1.027 1.025 
Household income (logged) 7.528*** 7.87*** 4.274*** 4.205*** 
Job experience (retrospective)    1.099*** 1.10*** 1.085*** 1.084*** 
Spouse pay (logged)  .157*** .16*** .178*** .176*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) *** *** *** *** 
 irregular employment 1.568* 1.54! 1.356 1.379 
 self-employment 2.366*** 2.30*** 2.435*** 2.449*** 
Financial difficulty (yes)  1.26  .929 
N 
1382 1382 1404 1402 
-2 Log likelihood 
1558.65 1555.77 1642.32 1640.54 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
338.18*** 341.06*** 302.53*** 301.66*** 
Source: the 3
rd
 wave, KLIPS. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06 
2000, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) =15.07, sig. =.058 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) 
=21.22, sig. =.005 
2002, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) =20.27, sig. =.009 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) 
=18.81, sig. =.016 
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Continued from Table 4.E  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 
2005 2006 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
The number of children aged 0 to 5 .490*** .489*** .495*** .493*** 
The number of children aged 6 to11 .897 .900 .707** .702** 
The number of children aged 12 to18 1.564*** 1.546*** 1.301* 1.280* 
Age .945*** .943*** .939*** .938*** 
Education (year) 1.155* 1.153* 1.145 1.149 
Household income (logged) 8.890*** 9.124*** 12.357*** 12.780*** 
Job experience (retrospective)    1.078*** 1.078*** 1.086*** 1.087*** 
Spouse pay (logged)  .081*** .085*** .072*** .075*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) *** *** *** *** 
 irregular employment 1.473 1.446 1.567 1.542 
 self-employment 2.058*** 2.002*** 2.494*** 2.457*** 
Financial difficulty (yes)  1.176  1.207 
N 
1379 1373 1161 1159 
-2 Log likelihood 
1585.14 1580.40 1317.59 1314.35 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
317.61*** 314.32*** 291.87*** 292.35*** 
Source: the 3
rd
 wave, KLIPS. Legend : * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06 
2005, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) =57.00, sig. =.000 ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) 
=54.16, sig. =.000 
2006, Model 1: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8) =42.28, sig. =.000  ; Model 2: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 
(8) =36.14, sig. =.000 
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Table 4.F  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not by year 
and by gender (individual/situational factors) –for all the steps 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Mother By gender (2006) 
2000 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Step 1 Job experience (retrospective) 1.125***     
 Children aged 0 to 5  .435*** .488***   
 Children aged 12 to 18    1.612***  
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 .502*** .460*** .514***   
Children aged 12 to 18    1.535***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.112*** 1.084*** 1.065*** 1.076***  
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5 .519*** .442*** .501***   
Children aged 12 to 18    1.540***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.112*** 1.087*** 1.066*** 1.071***  
Spouse pay (logged)  .599*** .605*** 1.639***  
Household income (logged) 1.845***     
Step 4 Children aged 0 to 5 .524*** .438*** .514***   
Children aged 12 to 18    1.595***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.106*** 1.084*** 1.060*** 1.063***  
Spouse pay (logged) .195*** .232*** .107*** .096***  
Household income (logged) 6.051*** 3.640*** 7.235*** 9.715***  
Step 5 Children aged 0 to 5 .549*** .452*** .539***   
Children aged 12 to 18    1.518***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.095*** 1.075*** 1.054*** 1.056***  
Spouse pay (logged) .161*** .180*** .097*** .078***  
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** *** *** ***  
 Irregular employment 1.590* 1.335 1.351 1.364  
 Self-employment 2.325*** 2.397*** 1.971*** 2.189***  
Household income (logged) 7.442*** 4.241*** 8.176*** 12.054***  
Step 6 Age    .960**  
Children aged 0 to 5 .648*** .518*** .661***   
Children aged 12 to18 1.351** 1.241* 1.390*** 1.730***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.090*** 1.073*** 1.050** 1.076***  
Spouse pay (logged) .161*** .181*** .095*** .073***  
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** *** *** ***  
 Irregular employment 1.510 1.305 1.305 1.425  
 Self-employment 2.297*** 2.359*** 1.893*** 2.310***  
Household income (logged) 7.464*** 4.204*** 8.275*** 13.205***  
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Continued from Table 4.F  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Mother By gender (2006) 
2000 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Step 7 
(Step 1  
for father) 
Age .971* .975* .942*** .945***  
Children aged 0 to 5 .590*** .480*** .541*** .669**  
Children aged 12 to18 1.462*** 1.326** 1.629*** 1.592***  
Job experience (retrospective) 1.098*** 1.085*** 1.074*** 1.078***  
Spouse pay (logged) .162*** .178*** .085*** .071***  
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** *** *** ***  
 Irregular employment 
1.542(.051)! 
1.348 1.377 1.414  
 Self-employment 2.363*** 2.410*** 2.016*** 2.398***  
Household income (logged) 7.640*** 4.310*** 9.367*** 13.320*** 6.665*** 
Step 8 
(Step 2  
for father) 
Education (year)   1.154*   
Age   .946*** .934***  
Children aged 0 to 5   .535*** .506***  
Children aged 6 to 11    .711**  
Children aged 12 to18   1.663*** 1.289*  
Job experience (retrospective)   1.077*** 1.084***  
Spouse pay (logged)   .081*** .075*** .327** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
  *** ***  
 Irregular employment   1.453 1.473  
 Self-employment   2.054*** 2.454***  
Household income (logged)   8.859*** 12.978*** 12.185*** 
N 1929 1848 1910 1874 1545 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off.  Legend :  * p<0.05 (sig. 
at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%) 
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Continued from Table 4.F  
Model summary Model Chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
Mother 2000 Step 1 102.690*** 1794.135 8.514(.385) 
 Step 2 172.076*** 1724.749 10.887(.208) 
 Step 3 203.298*** 1693.527 10.409(.237) 
 Step 4 283.881*** 1612.945 24.945(.002) 
 Step 5 322.447*** 1574.378 29.333(.000) 
 Step 6 333.436*** 1563.389 22.721(.004) 
 Step 7 337.416*** 1559.410 21.556(.006) 
2002 Step 1 98.475*** 1843.728 7.538 (.006) 
 Step 2 143.209*** 1798.994 19.379 (.013) 
 Step 3 167.251*** 1774.953 13.753 (.088) 
 Step 4 249.009*** 1693.195 12.585 (.127) 
 Step 5 290.604*** 1651.600 21.106 (.007) 
 Step 6 296.521*** 1645.683 19.746 (.011) 
 Step 7 300.622*** 1641.581 22.048 (.005) 
2005 Step 1 72.331*** 1822.389 .512(.474) 
 Step 2 96.004*** 1798.715 9.282(.319) 
 Step 3 117.723*** 1776.997 9.847(.276) 
 Step 4 250.054*** 1644.666 62.409(.000) 
 Step 5 276.109*** 1618.611 64.622(.000) 
 Step 6 290.128*** 1604.592 39.983(.000) 
 Step 7 307.754*** 1586.966 54.434(.000) 
 Step 8 312.030*** 1582.690 52.126(.000) 
2006 Step 1 43.147*** 1563.546 7.623(.006) 
 Step 2 71.044*** 1535.650 9.071(.336) 
 Step 3 93.404*** 1513.289 10.730(.217) 
 Step 4 234.855*** 1371.839 52.626(.000) 
 Step 5 263.048*** 1343.646 52.868(.000) 
 Step 6 270.770*** 1335.924 45.460(.000) 
 Step 7 279.160*** 1327.533 53.659(.000) 
 Step 8 287.554*** 1319.140 41.265(.000) 
Father 2006 Step 1 46.172*** 263.820 21.887(.005) 
 Step 2 58.750*** 251.241 20.009(.010) 
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Table 4.G  Logistic regression (stepwise) analyses on whether employed or not for 
mothers by year (individual/situational factors) – models without the variable, 
household income 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 1 Children aged 0 to 5  .436*** .485***  
 Children aged 12 to 18    1.615*** 
 Job experience (retrospective) 1.126***    
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 .498*** .461*** .511***  
Children aged 12 to 18    1.540*** 
Job experience (retrospective) 1.113*** 1.084*** 1.064*** 1.075*** 
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5 .512*** .443*** .498***  
Children aged 12 to 18    1.550*** 
Job experience (retrospective) 1.106*** 1.086*** 1.065*** 1.077*** 
Spouse pay (logged)  .607*** .605*** .632*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
***    
 irregular employment 1.306    
 self-employment 1.786***    
Step 4 Education (year)    1.265*** 
Children aged 0 to 5 .595*** .456*** .617***  
Children aged 12 to18 1.314**  1.405*** 1.646*** 
Job experience (retrospective) 1.102*** 1.081*** 1.061*** 1.086*** 
Spouse pay (logged)  .545*** .597*** .549*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** ***   
 irregular employment 1.236 1.122   
 self-employment 1.766*** 1.983***   
Step 5 Education (year)   1.287*** 1.301*** 
Children aged 0 to 5 .589*** .529*** .592***  
Children aged 12 to18 1.312** 1.266** 1.496*** 1.597*** 
Job experience (retrospective) 1.101*** 1.078*** 1.069*** 1.084*** 
Spouse pay (logged) .769* .544*** .502*** .551*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** ***  *** 
 irregular employment 1.103 1.092  1.393 
 self-employment 1.801*** 1.957***  1.720*** 
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Continued from Table 4.G  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 6 Education (year) 1.169*  1.310*** 1.329*** 
Children aged 0 to 5 .569*** .522*** .599*** .704** 
Children aged 12 to18 1.374*** 1.284** 1.461*** 1.425*** 
Job experience (retrospective) 1.105*** 1.075*** 1.065*** 1.079*** 
Spouse pay (logged) .695** .491*** .496*** .535*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
*** *** *** *** 
 irregular employment 1.177 1.147 1.107 1.373 
 self-employment 1.847*** 2.039*** 1.679*** 1.753*** 
Financially difficult (dummy)  1.373*   
Step 7 Education (year)  1.134*  1.346*** 
Children aged 0 to 5  .510***  .561*** 
Children aged 6 to 11    .727** 
Children aged 12 to18  1.326**   
Job experience (retrospective)  1.079***  1.080*** 
Spouse pay (logged)  .463***  .545*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
 ***  *** 
 irregular employment  1.222  1.422 
 self-employment  2.096***  1.780*** 
Financially difficult (dummy)  1.346*   
Step 8 Education (year)    1.342*** 
Children aged 0 to 5    .503*** 
Children aged 6 to11    .670*** 
Job experience (retrospective)    1.080*** 
Spouse pay (logged)    .551*** 
Spouse employment status 
(permanent is base case) 
   *** 
 irregular employment    1.446 
 self-employment    1.810*** 
 
N 1929 1848 1910 1874 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off.  
Legend :  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
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Continued from Table 4.G  
Model summary Model Chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
2000 Step 1 103.617*** 1801.819 8.500(.386) 
 Step 2 174.671*** 1730.765 11.272(.187) 
 Step 3 195.160*** 1710.276 12.173(.144) 
 Step 4 205.275*** 1700.161 12.345(.136) 
 Step 5 210.269*** 1695.166 10.772(.215) 
 Step 6 216.677*** 1688.759 4.587(.801) 
2002 Step 1 98.281*** 1852.118 7.494(.006) 
 Step 2 143.077*** 1807.322 19.112(.014) 
 Step 3 166.011*** 1784.389 13.816(.087) 
 Step 4 194.257*** 1756.142 19.449(.013) 
 Step 5 201.761*** 1748.638 16.059(.042) 
 Step 6 208.069*** 1742.330 12.536(.129) 
 Step 7 212.393*** 1738.007 5.531(.700) 
2005 Step 1 73.723*** 1827.478 .545(.461) 
 Step 2 96.936*** 1804.264 10.073(.260) 
 Step 3 118.781*** 1782.420 10.252(.248) 
 Step 4 135.468*** 1765.732 14.074(.080) 
 Step 5 152.865*** 1748.335 9.418(.308) 
 Step 6 169.451*** 1731.750 8.936(.348) 
2006 Step 1 43.479*** 1564.609 7.688(.006) 
 Step 2 70.832*** 1537.255 5.491(.704) 
 Step 3 88.196*** 1519.892 15.673(.047) 
 Step 4 102.302*** 1505.786 1.588(.991) 
 Step 5 118.116*** 1489.971 10.366(.240) 
 Step 6 126.459*** 1481.628 1.555(.992) 
 Step 7 135.504*** 1472.584 3.199(.921) 
 Step 8 134.069*** 1474.018 5.350(.720) 
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Table 4.H  Linear regression analyses on the number of employment break-offsa by 
gender for 2006 (individual/situational factors) - without the variable, job experience  
Statistics: standardized 
coefficients B 
Mother Father 
Step1 Step2 Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 
The number of children       
Age     .204*** .234*** .230*** 
Education (year)  -.141** -.239*** -.210*** -.138*** -.115** 
Household income (logged) -.223*** -.164**   -.162*** -.129** 
Work commitment       -.112** 
Spouse pay (logged)       
Irregular employment (dummy)  
     
Married and living with spouse  
     
F 24.63 16.61 50.23 44.87 37.01 30.47 
Adjusted R-square .05*** .06*** .06*** .10*** .12*** .13*** 
Source: the 9
th
 waves, KLIPS in the year 2006.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a
 employment break-offs 
refer to the number of employment failures including job transitions during the career for the recent and 
retrospective ones.  Legend :  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.I Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work 
commitment - Mother 
Statistics: standardized coefficients B Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 
The number of children
a
     
Age   -.124** -.113** 
Education (years)  .203*** .148** .150** 
Pay  .455*** .361*** .362*** .356*** 
Irregular employment     
Discrimination experience    -.097* 
The number of employment break-offs
b
     
Job experience
b
      
Household income (logged) 
    
F  
131.92 79.24 56.39 44.30 
Adjusted R-square 
.21*** .24*** .25*** .26*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS (2006).  Note:  
a
 statistics with the number of children were very similar with 
those with the three children age cohorts.
  b
 during the career for the recent years between 1998 and 2006.  
Legend:  * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
Continued from Table 4.I - Father 
Statistics: standardized coefficients B Step 1 Step 2 Step 3 Step 4 Step 5 
The number of children
a
      
Age      
Education (years)   .109** .096** .087* 
Pay  .475*** .418*** .370*** .361*** .351*** 
Irregular employment  -.147*** -.134*** -.133*** -.133*** 
Discrimination experience    -.075* -.069* 
The number of employment break-offs
b
     -.067* 
Job experience
b
       
Household income (logged) 
     
F 
224.35 124.06 86.60 66.70 54.43 
Adjusted R-square 
.22*** .24*** .25*** .25*** .26*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS (2006).  Note:  
a
 statistics for the number of children were very similar with 
those for children age cohorts;  
b
 during the career for the recent years between 1998 and 2006.  Legend:  
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table 4.J  Gender difference in the results of linear regression analyses on work 
commitment – ‘enter-method’ analysis models 
Statistics: coefficients B(SE) 
Work commitment 
Mother Father 
Model A Model B Model A Model B 
Constant 9.421***      
(1.925) 
8.105***   
(2.039) 
4.392** 
(1.437) 
3.899*      
(1.588) 
Age 
-.075** 
(.022) 
-.049! 
(.029) 
-.023 
(.017) 
-.016 
(.023) 
Education (years) 
.424** 
(.132) 
.397** 
(.139) 
.378*** 
(.084) 
.343*** 
(.090) 
Recent job experience (years in jobs 
between 1998 and 2006) 
.058* 
(.027) 
.051! 
(.029) 
.059***       
(.017) 
.061*** 
(.017) 
Pay (logged) 1.503*** 
(.277) 
1.637*** 
(.293) 
4.509***     
(.554) 
4.449*** 
(.577) 
Irregular employment -.118 
(.309) 
-.053 
(.327) 
-.962** 
(.306) 
-.880** 
(.319) 
The number of job breaks -.235 
(.309) 
-.171 
(.319) 
-.601* 
(.274) 
-.644* 
(.286) 
The number of children .013    
(.201) 
 
-.013   
(.150) 
 
Discrimination experience  -.286* 
(.120) 
 -.131 
(.107) 
The number of children aged 0 to 5  -.038 
(.333) 
 .274  
(.230) 
The number of children aged 6 to11  .223  
(.242) 
 -.125 
(.170) 
The number of children aged 12 to18  -.298 
(.240) 
 .009  
(.194) 
F 26.92 18.77 42.96 27.90 
Adjusted R-square .24*** .26*** .21*** .22*** 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS (2006).    Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ! < 0.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
248 
 
Table 5.A   Logistic regression on whether employed or not by year and gender 
(gender regime factors) – ‘enter-method’ analysis  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 
Mother Father 
2000 2002 2005 2006 2006 
The number of children aged 0 to 5 .818 .574** .533*** .523*** 1.011 
The number of children aged 6 to11 1.000 .740 .677* .721* .815 
The number of children aged 12 to18 1.500 .804 .983 1.760* 1.102 
Age .996 .999 1.016 1.022 .942** 
Education (year) .832 1.039 1.051 1.095 1.124 
Household income (logged) 2.250* 2.603*** 1.467* 1.817*** 16.776*** 
Discrimination experience 1.187 1.124 .943 1.047 1.065 
Childcare costs (for children under 6
a
) 1.047** 1.012! 1.019*** 1.017*** 1.000 
N 
194 531 809 757 1575 
-2 Log likelihood 
201.48 649.19 976.06 924.83 626.44 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
29.86*** 57.23***
b
 72.56***
b
 78.92*** 69.11*** 
Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS.  Note: 
a  
statistics for fathers are replaced by child costs for all age cohorts 
due to the model goodness-of-fit; 
b 
the models for 2002 and 2005 are insignificant in the 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test within 10% p-value.   Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06 
For mothers, 2000: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8)=13.72, sig. =.090 ; 2002: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 
(8)=6.54, sig.=.587
a
 ; 2005: Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (8)=12.62, sig.=.126
a
 ; 2006: Hosmer&Lemeshow 
test x
2
 (8)=16.94, sig.=.031;   For fathers, 2006: Hosmer & Lemeshow test x
2
 (8)=26.20, sig.=.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
249 
 
Table 5.B  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by 
year (gender regime factors) –for all the steps 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 1 Household income (logged)  2.957***  2.270*** 
 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
1.054***  1.021***  
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5  .713*   
Household income (logged) 2.003! (.050) 2.999*** 1.551** 1.944*** 
 Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
  1.017*** 1.013** 
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5   .711** .648*** 
Household income (logged)   1.592** 1.908*** 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
  1.016*** 1.014*** 
Step 4 Children aged 0 to 5   .522*** .676** 
Children aged 6 to 11   .687*  
Children aged 12 to18    1.885** 
Household income (logged) 
  1.529** 1.916*** 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
  1.019*** 1.015*** 
Step 5 Children aged 0 to 5    .511*** 
Children aged 6 to 11    .727* 
Children aged 12 to18    1.851* 
Household income (logged) 
   1.923*** 
Childcare costs  
(for children under 6) 
   1.017*** 
Model summary 
Model  
Chi-square 
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test 
 x
2
 (sig.) 
2000 Step 1 21.327*** 210.011 15.769(.027) 
 Step 2 25.495*** 205.844 7.653(.468) 
2002 Step 1 42.111*** 664.308 13.146(.107) 
 Step 2 48.760*** 657.659 15.931(.043) 
2005 Step 1 46.170*** 1002.447 6.319(.388) 
 Step 2 56.008*** 992.609 21.454(.006) 
 Step 3 64.229*** 984.388 23.778(.002) 
 Step 4 70.700*** 977.917 17.730(.023) 
2006 Step 1 37.915*** 965.837 34.119(.000) 
 Step 2 50.404*** 953.348 7.375(.497) 
 Step 3 63.272*** 940.481 20.155(.010) 
 Step 4 70.539*** 933.213 16.141(.040) 
 Step 5 75.736*** 928.017 5.065(.751) 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off. 
Legend:  * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%), ! p<0.10 (sig. at 90%) 
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Table 5.C  Logistic regression analysis results with discrimination experience by year 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
The number of children aged 0 to 5 .549*** .535*** .559*** .618*** 
The number of children aged 6 to11 1.046 1.003 .889 .840! 
The number of children aged 12 to18 1.421* 1.348* 1.284** 1.385** 
Age .998 1.003 1.005 1.008 
Education (year) .991 .999 1.035 1.039 
Household income (logged) 1.347** 1.380*** 1.226* 1.366*** 
Discrimination experience 1.021 1.108! 1.037 1.077 
N 1458 1567 1701 1604 
-2 Log likelihood 1889.72 2030.50 2228.99 2090.23 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 127.33***
a
 141.78*** 126.14*** 133.27*** 
Source: the 9
th 
wave, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a 
statistics for 2000 are insignificant in the 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test.  Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06 
For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8) =9.31, sig=.317
a
;  for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=32.66, 
sig=.000;  for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=35.67, sig=.000;  for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test 
x
2
 (8)=21.90, sig=.005 
 
Table 5.D  Logistic regression analysis results without discrimination experience by 
year 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
The number of children aged 0 to 5 .549*** .526*** .555*** .595*** 
The number of children aged 6 to11 1.023 .952 .879 .836* 
The number of children aged 12 to18 1.341** 1.314* 1.270** 1.327** 
Age 1.004 .998 1.001 1.005 
Education (year) .974 .966 1.032 1.066 
Household income (logged) 1.271** 1.305*** 1.247** 1.348*** 
N 1851 1828 1896 1858 
-2 Log likelihood 2396.32 2382.76 2486.49 2431.99 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 155.34*** 148.06*** 131.28*** 139.94*** 
Source: the 9th wave, KLIPS. Note: statistics are rounded off;  
a 
statistics for 2000 are insignificant in the 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test.  Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, !<.06 
For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=15.18, sig.=.056; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8) =47.74, 
sig=.000; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=34.25, sig=.000; for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test 
x
2
(8) =20.87, sig=.007 
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Table 5.E  Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during 
the career1 for mothers (gender regime factors) – for all the steps 
Statistics: 
standardized 
coefficients B 
(without pay
 
& irregular employment) 
Model 1 
(without overtime     
work) 
Model 2
2
 
(all the list 
variables) 
Model 3
 
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 Step1 Step2 Step1
1
 Step1
2
 
Children aged  
0 to 5 
        
Children aged  
6 to 11 
        
Children aged  
12 to 18 
        
Age         
Education 
(year) 
        
Household 
income (logged)
    -.084*     
Discrimination 
experience 
.115** .117** .121** .114**     
Overtime work 
(yes or no)
3
  
 .109** .171*** .176***     
Parental welfare
 
  -.157*** -.140***   -.235**  
Pay (logged)     -.230*** -.182***   
Irregular 
employment 
(dummy) 
    
 .120**  .173* 
F 10.57 10.15 12.60 10.88 35.39 22.00 12.01 5.00 
Adjusted  
R-square .01** .02*** .04*** .05*** .05*** .06*** .05** .02* 
Source: 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS.  Note:  
1 '
employment failure during career' refers to the number of breaks 
between jobs including retrospective ones;  
2 
‘employment failure during career' is replaced by the number 
of breaks between jobs held from 1998 to 2006 due to the goodness-fit-model;  
3
 overtime work refers to 
‘whether they had overtime work or not’ for Model 1 and 3 (dummy).  Legend: * p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** 
p<0.001 
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Table 5.F  Linear regression analyses on the number of failures in employment during 
the career1 for fathers (gender regime factors) – for all the steps 
Statistics: 
standardized 
coefficients B 
Model 1 
(without pay & irregular 
employment) 
Model 2
2
 
(without overtime work) 
Step 
1 
Step 
2 
Step 
3 
Step
1 
Step
2 
Step
3 
Step
4 
Step
5 
Step
6 
Children aged 
0 to 5 
        
-.066 
* 
Children aged 
6 to 11 
         
Children aged 
12 to 18 
         
Age   
.143 
*** 
 
.184 
*** 
.183 
*** 
.199 
*** 
.198 
** 
.165 
*** 
Education 
(year) 
-.258 
*** 
-.219 
*** 
-.199 
*** 
-.226 
*** 
-.196 
*** 
-.166 
** 
-.128 
*** 
-.116 
*** 
-.114 
*** 
Household 
income 
(logged)
 
      
-.109 
** 
-.101 
** 
-.104 
** 
Discrimination 
experience 
       
.078 
** 
.079 
** 
Parental 
welfare 
 
-.214 
*** 
-.195 
*** 
  
-.135 
*** 
-.117 
*** 
-.114 
*** 
-.112 
*** 
Overtime work 
(average 
hours)
 
         
Pay (logged)
 
         
Irregular 
employment 
(dummy) 
         
F 44.70 38.98 31.21 60.06 51.25 42.01 34.85 29.51 25.34 
Adjusted 
R-square 
.07 
*** 
.11 
*** 
.13 
*** 
.05 
*** 
.08 
*** 
.10 
*** 
.11 
*** 
.12 
*** 
.12 
*** 
Source: 9
th
 wave (2006), KLIPS.  Note: 
1 '
employment failure during career' refers to the number of breaks 
between jobs including retrospective jobs; 
 2  '
employment failure during career' is also applied to Model 2 
for fathers (which is different from that for mothers) due to the goodness-fit-model. 
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Continued from Table 5.F 
Statistics: standardized coefficients B 
Model 3 
(all the list variables) 
Step1 Step2 Step3 Step4 
Children aged 0 to 5     
Children aged 6 to 11     
Children aged 12 to 18     
Age   .160*** .158*** 
Education (year)  -.216*** -.196*** -.173*** 
Household income (logged)     
Discrimination experience     
Parental welfare -.260*** -.221*** -.199*** -.184*** 
Overtime work 
(average hours)     
Pay (logged)    -.092* 
Irregular employment (dummy)     
F 43.00 37.60 31.35 24.99 
Adjusted R-square 
.07*** .11*** .13*** .14*** 
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Table 6.A  (All) married women’s class identification by employment status and 
economic activity status (percentage, N) 
 
Percentage (cases, N) within employment Upper class Middle class Lower class 
By 
employment 
status 
Permanent workers 
2.0 
(16) 
62.0 
(500) 
36.0 
(290) 
Irregular(nonstandard)  workers 
0.3 
(1) 
37.3 
(117) 
62.4 
(196) 
Self-employed and unpaid family workers 
1.6 
(11) 
61.8 
(424) 
36.6 
(251) 
Sub-total  
1.6 
(28) 
57.6 
(1041) 
40.8 
(737) 
By 
economic 
activity 
status 
Not working 
1.9 
(37) 
64.3 
(1225) 
33.7 
(642) 
Employed 
1.6 
(28) 
57.6 
(1041) 
40.8 
(737) 
Sub-total 
1.8 
(65) 
61.1 
(2266) 
37.2 
(1379) 
Source: the 9
th
 wave, KLIPS. By employment status, Pearson x
2
(4)=74.99, sig (2-tailed)=.000; by 
economic activity status, Pearson x
2
(2)=20.16, sig. (2-tailed)=.000  
 
Table 6.B  Cross-tabulation analysis of married women’s employment and non-working 
by class across 5 waves (percentage) 
% 
2nd wave 3rd wave 5th wave 8th wave 9th wave 
non-E E non-E E non-E E non-E E non-E E 
Upper class 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.9 0.5 1.0 0.8 
Middle class 37.2 38.4 37.5 37.5 38.7 43.3 31.7 28.9 30.5 28.9 
Lower class 10.2 13.9 11.4 13.2 7.3 10.6 16.7 21.3 17.0 21.8 
% of Total N 47.6 52.4 49.1 50.9 46.1 53.9 49.3 50.7 48.6 51.4 
Note: married women aged less than 65 and with job experience (more than 1 year). Pearson Chi-Square 
tests over the waves, x
2
 (2)=10.850, p=.004 for the 2
nd
 wave;  x
2
 (2)=3.032, p=.220 for the 3
rd
 wave;  x
2
 
(2)=8.853, p=.012 for the 5
th
 wave;  x
2
 (2)=22.001, p=.000 for the 8
th
 wave;  x
2
=16.79, df=2 p=.000 for the 
9
th
 wave 
 
Table 6.C  The percentage of non-employed and employed mothers by class 
(percentage) 
  2nd wave 3rd wave 5th wave 8th wave 9th wave 
 non-E E non-E E non-E E non-E E non-E E 
Upper class 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 1.0 0.4 0.9 0.8 
Middle class 44.5 36.0 44.5 35.1 46.3 40.2 34.1 23.0 36.6 30.3 
Lower class 9.0 10.2 10.1 10.1 5.8 7.4 23.7 17.9 14.8 16.6 
% of Total N 53.7 46.3 54.6 45.4 52.3 47.7 58.8 41.2 52.4 47.6 
Note: mothers aged less than 65 and with job experience. Pearson Chi-Square tests over the waves: x
2
 
(2)=10.850, p=.004 for the 2
nd
 wave;  x
2
 (2)=3.032, p=.220 for the 3
rd
 wave;  x
2
 (2)=8.853, p=.012 for the 
5
th
 wave;  x
2
 (2)=22.001, p=.000 for the 8
th
 wave;  x
2
=16.79, df=2 p=.000 for the 9
th
 wave 
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Table 6.D Logistic regression analyses on being employed for mothers in the four 
selected years and the gender difference (class factors) – ‘enter-method’ analysis 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 
Mother Father 
2000
b
 2002 2005 2006 2006 
Children aged 0 to 5 .555*** .542*** .545*** .596*** 1.006 
Children aged 6 to11 1.025 .989 .859 .833* .737 
Children aged12 to18 1.351** 1.359** 1.240* 1.316** 1.067 
Social class  
(Lower class is base)  ** *** *** ** 
 upper class 2.232 .509 .370* .396* 1.143 
 middle class .757* .578** .621*** .556*** 2.454** 
Age 1.003 .999 1.002 1.007 .922*** 
Education(year) .990 1.004 1.067 1.123** .904 
Household income (logged) 1.334** 1.483*** 1.421*** 1.596*** 2.777*** 
Child costs
a
 1.000 .997 1.001 1.000 1.002 
N 1851 1828 1885 1844 1522 
-2 Log likelihood 2390.93 2368.05 2452.32 2385.74 608.73 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 160.73***
b
 162.77*** 150.29*** 167.12*** 96.83*** 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, ! p<0.06           
Note:  
a 
child costs include all costs for child education and childcare due to the goodness-of-fit model.  
b
 note that this model in 2000 is not significant in the Hosmer&Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test. 
Mothers:  for 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8) =9.97, sig. =.267
b
 ; for 2002, Hosmer&Lemeshow test 
x
2
(8)=20.84, sig.=.008; for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=17.06, sig.=.029; for 2006, 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8) =24.83, sig. =.002;  Fathers:  for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test 
x
2
(8)=14.56, test sig.=.068  
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Table 6.E  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not by year and gender  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Mother By gender (2006) 
2000 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Step 1 Children aged 0 to 5 .439*** .446*** .487***   
 Children aged 12 to 18    1.764***  
 Household income (logged)     3.212*** 
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 .522*** .546*** .601*** .666***  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.323*** 1.362*** 1.371*** 1.473***  
Household income (logged)     3.308*** 
Age     .930*** 
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5 .529*** .544*** .605*** .674***  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.344*** 1.358*** 1.372*** 1.487***  
Household income (logged) 1.257** 1.280** 1.253** 1.385*** 2.671*** 
Age     .937*** 
Social class (lower class is base)     ** 
 upper class     1.182 
 middle class     2.419*** 
Step 4 Children aged 0 to 5  .555*** .613*** .688***  
Children aged 12 to 18  1.346*** 1.355*** 1.467***  
Household income (logged)  1.422*** 
1.457*** 1.635*** 
 
Social class (lower class is base)  ** ** ***  
 upper class  .520 .418 .446*  
 middle class  .574*** .647*** .588***  
Step 5 
(step 
(step4 
for 
father) 
Children aged 0 to 5    .599*  
Children aged 6 to11    .821** .722* 
Children aged 12 to 18    1.300**  
Household income (logged)    1.651*** 2.754*** 
Social class (lower class is base) 
 
  *** ** 
 
upper class    .432* 1.098 
 
middle class
1
    .584*** 2.378*** 
Age     .928*** 
Step 6 
 
Children aged 0 to 5    .579***  
Children aged 6 to11    .822*  
Children aged 12 to 18    1.320**  
Household income (logged)    1.599***  
Social class (lower class is base) 
 
  ***  
 upper class    .401*  
 middle class    .554***  
Education    1.109*  
 
N 1929 1848 1910 1874 1545 
Source: the 3
rd
 , 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off. 
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%)  
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Continued from Table 6.E  
Model summary Model chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
Mother 2000 Step 1 129.440*** 2422.218 .089(.765) 
 Step 2 145.289*** 2406.369 5.071(.535) 
 Step 3 154.797*** 2396.861 24.516(.002) 
2002 Step 1 117.275*** 2413.542 12.836(.000) 
 Step 2 135.050*** 2395.766 14.289(.014) 
 Step 3 147.190*** 2383.627 47.623(.000) 
 Step 4 159.646*** 2371.171 30.344(.000) 
2005 Step 1 99.807*** 2502.801 2.353(.125) 
 Step 2 119.746*** 2482.862 3.393 (.494) 
 Step 3 129.946*** 2472.663 56.483 (.000) 
 Step 4 145.027*** 2457.581 21.089(.007) 
2006 Step 1 92.426*** 2460.429 11.661(.001) 
 Step 2 114.408*** 2438.447 5.306(.257) 
 Step 3 134.789*** 2418.066 28.497(.000) 
 Step 4 156.318*** 2396.537 21.029 (.007) 
 Step 5 161.868*** 2390.987 10.712(.219) 
 Step 6 166.628*** 2386.227 22.221 (.005) 
Father 2006 Step 1 57.923*** 647.632 15.715 (.047) 
 Step 2 76.950*** 628.604 11.998(.151) 
 Step 3 90.474*** 615.080 10.125(.256) 
 Step 4 95.441*** 610.113 21.077(.007) 
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Table 6.F  Korean mothers’ labour market behaviour predictions from the interaction 
between social class and child age cohorts by year – for all the steps  
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 
Logistic regression on whether employed or not 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 1 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class .466*** .461***  .560*** 
 Age   1.047***  
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class .443*** .455***  .511*** 
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class .416***   .478*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class   1.568***  
Household income (logged)  1.326***   
Age   1.037***  
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class .466*** .483***  .486*** 
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class    .675*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class   1.473***  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class .428***   .420*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 1.386** 1.895*** 1.854***  
Household income (logged)  1.443***   
Age    1.019* 
 
Step 4 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class .472*** .565***  .468*** 
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class    .626*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class  1.310*** 1.416***  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class .476***   .452*** 
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 1.566*** 2.174*** 2.061***  
Household income (logged) 1.353*** 1.402*** 1.380*** 1.490*** 
Age   
 
1.017* 
 
Step 5 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class .532*** .543***  .529*** 
 
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class    .688*** 
 
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class 1.247** 1.266** 1.502*** 
 
 
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class .539** .609*  .517*** 
 
Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class   1.473***  
 
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 1.752*** 2.083*** 2.103*** 
1.578*** 
 
Household income (logged) 1.344*** 1.373*** 1.468*** 
1.643*** 
Step 6 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class  
.564*** 
  
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class  
1.307** 
1.532***  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class  
.589* 
.652**  
Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class  
1.402* 
1.494***  
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class  
2.060*** 
2.133***  
Household income (logged)  1.415*** 1.415***  
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Continued from Table 6.F  
Step 7 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class  
 
.705***  
Children aged 12 to 18 by middle class 
  
1.322**  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class 
  
.565***  
Children aged 6 to 11 by lower class 
  
1.335**  
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 
  
1.863***  
Household income (logged) 
  
1.410***  
Step 8 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class 
  
.612***  
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class 
  
.768**  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class 
  
.488***  
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 
  
1.630***  
Household income (logged) 
  
1.447***  
Step 9 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class 
  
.569***  
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class 
  
.730***  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class 
  
.466***  
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 
  
1.556***  
Household income (logged) 
  
1.421***  
Step 10 Children aged 0 to 5 by middle class 
  
.535***  
Children aged 6 to 11 by middle class 
  
.705***  
Children aged 0 to 5 by lower class 
  
.439***  
Children aged 12 to 18 by lower class 
  
1.478***  
Household income (logged) 
  
1.446***  
 N 1929 1848 1910 1874 
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Continued from Table 6.F  
Model summary Model Chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
Mother 2000 Step 1 103.571*** 2448.087 .069(.793) 
 Step 2 128.815*** 2422.844 .377(.828) 
 Step 3 138.799*** 2412.859 2.871(.580) 
 Step 4 153.672*** 2397.986 30.112(.000) 
 Step 5 162.385*** 2389.274 22.397(.004) 
2002 Step 1 101.827*** 2428.990 10.538(.001)** 
 Step 2 117.906*** 2412.910 42.697(.000)*** 
 Step 3 140.021*** 2390.796 45.723(.000)*** 
 Step 4 153.078*** 2377.739 38.712(.000)*** 
 Step 5 158.307*** 2372.510 42.821(.000)*** 
 Step 6 162.601*** 2368.216 30.979(.000)*** 
2005 Step 1 46.649*** 2555.959 44.826(.000) 
 Step 2 74.194*** 2528.414 22.736(.004) 
 Step 3 98.924*** 2503.684 21.521 (.006) 
 Step 4 117.441*** 2485.167 47.130(.000) 
 Step 5 132.737*** 2469.871 47.572(.000) 
 Step 6 140.873*** 2461.735 40.397(.000) 
 Step 7 153.603*** 2449.005 22.998(.003) 
 Step 8 161.893*** 2440.715 12.709(.122) 
 Step 9 159.340*** 2443.268 15.394(.052) 
 Step 10 157.978*** 2444.630 12.728(.122) 
2006 Step 1 51.360*** 2501.495 1.234(.267) 
 Step 2 88.532*** 2464.323 2.570(.277) 
 Step 3 116.809*** 2436.046 3.830(.574) 
 Step 4 145.656*** 2407.199 38.906(.000) 
 Step 5 168.229*** 2384.626 16.543(.035) 
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Table 6.G  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not by year and by 
gender (class factors) – for all the steps 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Mother By gender (2006) 
2000
1
 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Step1 Children aged 0 to 5 .427*** .437***    
 Children aged 12 to 18   1.523*** 1.621***  
 Household income (logged)     3.201*** 
Step2 Children aged 0 to 5 .504*** .424*** .549*** .557***  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.313**  1.370*** 1.458***  
Household income (logged)     3.282*** 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .690**    
Age     .930*** 
Step3 Children aged 0 to 5 .511*** .425*** .551*** .570***  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.329***  1.358*** 1.453***  
Household income (logged) 1.245* 1.290*    
Social mobility belief (positive)  .657**    
Social class (lower class is base)   ** **  
 upper class   .634 .336*  
 middle class   .688** .672**  
Step4 Children aged 0 to 5 .506*** .445*** .553*** .578***  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.325***  1.356*** 1.461***  
Household income (logged) 1.270** 1.554*** 1.211* 1.383**  
Social mobility belief (positive) .787* .652**    
Social class (lower class is base)  *** ** *** 
 
 upper class  .284 .488 .224**  
 middle class  .398*** .604*** .544***  
Step5 
(step3 
for 
father) 
Children aged 0 to 5 .516*** .393*** .567*** .590**  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.322***  1.392*** 1.504***  
Household income (logged) 1.354** 1.584*** 1.317** 1.493*** 2.640*** 
Social mobility belief (positive) .794* .651**    
Social class (lower class is base) 
 
*** ** *** ** 
 
upper class  .257 .601 .242** 1.208 
 
middle class
1
 .744* .379*** .632** .574*** 2.499*** 
Child education costs
2 
(for children over 6) 
  .995* .996*  
Age  .974*   .936*** 
 Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.  Note: statistics are rounded off;  
1  
statistics for social 
class in 2000 are replaced by those for middle class (dummy) due to the goodness-of-fit model;  
2
 
statistics for child education costs in 2000 are replaced by those for total child costs including childcare 
and education costs due to the goodness-of-fit model. 
Legend : * p<0.05 (sig. at 95%), ** p<0.01 (sig. at 99%), *** p<0.001 (sig. at 99.9%) 
 
262 
 
Continued from Table 6.G 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) Mother By gender (2006) 
2000
1
 2002 2005 Mother Father 
Step6 
(step4 
for 
father) 
Children aged 0 to 5  .391***    
Children aged 6 to11  .769**   .713* 
Household income (logged)  1.580***   2.720*** 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .649**    
Social class (lower class is base)  ***   ** 
 upper class  .260   1.123 
 middle class  .377***   2.458*** 
Age  .963**   .928*** 
 
N 1929 1848 1910 1874 1545 
 
Continued from Table 6.G 
Model summary Model Chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
Mother 2000 Step 1 114.536*** 1952.746 1.134(.287) 
 Step 2 126.636*** 1940.646 4.644(.590) 
 Step 3 133.103*** 1934.179 16.982(.030) 
 Step 4 137.885*** 1929.397 7.079(.528) 
 Step 5 142.118*** 1925.164 3.657(.887) 
2002 Step 1 32.164*** 1353.669 .792(.374) 
 Step 2 40.353*** 1345.479 1.668(.434) 
 Step 3 46.726*** 1339.107 13.859(.086) 
 Step 4 63.423*** 1322.409 12.498(.130) 
 Step 5 68.995*** 1316.838 9.183(.327) 
 Step 6 76.963*** 1308.870 15.072(.058) 
2005 Step 1 37.756*** 1829.259 7.387(.007) 
 Step 2 53.570*** 1813.445 3.864(.425) 
 Step 3 63.780*** 1803.235 5.704(.575) 
 Step 4 68.083*** 1798.932 5.714(.679) 
 Step 5 73.833*** 1793.182 10.723(.218) 
2006 Step 1 50.894*** 1791.537 8.108(.004) 
 Step 2 65.841*** 1776.589 5.400(.369) 
 Step 3 79.890*** 1762.541 7.046(.424) 
 Step 4 91.658*** 1750.773 4.853(.773) 
 Step 5 96.206*** 1746.224 12.422(.133) 
Father 2006 Step 1 58.012*** 653.359 16.236(.039) 
 Step 2 78.368*** 633.002 13.101(.108) 
 Step 3 93.094*** 618.277 7.543(.479) 
 Step 4 98.593*** 612.778 21.538(.006) 
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Table 6.H  The probability of being employed, for mothers within the upper/middle 
class - for ‘enter-method’ analysis with child costs including childcare and child 
education 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000     2002     2005                 2006                          
Children aged 0 to 5  .513*** .526*** .575*** .617** 
Children aged 6 to 11 .927 .992 .774* .779* 
Children aged 12 to 18 1.160 1.365** 1.218 1.339* 
Age 1.011 .997 1.077 .987 
Education (year) 1.054 .989 .986 1.127 
Household income (logged) 1.282* 1.637*** 1.410** 1.863*** 
Child costs 
a
 1.007 .994* 1.001 .995 
Social mobility belief (positive) .842 .623** 1.097 .731 
Interaction between child costs 
and social mobility 
.993 1.005 1.000 1.007* 
N 
1203 1402 1277 1270 
-2 Log likelihood 1545.75 1797.49 1676.68 1637.27 
Model Chi-square (goodness-of-fit) 
106.33***
b
 139.79***  75.72*** 111.97*** 
Source: the 3
rd
, 5
th
, 8
th
 and 9
th
 waves, KLIPS.   Legend: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
Note:  
a
 child costs include both education and childcare costs;  
b
 this model in 2000 is insignificant in the 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test;  For 2000, Hosmer&Lemeshow x
2
(8)=13.11, sig.=.108
b
 ;  for 2002, 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=15.73, sig.=.046 ;  for 2005, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=30.85, 
sig.=.000 ;  for 2006, Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
(8)=21.36, sig.=.006 
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Table 6.I  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers within 
the upper/middle class by year - for all the steps 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 1 Children aged 0 to 5  .510*** .449***   
 Children aged 12 to 18   1.548*** 1.664*** 
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 .606*** .436*** .646*  
Children aged 12 to 18 1.400***  1.424*** 1.661*** 
Household income (logged)    1.522** 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .665**   
Step 3 Children aged 0 to 5   .446***  .588** 
Children aged 6 to 11     
Children aged 12 to 18    1.495*** 
Household income (logged)  1.432**  1.484** 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .629**   
Step 4 Children aged 0 to 5   .391***  .607* 
Children aged 6 to 11     
Children aged 12 to 18    1.561*** 
Household income (logged)  1.480**  1.651*** 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .628**   
Age  .972*   
Child education costs  
(for children aged over 6) 
   .996* 
Step 5 Children aged 0 to 5   .386***   
 
Children aged 6 to 11  .758**   
 
Household income (logged)  1.490**  
 
 
Social mobility belief (positive)  .627**   
 
Age  .959**   
 
N 1181 1598 1264 1244 
Model summary Model Chi-square -2 Log likelihood Hosmer&Lemeshow test x
2
 (sig.) 
2000 Step 1 28.541*** 860.230 1.180(.277) 
 Step 2 36.999*** 851.772 1.429(.921) 
2002 Step 1 27.776*** 1196.294 .864(.353) 
 Step 2 36.571*** 1187.499 1.263(.532) 
 Step 3 45.217*** 1178.853 20.070(.010) 
 Step 4 50.486*** 1173.584 20.854(.008) 
 Step 5 58.335*** 1165.734 21.310(.006) 
2005 Step 1 25.897* 1173.594 2.699(.100) 
 Step 2 31.044*** 1168.448 1.752(.781) 
2006 Step 1 37.140*** 1157.618 2.097(.148) 
 Step 2 48.999*** 1145.759 15.458(.051) 
 Step 3 56.907*** 1137.851 7.338(.501) 
 Step 4 61.163*** 1133.595 6.663(.573) 
265 
 
Table 6.J  Logistic regression analyses on whether employed or not for mothers by year 
- within the lower class 
Statistics: odds ratios - Exp(B) 2000 2002 2005 2006 
Step 1 Children aged 0 to 5  .362**  .372***  
 Children aged 12 to 18    1.543*** 
Step 2 Children aged 0 to 5 .376**  .450** .582* 
Children aged 12 to 18   1.346* 1.434** 
Household income (logged) 2.224* 2.187*   
Step 3 
Children aged 0 to 5  
  .435**  
Children aged 6 to 11 
    
Children aged 12 to 18 
  1.343*  
Household income (logged) 
  1.383*  
 
N 128/748 116/598 466/615 450/585 
Model summary 
Model  
Chi-square  
-2 Log 
likelihood 
Hosmer&Lemeshow test  
x
2
 (sig.) 
2000 Step 1 9.903** 167.043 1.937  (.164) 
 Step 2 14.023** 162.922 7.733  (.460) 
2002 Step 1 7.309** 140.820 8.264  (.408) 
2005 Step 1 17.670*** 615.225 .000    (.) 
 Step 2 23.294*** 609.602 1.427  (.699) 
 Step 3 28.153*** 604.743 15.562* (.049) 
2006 Step 1 13.025*** 591.026 6.368* (.012) 
 Step 2 17.167*** 586.884 7.029  (.218) 
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i
 비맞벌이 가구에서는 가사는 부인이 주로 담당해야 한다는 생각이 지배적이다. 가사는 부인이 
주로 담당해야 한다는 생각에 동의하는 비율은 남성과 여성 모두 91% 수준에 달하고 있으며 
가사를 공평하게 분담해야 한다거나 남편이 담당해야 한다는 생각에 동의하는 비율은 극소수에 
불과하다. 중략…, 반면에 맞벌이 가구의 경우 부인이 주로 가사를 담당해야 한다고 응답한 
비율은 남성의 경우 50.7%, 여성의 경우 43.6%로 나타나고 있다. 주부가 밖에서 일을 하고 
있더라도 가사일은 아무래도 여자가 해야 한다고 생각하는 사람이 절반에 이른다는 것을 
의미한다. <표 8> 가사분담에 대한 태도 참조 (Hwang, 2002:26).  
ii
 전반적인 생활만족도는 맞벌이주부와 전업주부 간에 큰 차이가 없으나, 맞벌이주부의 경우는 
여가활동과 주거환경에 대해서 만족도가 상대적으로 낮고 전업주부의 경우는 가족의 수입에 
대해서 상대적으로 만족도가 낮은 것으로 나타난다. 자신의 취업을 통해 소득을 추가적ㅇ로 얻고 
있는 맞벌이주부는 취업으로 인해 손실된 여가에 부족함을 느끼고 있고 반대로 상대적으로 
여가를 많이 누리고 있는 전업주부는 취업하면 얻을 수 있었을 추가적인 수입에 대해 아쉬움을 
갖고 있는 셈이다 (Hwang, 2002:28). 
iii
 …다른 한편으로 기혼여성의 직장생활에 대한 애착은 상당한 것으로 나타났다. 조사대상인 
기혼여성노동자들은 ‘직장인’으로써의 강한 정체성을 가지고 있었고, 직장생활에 대한 애착 
면에서 볼 때 여성이 남성에 비해서 뒤지지 않는다는 해석이 가능하였다. 이들은 가족과 사회가 
출산,양육의 문제를 적극 지원해 준다면 가능한 한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다는 의견을 강하게 
피력하고 있다 (Jang and Bu, 2003:1).  
iv
 A= 출산 양육과 상관없이 가능한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다 B= 출산 양육으로 인해 회사에서 
불이익을 주지 않는다면 가능한 오래 직장생활을 하고 싶다 C=가족과 사회가 출산 양육문제를 
적극 지원해 준다면 가능한 오래 직장 생활을 하고 싶다 D= 경제적인 필요성이 없다면 언제든지 
일을 그만두겠다 (Jang and Bu, 2003:18-9, the note of the table 6). 
v
 한국 조선시대 가족의 특징을 규정한다면 남성중심의 가부장적 사회하고 할 수 있다. 가족제도 
안에서 영성의 지위와 위치는 남녀칠세부동석, 부부유별, 부장부수, 삼종지도, 칠거지악 등 
가부장적인 유교 특유의 문화가치에 크게 위축될 수 밖에 없었다. 이러한 여성관은 여성을 
남성에 비해 상대적으로 낮은 위치로 격하시켰으며, 여성의 활동범위도 가부장적인 가정 안으로 
한정될 수 밖에 없었다. 중략. 조선시대에 여성의 사회참여 역시 신분과 직업에 따라 다르다. 
사대부의 귀한 부인들은 가옥 내실에 깊숙이 들어앉아 내외법을 익히면서 존장녀로서의 
리더십을 발휘하였다. 그러나 농민과 상인계층에 속하는 여성들은 남자와 더불어 밭에 나가 일을 
해야 하고, 베를 짜고, 장에 나가 물물교환을 해왔다 (박용옥 (1975) 재인용, Byun, 2001:19).  
vi
 성별로 자영업주 비중의 추이를 살펴보면, 여성 비농 부문 자영업주의 비중이 1990년대 이후 
상대적으로 안정적 모습을 보이는 반면, 남성은 2003년까지 증가하였다가 이후 급격히 줄어드는 
역U자형의 모습을 보인다. 외환위기인 1998년 이후 자영업에서 발견되는 특징의 하나는 경제적 
독립에 대한 인식의 제고 등으로 인해 여성의 자영업 증가율이 남성보다 더 빠르게 진행되었다는 
점이다. 2007년까지 남성 자영업주는 13.4% 증가하였으나 여성은 23.5%나 증가하였다. 이러한 
변화는 다른 OECD 국가들에서도 마찬가지로 관찰되고 있다 (Keum et al., 2009:59). 
vii
 한국개발연구원(2001)은 산업구조에 대하여 지식집약화와 경제의 서비스화가 진척되면서 
GDP에서 차지하는 농림수산업과 제조업의 비중은 낮아지는 반면, 서비스업의 비중은 
지속적으로 높아질 것으로 전말하고 있다. 서비스 부문에서도 산업 전반의 지식집약화와 세계화, 
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소득수준의 향상, 금융자산의 축적, 정보통신 인프라의 구축 등에 의해 금융, 의료, 보건, 디지털 
컨텐츠, 사업서비스 등의 발전이 현저할 것으로 예상한다. 한편 여성 취업자가 집중되어 있는 
도소매 및 음식숙박업이 GDP에서 차지하는 비중은 감소하는 것으로 나타나고 있다 (Keum, 
2002:77).    
viii
 분석결과, …중략, 노동생산성 변동에 대한 변화 – 구성 요인분해 (shift-share decomposition) 
결과, 제조업과는 대조적으로 서비스업에서는 고부가가치업종의 성장이 둔화되고 저부가가치- 
저생산성 업종의 고용이 확대되는 비효율적인 구조 변화가 진행되고 있는 것으로 나타났다. 
중략…교욱서비스업, 보건업 등에서의 부진도 서비스산업의 체질 개선에 실패하고 있는 주된 
요인 중 하나로 파악된다. 중략…우리 서비스 부분이 임금상승에 대해 숙련노동 수요를 늘리거나 
노동 효율을 높이는 방식 대신 직접적으로 고용을 줄이거나 비정규직을 늘리는 방식에 의존하는 
대응 패턴이 관찰되고 있다 (Hwang, 2008:27). 
ix
 1980년대까지 지속적으로 하락하였던 비농 부문의 자영업주 비중은 1990년대에 들어 다소 
높아지는 현상이 관찰되었다. 이러한 자영업주의 비중은 2001년을 기점으로 역전되어 그 비중이 
하락하고 있으며, 특히 2003년의 신용대란은 자영업 감소에 결정적 영향을 주었다 (Keum et al., 
2009:59). 
x
 이것은 달리 말하면 비정규직화의 추세 속에서 개인의 교육투자와 훈련으로 극복할 수 있는 
문제가 아니라는 것이다. 비정규직 노동자 중에서 여성의 비중이 높고, 여성 임금근로자 중에서 
비정규직의 비율이 매우 높은 이유는 일차적으로 여성의 노동력가치에 대한 일방적인 저평가를 
가능하게 하는 가부장적 가치의식 때문이겠으나, 현실적으로 이것을 가능하게 하는 메커니즘은 
성별로 구분지어진 직종분리와 직무분리이다. 임금근로자의 직종분포가 여성과 남성간에 현저히 
다른 구조에서 특정 직종에 속한 근로자의 대부분이 비정규직으로 일하게 되는데, 특히 이 
과정에서 전통적으로 여성직으로 알려진 일자리들이 비정규직화하는 경향이 있다 (Jang, 
2001:90). 
xi
 이상의 분석결과는 정확성 및 자료의 한계를 지니고 있지만 성별 임금격차에 있어 승진의 
중요성을 확인하고 있다는 측면에서 의의를 찾을 수 있다. 또한 임금격차의 69.5%를 근속기간, 
교육, 거주지역 등의 설명변수를 통해 설명할 수 있지만 아직도 29.5%의 임금격차를 설명할 수 
없다는 사실은 우리나라에 성차별이 존재할 가능성을 시사한다. 중략…전체 성별 임금격차의 
34.1%가 명확한 원인을 모르고 성차별적 요인으로 간주된다는 것은 기업의 임금결정 및 성차별 
구조의 존재 여부, 규모에 대한 고찰을 요구한다 (Keum, 2002:178-9). 
xii
 기업의 성차별을 이해하려는 노력의 일환으로 구직활동 및 채용에서의 성별 격차를 분석한 
결과, 많은 여성들이 구직에 애로를 겪고 있으며 사업장들의 상당수는 채용시 성별 제한을 두고 
있는 것으로 나타나고 있다. 이러한 사업체 조사 결과는 구직활동시 여성의 입직을 허용하는 
직장 또는 직업에만 여성들이 지원하는 자기 선택적 과정으로 인해 성차별이 완화된 것으로 
나타나고 있을 뿐 실제로는 아직도 성차별이 광범위하게 행해지고 있을 가능성을 시사한다 
(Keum, 2002:196). 
xiii
 …중략, 넷째, 여성 취업자의 ‘서비스산업 집중화 현상’이 발생하였다. 1990년대 들어 제조업 
취업자의 비중 및 절대 숫자는 남녀 모두 감소하였으나 여성의 감소폭이 컸고, 줄어든 여성 
근로자의 대부분은 서시스산업으로 진출하였다. 이에 따라 1990년대 여성 근로자의 전체 
증가보다 훨씬 많은 여성이 서비스산업에 종사하게 되었다. 다섯째, 직업별로 산업구조의 
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고도화와 지식기반산업의 확대, 정보화 등으로 전문/기술/행정관리직에 대한 수요가 급증하였다. 
그러나 고임금 고생산성으로 상징되는 이들 직업군에서 여성보다 남성의 증가 속도가 빠른 
것으로 나타났다. 여섯째, 일자리의 증가 또는 창출이 남성은 상용직을 중심으로 이루어진 반면 
여성은 임시 일용직을 중심으로 이루어졌다. 1990년대 중반 이후 임시/일용직의 비중은 급격히 
증가하고 그 결과 2000년에는 여성 임금근로자의 69.7%가 임시/일용직인 것으로 나타났다 
(Keum, 2002:104). 
xiv
 자녀들이 어느 정도 성장한 30대 후반 이후 여성의 상당수는 취업의사를 지니고 있으나 
기술/기능 부족 또는 경험 부족과 같은 원인으로 인해 취업하지 못하고 비경제활동상태에 
머무르는 경우가 다수 발견된다 (Keum, 2002:157). 
xv
 기초분석 결과 남성의 승진 경험이 여성의 3배에 달하지만 근속기간, 시간당 임금, 고용형태, 
직종 등을 통제한 뒤에는 승진 경험 확률의 성별 격차가 2배로 줄어들었다. 비록 기업에 대한 
충성도, 성실성, 인간관계와 같은 관찰 불가능한 요인들과 기대근속기간 및 노동비용에서의 성별 
차이가 추정식에 반영되지 않았지만 승진 경험의 성별격차가 2배에 달한다는 추정 결과는 
기업내 승진에서 성차별이 작용하였을 가능성을 강력하게 시사한다 (Keum, 2002:170).  
xvi
 자본주의 사회에서 성적 계급구조는 직무배분과 관련된 두 가지 사회적 과정과 연관되어 
있다: 성차별적 직무 매칭 과정과 성차별적 경력이동 과정. 노동시장에서의 성별분리는 구직-
구인 결합과정에 내재되어 있는 직무의 셩별 분업을 통해서 이루어진다. 성차별적 편견을 갖는 
고용주의 선호와 태도가 구직-구인 결합과정에 영향을 미치는 요소이다. 대부분의 남성 고용주는 
경영직 자리를 채우기 위하여 충원할 때 여성에 대한 편견을 가지고 있다 (Shin and Cho, 
1998:718).  
xvii
 먼저 성별에 따른 경력의 차이를 보면, 남성과 여성에서 첫 번째 직업을 갖는 연령에서 큰 
차이를 보이고 있다. 중략…남성의 경우 첫 번째 직업을 갖는 누적 빈도가 나이 30에 이르면 거의 
증가하지 않는다. 그러나 여성들의 경우 30세 이후에도 지속적으로 꾸준히 증가하고 있다. 
이러한 차이는 남성의 경우 대부분이 30세 이전에 직업을 갖기 때문이다. 30세 이후에 직업을 
갖는 경우는 2.1%에 불과하였다. 이와는 대조적으로 25% 이상의 여성이 30세 이후에 직업을 
갖는 것으로 나타났다. 35세가 넘어서 직업을 갖는 여성들의 경우 대부분이 승진의 기회가 없는 
쁘띠부르조아지나 노동계급에 집중되어 있다. 그러므로 그들은 경영직이나 감독직으로 승진할 
수 있는 기회를 갖고 있지 못하다. 이러한 초기적인 차이가 평생동안 남성과 여성의 계급궤적에 
차이를 결정짓고 있다. 그러나 상대적으로 여성들이 노동시장으로 늦게 진출하는 것이 최초의 
일에 기초한 계급위치의 상대적인 비율에 극적인 영향을 미치지는 않는다 (Shin and Cho, 
1998:723). 
xviii
 여성들은 노동시장에서 노동자로서 그들이 지닌 능력을 충분히 실현할 수 없게 하는 
권력관계(가부장제)로 인해 양육자로 ‘사회적으로 구성’된다. 여기에는 두 가지 요인이 상호 
관련되어 있다. 첫째, 현재의 임금노동은 생계부양자와 양육자 사이의 분업, 즉 자신의 모든 
시간을 회사를 위해 바칠 수 있는 ‘이상적 노동자’와 그의 노동력 재생산을 책임지는 ‘가사노동자’ 
사이의 분업에 기초해 있다. 둘찌, 노동시장이 가족과의 관계 속에서 움직이는 방식으로 인해 두 
가지 분화된 역할은 성별화된다. 여기서 노동시장에 존재하는 차별은 여성이 양육자의 역할로 
전환하게 되는 중요한 요인으로 작용한다. 중략…이상적 노동자 규범에 전제를 둔 어떤 법이나 
사회정책도 여성을 양육자 역할에 한정시킬 수 있다. 어머니들은 정의 자체에서 이상적 노동자의 
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지위에서 배제되기 때문이다. 이러한 규범이 존재하는 한 여성은 이상적 노동자나 양육자 둘 
중의 하나만이 될 수 있다 (Shin, 2001:104). 
xix
 KLIPS를 통해 분석한 결과를 요약하면 근로시간 단축은 제도적으로 고안된 것보다 느린 확산 
속도를 보이며, 근로시간 단축이 개인에게 미치는 영향은 아직까지 ‘큰 변화가 없다’로 요약할 수 
있다 (Kim, 2007:451,abstract 인용). 
xx
 이와같은 고용상 지위에 따른 기업복지의 배제 현상은 비정규직 근로의 질의 저하와 
고용불안정을 야기할 뿐만 아니라, 기업복지의 임금보충 기능이 약화됨으로써 정규직과의 
소득격차가 심화되는 등의 노동시장에서의 전반적인 배제 현상으로 이어질 수 있다 (Ban, 
2006:28). 
xxi
 여성들이 쁘띠부르조아지나 노동계급일 경우 남성들에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 잔류하는 
경향이 있다. 이러한 계급들은 생산수단의 소유나 권위의 차원에서 상대적으로 열악한 
계급들이다. 여기에서 알 수 있는 점은 먼저 남성들의 경우 첫 번째 계급이 자본가나 경영자와 
같은 상대적으로 혜택을 누리는 계급인 경우 여성들에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 잔류한다. 
여성들의 경우 상대적으로 혜택을 누리지 못하는 계급에서 남성에 비해서 더 높은 비율로 
잔류한다. 이것은 한국사회에서 성과 계급궤적간의 분명한 상호작용이 있음을 보여주는 것이다 
(Shin and Cho, 1998:724). 
xxii
 분석결과 한국의 여성들은 남성에 비해서 노동시장에 진출하는 연령이 늦기 때문에 승진이 
보장되지 않는 직무나 직종으로 더 많이 진입을 하는 것으로 나타났다. 그리고 진입 후에 
여성들의 계급이동은 남성에 비해서 절반에 불과하여 여성들의 계급이동이 어려운 것으로 
나타났다. 이것은 한국의 세대내 계급이동체제가 성차별적 속성을 강하게 지니고 있다는 것을 
의미한다 (Shin and Cho, 1998:715). 
xxiii
 가족은 가족구성원의 소득을 합법적으로 통합하는 유일한 제도일 뿐 아니라 소비생활의 
기본단위이기도 하다. 또한 계급이동에 영향을 미치는 자녀 교육에 대한 투자도 가족 전체의 
가용한 물질적 자원에 의해서 결정되며 자녀의 일상적인 여가활동이나 문화생활도 가족의 
물질적 자원의 규모에 의해서 제약을 받는다 (Bourdieu, 1977; Passerson, 1986; Alice, 2001; 
Katsillis and Runbinson, 1990). 따라서 가족 간 경제적 불평등은 ‘세대 내’ 생활기회의 불평등뿐 
아니라 자녀의 교육과 직업 획득에 직접 영향을 미쳐 ‘세대 간’ 사회이동을 제약하는 불평등을 
재생산한다. 중략, 기혼여성의 경제활동참여율이 50%를 상회하는 사회에서 부인들의 
경제활동은 가족 간 소득 불평등에 영향을 미치는 중요한 요인이 되고 있다 (Kim and Shin, 
2008:81). 
xxiv
 해방 후 한국사회에서 비교적 빠른 속도로 진행된 산업화/도시화 과정은 한국 가족구조와 
가치관의 변화를 야기하였으며, 이에 따라 한국여성의 위치는 과거와 비교해 볼 때 많은 변화가 
있어왔다. 이러한 변화에 법, 제도의 변화는 여성의 지위향상에 많은 영향을 미쳤다 (Byun, 2001: 
20). 근대화 과정에서 한국가족의 가장 큰 특징은 사회계층간에 상이한 모습을 보인다는 점이다. 
한국사회에서 고용안정성의 차이와 가구주 소득수준 차이는 사회계층간의 격차를 심화시켰고, 
그 결과 가족의 안정성의 차이와 이에 따른 계층간의 상이한 가족전략이 나타나게 된다. 따라서 
고용안정이 보장되고 비교적 후한 보수를 받는 상층 근로자와 불안정 고용, 저임금을 받는 
하층근로자와 가족생활은 다른 모습을 띨 수 밖에 없다. 남성가구주의 고용이 안정되고 비교적 
안정된 수준의 임금을 받는 중산층 가족의 경우 가족 내에서 성별역할분업구조는 명확하게 
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나타난다. 이들 가족은 대개 남편이 단일 생계부양자이며, 부인은 전업주부이다. 중략, 이들의 
가족 전략은 친족간의 자원교환을 통해 가족지위와 계급지위를 유지하는 전략과 자녀교육을 
통한 가족상승전략이 중심이다. 중략, 한편 남성가구주의 고용이 불안정하고 저임금을 받는 
생산직 근로자 가족과 도시빈민 가족의 경우 가족내 성별역학분업구조는 좀 더 복잡하다. 이들 
가족은 남성가구주뿐만 아니라 부인, 자녀들까지 취업을 하여 각각의 소득을 결합하는 
소득극대화 전략과 지출극소화 전략을 취함으로써 생계를 유지하는 것이 가능해진다. 따라서 
여성들의 높은 경제활동참여율과 부부간의 경제적 의존성, 그리고 다가구취업이 이들 가족의 
중요한 특징이다. 중략, 또한 교육기회에 있어서 아들, 딸 사이에 차별이 나타나는 경우가 많기 
때문에 이 과정에서 가족내 젠더관계의 불평등성이 재생산되는 경향이 있다. 즉 이들 가족의 
생존전략과 상승전략은 가족성원간의 성차별에 크게 의존한다는 점이다 (Byun, 2001:43-44).  
xxv
 사회계층의식 (social status consciousness) 또는 계층정체성 (status identification)은 
사회구성원들이 자신의 사회경제적 지위가 어떠한 계층적 위계수준에 속하는지를 주관적으로 
인식하는 것이다. 다시 말해, 계층의식은 사회계층의 위계속에서 자신의 지위를 자리매김하거나 
특정 계층지위에 주관적 일체감을 갖는 것으로 정의하고 있다 (Lee and Shin, 2009:271). 
xxvi
 분석결과 기초분석에서 유의가 차이가 있는 것으로 나타난 자녀연령, 어머니의 취업여부, 
가구소득을 포함하여 기초분석에서 드러나지 않은 어머니 연령이 자녀의 교육 및 보육기관 
이용에 영향을 미치는 요인으로 밝혀졌다. 즉 어머니가 미취업인 경우보다는 취업한 경우에, 
자녀의 나이가 아주 어린 영아의 경우보다는 유아의 경우가, 어머니의 연령이 적을수록, 그리고 
가구의 소득이 많을수록 영유아가 교육 및 보육기관을 이용할 가능성이 높다는 것이다. 중략, 
뿐만 아니라 가구의 월평균 소득이 많은 가계일수록 자녀가 교육 및 보육기관을 이용한다는 것은 
저소득층 자녀를 중심으로 지원하는 정부의 미미한 재정지원수준으로 인하여 대다수 가계들이 
영유아 자녀에 대한 부담스러운 교육 및 보육비 지출을 하고 있음을 반증하는 것이라 할 수 있다 
(Kim, 2004:7). 
xxvii
 우리 사회에서 학교교육이 갖는 의미는 남다르다. 근대화의 시작과 함께 식민지를 경험했고 
독립을 하면서 얼마 있지 않아 전쟁을 경험함으로써 전통사회의 계급이나 사회적 불평등이 
연속되지 못했다고 해도 과언이 아닐 정도로 모든 것을 잃고 말았다. 다른 말로 하면 사회적 
불평등의 문제보다는 절대 빈곤의 문제가 더 컸다. 계층이동, 지위상승 등에 대한 욕구가 강하게 
작동할 수 있었던 조건 역시 이러한 절대빈곤이 있었기 때문으로 해석할 수 있다. 자녀 세대의 
계층이동을 위해 교육을 지원하는 관심과 열의, 즉 소위 말하는 ‘교육열’이 폭발적으로 
일어나면서 해방 후 한국 사회 지표의 변화 가운데 가장 극적인 영역이 학교 진학률이 되었다 
(Sung, 2009:317). 
xxviii
 특히, 한국사회에서 사교육은 성적을 향상시키고, 소위 ‘명문’ 대학에 입학하기 위하여 
필수적이라고 여겨지는 만큼 (정영숙, 1996; 이수정, 2007), 사교육은 부모들의 주요한 계급 
재생산 또는 상향 이동의 전략이며, 지위경쟁의 장이라고 할 수 있을 것이다. 이외에도 
교육공급자의 측면에서 공교육의 낮은 질과 획일성 등의 문제 (이주호/홍성창, 2001)나 한국적 
또는 유교적 특수한 교육열의 현상으로 사교육 문제를 설명하려는 시도(이종각 편, 2005 참고)도 
있었지만, 이는 사교육의 계급적 차이를 밝혀내는데 적절하지 못하다. 경험적 연구에 의하면 
부모의 사회경제적 배경이 교육열이나 학교만족도에 영향을 미치지 않는 것으로 나타났기 
때문이다 (김현진, 2004; 노현경, 2006). (Kim and Yeom, 2009:31-2). 
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xxix
 한국사회에서 모성은 출산과 양육이 미분화되고 교육의 관리자 역할이 과도하게 강화되어 
있다. 이는 한국사회에서 어머니 역할의 규범적 전형이 전업주부의 삶을 토대로 하고 있어, 
취업주부적 삶의 양식에 기초한 모성의 이념형이 보편화되고 있지 않음을 보여준다 (Shin, 
2001:97). 
xxx
 부모의 자녀 양육 및 사회화를 위한 역할은 아버지보다 어머니에게 과중적으로 부담되고 있다. 
이는 ‘우리사회에서 어머니 역할에 대한 사회적 기대가 더 크고, 더 많은 가치가 부여되며, 
역할수행에 대한 규범이 더 엄격하기 때문이다’ (유희경, 1995). 여성이 배우자인 남성과 
마찬가지로 직업활동을 통해 가정경제에 기여를 하고 있는 경우에도 자녀양육 및 교육을 위한 
책임은 여성의 몫으로 돌려지는 경향이 있다. 중략, 가정 내에서의 이러한 부모의 성 역할 분담적 
태도는 자녀세대에 대해 암묵적으로 내면화되는 사회화 과정의 핵심적인 내용을 이룬다 (Byun, 
2001:61-2). 
xxxi
 자녀교육을 위한 지원활동은 계층별로 격차가 두드러기게 나타났는데, 고소득계층일수록 
그리고 고학력계층일수록 자녀교육 지원활동에 참가하는 비율이 높게 나타나 이 분야에서도 
양극화가 존재하는 것을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 중략, 소득활동참가에 대한 회귀분석결과, 비록 
통계적으로 아주 유의하지는 않지만, 사교육비 지출이 소득활동참가와 부의 상관관계에 있는 
것으로 나타났다. 특히 사교육비 지출의 소득활동참가에 대한 부의 영향은 소득계층별로 다르게 
나타났는데, 저소득(남편소득 기준) 계층보다 중위 고위소득 계층에서 사교육비가 증가할수록 
기혼여성의 소득활동참가가 상대적으로 크게 줄어드는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 결과를 
종합하면, 저소득 계층에서는 사교육비가 증가하면 이를 마련하기 위해 노동시장에 남아 
있으려는 유인이 있는 반면, 상위 소득계층에서는 사교육비가 늘어나게 되면 일부 기혼 여성들이 
노동시장 활동을 포기하고 집안에서 자녀교육을 위한 지원/지도하는 유인이 강하게 작용하는 
것으로 보인다 (Choi, 2008:99).   
 
